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After the Second World War the European continent stood divided between 
two clearly defined and competing systems of government, economic and social 
progress. Historians have repeatedly analyzed the formation of the Soviet bloc in the 
east, the subsequent superpower confrontation, and the resulting rise of Euro-Atlantic 
interconnection in the west. This dissertation provides a new view of how two 
borderlands steered clear of absorption into the Soviet bloc. It addresses the foreign 
relations of Yugoslavia and Finland with the Soviet Union and with each other 
between 1948 and 1958. Narrated here are their separate yet comparable and, to some 
extent, coordinated contests with the Soviet Union. Ending the presumed partnership 
with the Soviet Union, the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 launched Yugoslavia on a search 
for an alternative foreign policy, one that previously began before the split and helped 
to provoke it. After the split that search turned to avoiding violent conflict with the 
Soviet Union while creating alternative international partnerships to help the 
  
Communist state to survive in difficult postwar conditions. Finnish-Soviet relations 
between 1944 and 1948 showed the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that in order to avoid 
invasion, it would have to demonstrate a commitment to minimizing security risks to 
the Soviet Union along its European political border and to not interfering in the 
Soviet domination of domestic politics elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Following 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc, its party leadership increasingly granted 
the Foreign Ministry resources needed to establish a wider and more important range 
of diplomatic relations than those of any East European state. The placement of Tito’s 
closest associate Kardelj as Foreign Minister from August 1948 to January 1953 
carried the process forward. It created a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that produced 
political analysis independent from that of Tito’s own committee on foreign relations. 
By 1953, the ministry regarded the Finnish model of neutralism as a solution to the 
Yugoslav security dilemma. It came to abandon that in favor of the Non-Aligned 
Movement only after 1958, when it became clear that relations between Yugoslav and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
After the Second World War the European continent stood divided between 
two clearly defined and competing systems of government, economic and social 
progress. Historians have repeatedly analyzed the formation of the Soviet bloc in the 
east, the subsequent superpower confrontation, and the resulting rise of Euro-Atlantic 
interconnection in the west. The Cold War historiography of Europe between 1945 
and 1989 has focused almost exclusively on this two-sided confrontation. This largely 
Western scholarship has served to track the formation of the Soviet bloc in Eastern 
Europe: its function as defensive buffer-zone for Soviet security, its advantages for 
initial economic recovery, and its exclusionary role in filtering out influence from the 
West. This initial approach to the Cold War placed responsibility squarely on Josef 
Stalin’s wartime and postwar policies, his expansionist desire for a Communist 
takeover in Eastern Europe.1 By the 1960s, revisionists were presenting the United 
States also as an expansionist power that was seeking economic hegemony in 
Europe.2 Post-revisionists’ writing before and after the Communist collapse of 1989 
sees the Cold War more as a natural outcome of the Second World War that created a 
power vacuum from which two superpowers emerged.3 
                                                 
1 For example, William H McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953). 
2 For example, William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 3rd edition (New 
York: W. Norton &  Company, 1972). 
3 For example, John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the 




This dissertation provides a new view of how two borderlands steered clear of 
absorption into the Soviet bloc during the early Cold War. It addresses the foreign 
relations of Yugoslavia and Finland with the Soviet Union and with each other 
between 1948 and 1958. Much can be learned from their separate yet comparable 
and, to some extent, coordinated contests with the Soviet Union. Consider first the 
often-discussed expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Cominform in 1948 and its 
long-term consequences for the conduct of the Cold War in Europe.4 Ending the 
presumed partnership with the Soviet Union, the Tito-Stalin split launched 
Yugoslavia on its well analyzed search for the separate kind of Communist regime 
that came to be known as workers’ self-management.5 Much less attention has been 
paid to Yugoslavia’s search for an alternative foreign policy, one that previously 
unconsulted evidence suggests began before the split and helped to provoke it. After 
the split that search turned to avoiding violent conflict with the Soviet Union but 
while creating alternative international partnerships to help the still Communist state 
to survive in difficult postwar conditions. It will be argued that the Finnish 
formulation of a foreign policy of neutralism towards the Soviet Union quickly 
became an important example for Yugoslavia.6 Finnish-Soviet relations between 1944 
and 1948 showed the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that in order to avoid invasion, they 
would have to demonstrate a commitment to minimizing security risks to the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                           
For example, Melvyn Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War, 1917- 1953 (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). 
4 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). 
5 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: Published for the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London, by the University of California Press, 1977). 
6 Neutralism here is defined as a political strategy appropriate to the circumstances of the Cold War. 
The policy of neutralism in the Finnish case according to the formulation by Presidents J.K. Paasikivi 
and Urho Kekkonen meant that Finland established bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and 




Union along its European political border and to not interfering in the Soviet 
domination of domestic politics elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  
Presidents Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen developed Helsinki’s 
policy in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.7 Finnish neutralism 
came to be known as the ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line,’ after the two so-called “line 
men,” who drafted the policy in order to hold the line of the 800-mile long territorial 
Finnish-Soviet border, literarilally, against Soviet political or military invasion. 
Paasikivi and Kekkonen had concluded that this new strategy would be necessary for 
Finland to maintain its independence as the Cold War emerged. For Finland, 
neutralism meant limiting relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions to economic 
agreements, refraining from security alliances, limiting cooperation with Western 
intelligence agencies, and allowing a domestic Communist party to exist and be 
active. During the 1950s, along the same lines as this Finnish model, the Yugoslav 
leadership proceeded to expand Western economic relations, while demonstrating to 
the Soviets that Yugoslavia would never actively advocate that other East European 
states break from the bloc.   
How first Finland and then Yugoslavia decided to pursue “neutralism” as a 
common strategy for foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War, and 
then Yugoslavia after the split with Soviet Union in 1948 are an interesting questions. 
A more interesting one is how they both continued to do so through the 1950s, led by 
an autonomous Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and a Finnish President who were acting 
more independently than their respective political frameworks, Communist and multi-
party parliamentary, would lead us to expect. In the process, we shall see a surprising 
                                                 




coordination emerge between the Yugoslav and the Finnish Foreign Ministries on 
policies towards the Soviet Union. Their common focus on the European balance of 
power casts serious doubt on the long-standing Western, Russian and Yugoslav 
assumption of an early Tito-led turn to the Third World and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, led by Tito himself, as the center piece of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy by 
the mid-1950s. 
Finnish-Soviet and Yugoslav-Soviet exchanges also shared between Belgrade 
and Helsinki throughout the 1950s represent a unique feature of the Cold War Europe 
as seen through the lens of neutralism. At the core of Yugoslav policy and of the 
Belgrade-Helsinki dialogue was an ongoing negotiation over the Cold War in Europe. 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, Stalin viewed Soviet foreign policy in 
Europe as crucial to Soviet recovery from the war and its political and economic 
ascendancy in the future. Stalin’s approach (as well as that of Nikita Khrushchev who 
was to follow) was not to confine Soviet defense and foreign policy in Europe to East 
Central Europe. Most Cold War literature focuses exclusively on states that later 
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or signed the Warsaw Pact.  
However, Stalin’s postwar foreign policy targeted the entire Soviet territorial and 
political border, extending in the north to Finland and in the south to Yugoslavia, 
which shared a border with Soviet bloc states Hungary and Bulgaria. Soviet efforts to 
subjugate Finnish and Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies after 1945 were 
frustrated on several levels. Lack of ability to control political developments in 
Finland and Yugoslavia became a concern after 1948 when Yugoslavia succeeded in 




a treaty similar to those accepted by its emerging bloc regimes. Instead of an all-
encompassing Finnish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, the Soviets received only ‘a treaty without effective alliance’ in 1948. 
Moscow feared that both Helsinki and Belgrade might escape its grasp and actively 
join the West European bloc. Soviet attempts to dominate both the Helsinki and 
Belgrade governments resurfaced in 1956 and 1958.  
Stalin's death in 1953 generated a great deal of uncertainty for both Yugoslav 
and Finnish foreign policy. What was by then, their common neutralism had been 
based upon Stalin's foreign policy priorities. In 1953, it was unclear who would lead 
the Soviet Union, and whether Finnish and Yugoslav policies of neutralism would 
still be tolerated. Again in 1956, the Hungarian Revolution tested Yugoslav and 
Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Any significant support for Hungarian 
independence would have jeopardized the baselines of both Finnish and Yugoslav 
neutralism. In 1958, the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership, essentially Josip Broz 
'Tito' and Edvard Kardelj, again challenged neutral relations with the Soviet Union 
against the wishes of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry with theoretical criticism of 
Soviet Communism. That same year, the Finnish Social Democratic Party, through a 
newly formed coalition government with the Conservative Party, challenged the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line by expanding ties with the United States. After turning 
aside these challenges, Finland and Yugoslavia arrived at two different solutions in 
1961: Finland decided to seek economic security increasingly from Euro-Atlantic 
economic integration by joining the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).8 The 
                                                 
8 Finland became an Associate Member in 1961 and a full member in 1986, and giving up membership 




Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line survived, but only within this context of deepening Euro-
Atlantic trade relations, until the end of the Soviet control over Eastern Europe in 
1989. In 1961, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, frustrated by recurring rhetorical 
eruptions between the Yugoslav and the Soviet party leaderships, directed Yugoslav 
foreign policy away from Europe and towards neutralism through the Non-Aligned 
Movement. The inaugural conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in 
Belgrade in 1961. 
Before directing these introductory remarks to the myths of the early 
Yugoslav Non-Alignment and Finland's early domestic subordination, we need to 
review the historiography of the split itself, Western and Yugoslav (or successor), 
Soviet and Russian. This dissertation addresses issues raised by all of these 
historiographies, drawing on previously unconsulted archival sources to make its 
case. 
Western and Yugoslav Historiography of the Split 
According to initial Western scholarship on Yugoslavia, the split with the 
Soviets in the spring of 1948 was not ‘intended’ by the Tito-led regime. Its 
leadership, fresh from their Partisan triumph in the Second World War, had set out to 
follow the example set by the Soviet Union directly, virtually copying the Stalin 
constitution of 1936.9 Yet by the fall of 1944 Tito’s expansive and unwavering goal 
of leading a future Balkan Federation was also emerging without due Soviet 
coordination. By 1946 the Yugoslav leadership had dismissed the few personnel 
                                                 




trained in Moscow from its ranks, semi-privately discussed their dislike of Soviet 
influence, provocatively continued to support Greek Communist guerillas in Northern 
Greece, bickered over Trieste with the Allies, and continued to propagate anti-
Western rhetoric. As post-1989 research in Soviet archives makes clear, these 
provocations directly interfered with Stalin’s immediate post-war foreign policy goals 
– to speed Soviet recovery by prolonging a working relationship with the West and to 
expedite peace negotiations in order to secure war reparations. 10 Independent foreign 
policy initiatives by Yugoslav Communists questioned the Soviet Union’s primacy 
among Communist states. The strained relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet 
Communist leaderships spiralled into a dangerous open conflict in 1948. These 
Yugoslav initiatives and provocations led to the Soviet-Yugoslav split and to the 
Yugoslav security and economic dilemma posed by its geographic position between 
Soviet bloc states and NATO-member Italy.    
In the 60 years since the event, few detailed works have been written on the 
Tito-Stalin split, and only one focused directly on foreign relations following the 
split. Vladimir Dedijer’s The Battle Stalin Lost in Serbo-Croatian as well, argued in 
1970 that Yugoslavia was, through no desire or fault of its own, expelled 
unexpectedly from the Communist bloc by Stalin.11 In 1975 Čedomir Štrbac’s Sukob 
KPJ i Informbiroa (The Conflict between the CPY and the Cominform) concentrated 
on the anti-Yugoslav acts and tactics pursued by the Soviets through their satellites 
                                                 
10 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 34-35, 54. 





against Yugoslavia after the split and the eventual normalization of relations.12  
Ranko Petković’s 1998 edited volume 1948: Jugoslavija I Kominform has now 
reviewed the split with support from documents published in Yugoslavia and in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States volumes.13 From Zagreb in 1988, Darko 
Bekić’s Jugoslavija u Hladnom Ratu (Yugoslavia in the Cold War) put the Tito-Stalin 
split within the context of US-Yugoslav relations and of Soviet-Yugoslav exchanges.  
Western scholarship on the split has also been limited. Only Adam Ulam’s 
Titoism and the Cominform (1952), Milovan Djilas’s Conversations with Stalin 
(1962), and Ivo Banac’s With Stalin against Tito (1988) focus on the split itself, but 
only Alvin Rubinstein’s Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (1970) concentrated 
on foreign relations in the 1950s and beyond.14 Subsequent memoirs by Edvard 
Kardelj and a major Yugoslav diplomat reinforced Rubinstein’s argument for an early 
Yugoslav turn to the Non-Aligned Movement and Tito’s leading role therein.15 
Prevalent since the dissolution of multinational Yugoslavia into ethnic nation-states 
or units have been histories of the constituent nations of Yugoslavia. They have left 
Titoist foreign policy largely unexamined. Its study has also been hindered by the 
location of the Yugoslav archives in Belgrade, which has experienced political 
                                                 
12 Čedomir Štrbac, Jugoslavija i Odnosi Izmedju Socijalističkih Zemalja: Sukob KPJ I Informbiroa. 
(Belgrade: Instituta  za Medjunarodnu Politiku I Privredu, 1975). 
13Ranko Petković, 1948: Jugoslavija i Kominform – pedeset godina kasnije. (Belgrade: Medjunarodna 
Politika, 1998).  
14 Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform ; Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962); Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav 
Communism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the 
Nonaligned World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
15 Leo Mates, Medjunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije. (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976). 
    Edvard Kardelj, Sećanja. Borba za priznanje I nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije, 1944-1957. (Ljubljana 




instability since 1989. Access to the archives in Belgrade has been restricted and 
limited.16  
 These previous accounts, with the exception of Rubinstein’s, as noted 
above, focused on the question whether the Tito-Stalin split was intentional or 
accidental from the Yugoslav perspective, on the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations 
leading-up to the split, and just on what role the Yugoslav defection played in the 
tightening up of the East European regimes. In 1952, Adam Ulam introduced the 
argument that despite Tito’s ongoing plans for primacy in the Balkans, his party 
leadership were completely surprised by their expulsion from the Cominform in June 
1948. Accepting Belgrade’s official account, Ulam argued that because of the 
wartime sacrifices and Communist commitment shared with the Soviet Union, the 
Yugoslavs could not have dreamed of purposefully criticizing or defying their great 
ally, even in 1948.17 Echoing Ulam’s view are testimonies of great surprise at the split 
from important party figures, as described by Vladimir Dedijer in his diary.18  
Ulam’s work presented the now difficult to sustain view that the Yugoslavs 
did very little to provoke the split. His account acknowledged, yet dismissed, both 
private and semi-public expressions of negative feelings towards the Soviets within 
Tito’s leadership. He emphasized instead Stalin’s failed attempt to purge Tito’s 
                                                 
16 See for example, Radonja Leposavić, vlasTito iskustvo past present. (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 
2005,) 8-9. ; Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, 31, 38. 
 
18 Vladimir Dedijer, Dnevnik 1-3 (Belgrade: Drzavni izdavac ̌ki zavod Jugoslavije, 1945-1950). 
    Later accounts echoing Dedijer’s account: Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin. (New York: 
Harcourt, Bruce & World, 1962); Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences: the Struggle for Recognition and 
Independence: the New Yugoslavia, 1944-1957. (London: Blond & Briggs in association with 




followers in the party and army, joining Djilas in noting the resemblance of these 
methods to those of the late 1930s purges in the Soviet Union.19  
Ulam’s lasting contribution is his identification of the Yugoslav Partisans and 
their Communist leadership’s elevated role amongst the ‘People’s Democracies’ of 
Eastern Europe. Wartime casualties and eventual successes made Yugoslavia a 
natural leader among the Communist parties in post-war Eastern Europe, despite the 
greater economic importance of Czechoslovakia and Poland.20 Unlike these countries, 
Yugoslavia had fought and won the war with a homegrown Communist movement 
and a native leader, with only late Soviet assistance. Tito’s wartime performance and 
his potential popularity within Eastern Europe appeared to threaten Stalin’s primacy 
throughout Eastern Europe after the war. Ulam’s account emphasizes the pragmatism 
and lack of ideological consistency in Stalin’s policies during the Second World War 
and immediately after as a postwar dilemma. During the war, for example, Stalin had 
endorsed British attempts to persuade the Partisans to recognize the royal Yugoslav 
government in exile in London. Stalin’s efforts to diminish domestic Communist 
predominance were never admitted in the postwar environment in which Tito and the 
Partisans claimed their due recognition. Indeed, Ulam suggests that Stalin may have 
feared that the Yugoslavs would make this information public. Without reference to 
Stalin’s fears or Yugoslav provocation, Denison Rusinow’s 1977 study does point to 
the impossibility of any Soviet accommodation to separate Yugoslav initiatives after 
                                                 
19 Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, 189; Djilas, Conversations with Stalin. 




the 1947 Sklaraska Poreba meeting that established the Communist bloc and the 
Cominform; an unplanned response to the escalating Cold War.21  
Ivo Banac’s later 1988 volume agrees that the Yugoslavs were surprised by 
the Soviet attack in 1948, but says they should not have been. He goes on to argue 
that serious conflict between the CPY and the Soviets had already been 
acknowledged during the war. In 1941, the Soviets contemplated recognizing the 
German partition of Yugoslavia that had resulted from the Axis occupation.22 
Drawing on early disagreements between Tito’s leadership and Stalin, Banac 
highlights the Partisans’ overzealous, hard left attitude during the war. While Stalin 
embraced a broad form of Russian nationalism as a rallying call during the war 
(reversing the Marxist-Leninist rejection of ethnic nationalism), the Partisans adhered 
strictly to the iconography of international Communism. Banac, like Ulam, draws on 
wartime experiences to make postwar conclusions. According to Banac, the Yugoslav 
Partisan takeover embraced none of the tolerance of a multiparty coalition that Stalin 
initially advocated as the war ended. Banac is the only historian of the Tito-Stalin 
conflict to refer to Finland, although in cursory fashion. He notes that at the first 
meeting of the Cominform in Szklarska Poreba in September 1947 Andrei Zhdanov 
grouped Finland within the cluster of anti-Fascist “new democracies.”23 Banac 
therefore infers a Soviet desire in 1947 to include Finland, like Yugoslavia, within the 
Soviet bloc. While it is problematic to recognize any sincerity in the call for the 
“restoration of democratic liberties” in Stalinist foreign policy after 1946, Banac’s 
work does spell out the separate and provocative way Yugoslav foreign policy was 
                                                 
21 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974, 23. 
22 Banac, With Stalin against Tito. 4-6. 




itself going even before 1947. He also calls attention to the early employment of 
Yugoslav Administration for State Security (UDBa) as a tool of foreign policy. 
Already in 1946, it was the UDBa that provided arms to the Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE) in the second round of the Greek Civil War.24 Between 1945 and 1948, 
the postwar Communist leadership continued to act according to its wartime Partisan 
ethos, where the primacy of ultimate political goals for independence from outside 
political pressure and determination to build a one-party Communist state at any cost 
trumped all else. The split with the Soviets, he concludes, may not have been 
intended but was an inevitable consequence of both the Partisan leadership’s 
overextended, unrealistic political goals and its political behavior.  
 None of this limited set of volumes on the split discusses the regional or 
international consequences of Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc. Prior to 
the split, the confident Communist leadership had not paid much attention to foreign 
policy, considering its territorial claims in Trieste and support of the KKE as 
domestic matters as initiatives that the Soviets would readily stand behind. Then, 
expulsion from the Soviet bloc quickly forced the Yugoslav regime to seek security in 
relations with non-Communist countries.25 Entirely absent from both Western and 
domestic historiography of Yugoslavia is any discussion of how the Finnish 
formulation of neutralism (between 1944 and 1948) as its policy toward the Soviet 
Union and Western Europe set an important example for Yugoslavia from 1948 
forward.  
 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 35. 





Recent Soviet and Russian Historiography of the Split 
Earlier work on the Tito-Stalin split was done largely in the absence of official 
Soviet documents. While Kardelj and Djilas provided first-hand accounts of the 
events from within Tito’s immediate circle, both works function as biographies 
intended to deliver unambiguous political messages. Ivo Banac’s only primary 
sources are the Croatian and Macedonian Party archives, the Institute for the History 
of the Workers Movement of Croatia and some Soviet sources from the Hoover 
Institute before the Soviet Archives were opened. He includes no documents from the 
Yugoslav federal archives.  
In contrast, since the end of the Soviet Union work by Russian historians has 
focused narrowly on foreign policy documents from the archives. The so-called “let 
the documents speak” approach, described by Norman Naimark in his two essays on 
post-Soviet Russian historiography, has been applied to the Tito-Stalin split and 
presents facts emerging from archival party documents alone.26 Attempts to analyze 
Soviet goals and policy towards Yugoslavia beyond what is directly stated in these 
documents (now compiled into large Russian volumes on Eastern Europe) are less 
frequent. By limiting themselves to the details in the documents, Russian scholars 
attempt to minimize the ideological agendas that distorted scholarly work in the 
Soviet period. Only very broad positions relevant to Soviet engagement in Eastern 
Europe immediately after the war are developed in current Russian scholarship on the 
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Tito-Stalin conflict. The collections of documents assembled by T.V. Volokitina et. 
al. join Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov’s volume Inside the Kremlin’s 
Cold War to argue that the forceful subjugation of East European governments was 
not Stalin’s goal in the immediate postwar period. 27 
The Tito-Stalin conflict is viewed as the result of failed Soviet attempts to 
contain Tito’s aggressive regional territorial advances in the Balkans. According to 
the Volokitina volumes, Stalin feared that Eastern Europe might defy the Soviet 
Union if inspired by Western collusion with Yugoslavia. Documents published from 
the Soviet archives reveal an awareness that in many East European countries the 
public had not reacted well to the news of the expulsion of the CPY from the 
Cominform in June 1948.28  The Volokitina studies on the split clearly describe 
Soviet strategy toward Yugoslavia as part of a broader plan for Eastern Europe 
illustrating the Soviet interpretation of the region’s interconnectedness. By this view, 
Moscow’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the West was pragmatic but the Communist 
political elites in Eastern Europe at this time pushed ahead to adopt the political 
systems under Soviet sponsorship that eventually became a burden to the Soviet 
Union. They were therefore also partially responsible for their adoption.29 
In contrast to Volokitina, the veteran Russian historian Vladimir Gibianskii 
repeatedly engaged with the Tito-Stalin split and insists that Soviet hegemony over 
the East European Communist parties had already been defined as a primary goal 
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during the war.30 Gibianskii also disputes Banac by arguing that, for the Yugoslav 
leadership, the Soviet Union was a “natural center” and its primary source of 
necessary political support during the postwar period.31 The crux of Gibianskii’s 
argument is that the Yugoslavs and the Soviets were close allies and partners “right 
down to the beginning of 1948”.32 While he concludes that the Soviet Union gave 
other East European countries even less favorable evaluations at this time, his sources 
nevertheless testify to a conflictual relationship between the Yugoslav and Soviet 
leaderships.  
Gibianskii argues that the notion of an increasingly negative Soviet view of 
Yugoslav leaders as early as the fall of 1947 was generated primarily by reports 
originating from the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade Anatolii Lavrentev. His reports 
identified an increase in nationalist Yugoslav propaganda and overestimation of 
military and Communist credentials from the Second World War.33 Even then, the 
head of the Balkan division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, Aleksandr 
Lavrishchev, repudiated Lavrentev’s claims in a telegram to Viacheslav Molotov as 
late as October 1947.34 Gibianskii’s conclusion can thus be contested, but his 
publication of Soviet documents includes persuasive details left out of most 
monographs on Yugoslavia. 
In addition to uncertainties about the background to the split, the opening of 
the Soviet archives has provided a broader perspective on Soviet foreign policy and 
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Stalin’s political circle.35 Drawing on these documents and memoirs, A. S. Anikeev’s 
2002 study Kak Tito ot Stalin Ushel (How Tito Walked Away from Stalin) has 
concentrated on the triangular relations between Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the 
United States in the early Cold War. 36  According to Anikeev, the Partisan leadership 
already made plans during the war for a future policy that would allow for Yugoslavia 
to play a leading role in the region. Anikeev strongly denies any surprise at the Tito-
Stalin split or early pretense for Yugoslav obedience to Soviet leadership. He 
describes Tito as “arrogant” for interfering with the traditional hierarchical relations 
between Communist parties that were subjects to the Soviet party. Before the split, 
Anikeev argues that the Kremlin and Stalin had unwittingly acknowledged the 
Yugoslav claim for primacy by “entrusting” it with control over political leadership in 
Albania and allowed Tito to support the Greek Communist insurgency. It has not 
been claimed elsewhere that Stalin willingly supported Yugoslav aid to the Greek 
Communists. Anikeev further argues that these privileges were not to be 
misinterpreted, as perhaps Tito did, to mean that Moscow was granting Yugoslavia a 
free hand in the Balkans. Anikeev maintains that the Yugoslav-American 
rapprochement followed the split largely as a consequence of necessity for 
Yugoslavia to overcome the economic blockade. Anikeev, like Volokitina and other 
Russian contemporaries, sharply criticize Stalin’s program of expansion into Eastern 
Europe after the war, considered as ‘the West’. Anikeev ascribes this approach to 
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Bolshevik ‘messianism’ and old Russian imperial plans of expanding influence in the 
Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. After the Second World War it could rely on 
growing military strength and the new Cominform. These Russian historians today 
see an unfortunate causal relationship between postwar Soviet expansion into Eastern 
Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.37 Anikeev’s focus on Soviet 
goals in the Balkans instead of East Central Europe makes his work important for the 
examination of the Tito-Stalin split.  
 
The Non-Alignment Myth in the Historiography of 
Yugoslavia 
Despite the differences just noted, Western, Yugoslav and Russian scholarship 
on Yugoslavia has agreed that Yugoslav foreign policy was from the Tito-Stalin split 
forward built around a concept of Non-Alignment linked to non-European states and 
already formulated by 1955. Some accounts even extend this period to include a 
1948-point of origin. The former British Ambassador Duncan Wilson, traces the roots 
back to 1948 and to Tito. Wilson argues that,  
It was at this time [1958-1961] that Tito began to develop more 
systematically than before the policy of ‘non-alignment’ in order to 
strengthen Yugoslavia’s international position. From 1949 onwards 
the Yugoslavs had been constrained by circumstances to work 
towards some such policy. They were anathema to the Soviet bloc, 
and did not wish to ally themselves too closely with the West. Their 
best hope of diplomatic support lay in developing connections with 
the Asian and later African countries which were also trying to 
assert their independence…38  
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Wilson argues that Haile Selassie’s visit to Belgrade in 1954 and Tito’s visit to 
Ethiopia in 1955 paved the way to Non-Alignment: “From this point on, Tito’s own 
propensity for foreign travel and talent for diplomacy contributed much to the form of 
Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment.”39  
In existing scholarship, Yugoslav foreign policy during the 1950s is 
considered synonymous with the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. The 
major Western work supporting such mythic importance for the Non-Alignment is 
Alvin Rubinstein’s aforementioned 1970 volume. Despite its title, Yugoslavia and the 
Non-Aligned World, Rubinstein traces the beginning of Yugoslav Non-Alignment to 
the Asian Socialist Conference of 1952, Nehru’s subsequent drafting of Indian Non-
Alignment, and the Bandung Conference of 1955.40 Yugoslavia was not a participant 
in any of these initiatives, only sending an observer delegation to the Asian Socialist 
Conference and no one to the Bandung Conference.  
 Rubinstein argues that the Yugoslav leadership did not immediately seek 
partnership with the formerly colonized countries in 1948 because they counted the 
economic dependence of these countries upon former colonizers as decisive. He 
maintains that the independent positions of Burma, India and Egypt with regard to the 
Korean War changed this perception.  
More than any single event, the Korean War wrought a major 
change in Yugoslav views of the newly independent nations. 
Hitherto accepted assumptions came under searching review. 
Thus, the belief that economic dependence meant political 
subservience was contravened by the independent positions 
which nations such as India, Burma, and Egypt adopted towards 
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the Korean War, despite their continued close and dependent 
economic links to the former metropole.41 
 
Rubinstein admits Yugoslavia’s absence from the Bandung Conference but argues 
that its failure left Yugoslavia to become “a major beneficiary of the Conference’s 
inability to establish a workable basis for cooperation.”42 Tito was supposedly able to 
turn his early absence from a failed attempt at Non-Alignment to Yugoslavia’s 
advantage: “more than any other country, Yugoslavia helped to make of Bandung a 
prologue to political action rather than a footnote to futility.”43 Tito did invite Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and Jawaharalal Nehru to Brioni in 1956. Rubinstein equates Yugoslav 
foreign policy with Tito’s personal initiatives, and ignores the fact that, as noted 
below, Nasser came with his political authority yet to be established and Nehru with a 
narrower Asian agenda. Except for limited attention to Yugoslavia’s relations with 
Italy, Rubinstein focuses solely on the non-European members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. There is no discussion of Finnish or Austrian parallels in relations with 
the Soviet Union. 
Fred Singleton, a leading British historian of Yugoslavia, simply assumes that 
Non-Alignment was born of the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, and was fully in place 
through the 1950s. He concludes, “The non-aligned policy was the cornerstone of 
Yugoslavia’s foreign relations during the decade between the early 1950s and the 
early 1960s, and its high watermark was the Belgrade conference of 1961.”44 The 
most recent American scholarship does not challenge this view. Sabrina Ramet boils 
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Yugoslav foreign policy during this period down to a single paragraph, commenting 
that  
The third leg in the triad – nonalignment – emerged in the mid-1950s, 
as Tito collaborated with Third World leaders, such as Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdal al-Nasir and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, to develop a nonaligned 
movement in which member states would abjure both the passive role 
of unaligned or neutral states and any affiliation with either the Soviet 
bloc or the American-sponsored Atlantic Alliance.45  
 
John Lampe similarly concludes, “The emergence of a coordinated policy between 
these founding members [of the Non-Aligned Movement] dated from Tito’s 1956 
meeting with Nehru and the man who became his closest associate among these 
leaders, President Gaman Abdel Nasser of Egypt.”46 
Tito did travel a great deal and his ambiguous statements, for example in 1955 
that “the uncommitted countries were Yugoslavia’s true allies and greatest friends,” 
have been cited as proof of an already then formed policy of Non-Alignment.47 Yet 
they have not been enough to determine the Yugoslav direction as more than as 
“some such policy.”48 Overlooking the crucial advantage taken from the 1954 
establishment of trade relations with Italy, Duncan Wilson for instance argues that by 
1955 Tito was leaning towards non-European Non-Alignment for economic reasons. 
He does admit that only two percent of Yugoslav trade in 1954 was with ‘developing 
countries.’ This number shows no clear advantage.49  
On the Russian side, Anikeev calls the Yugoslav leadership’s increased fear of 
Soviet invasion a consequence of the Korean War. As for the normalization of 
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Yugoslav-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s, Anikeev emphasizes the firm Yugoslav 
commitment to a position outside the Warsaw Pact. Anikeev joins Western scholars 
in arguing that by 1955 Tito had begun to actively pursue foreign connections with 
Third World leaders.50 Concluding his study in 1957, a year after the Hungarian 
Revolution, Anikeev claims that by this time Tito had fully developed his 
commitment to the Third World. He makes no mention of Yugoslavia’s Foreign 
Ministry, let alone acknowledging the Ministry’s possibly separate role. 
 There are few domestic works on Yugoslavia’s Non-Alignment. First 
Radovan Radonjić’s in Izgubljena Orientacija (Lost Orientation) in 1985, and now 
Dragan Bogetić’s Nova Strategija Spojlne Politike Jugoslavije 1956-1961 (The New 
Strategy of Yugoslav Foreign Policy) in 2007, argue that the Yugoslav foreign policy 
was seeking African and Asian partners as early as the Bandung Conference of 1955, 
considering it Yugoslavia’s first foreign policy initiative, and ignoring the fact that 
Yugoslavia did not even send an observer.51 Both of their arguments rely heavily on 
the retrospective account on Non-Alignment’s “Historic Steps” from Kardelj, the 
party’s chief ideologue.52 
Indeed, the historiography of Yugoslav Non-Alignment has been heavily 
influenced by the personal accounts of Kardelj and Tito’s biographer Vladimir 
Dedijer. Wilson speaks of Yugoslav foreign policy much as it is framed in their 
two person accounts: determined by Tito alone and having a great effect on world 
politics.  
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“[Tito’s] pursuit of ‘non-alignment and efforts to co-ordinate the 
policies of non-aligned (mainly Asian and African) states have also 
had their importance on world scale. They have to some extent 
determined the shape of the confrontation or co-operation between 
‘North’ and ‘South’ – the more and less developed countries of the 
world – on questions of investment and trade.”53  
 
In the much cited accounts of Kardelj and Dedijer, the world needs Tito. Fortified by 
his cult of personality and his reputation as a great East European leader in the 
Second World War, Tito alone could have influenced international affairs. Neither 
Kardelj nor Dedijer mentions the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry once. Nor do they even 
identify Koča Popović, the long-term Foreign Minister (1953-1966). Only in the case 
of Kardelj this is understandable, as he viewed Popović as his primary competitor in 
shaping Yugoslav foreign policy.  
In Kardelj’s ideological frame of reference, Yugoslavia played an influential 
part in determining how far Non-Alignment should be equated with anti-imperialism 
and  anti-colonialism, which in turn determined how far the movement was accepted 
by Soviet leaders.54 This approach to Non-Alignment fails to explain how and why 
there came to be so many Yugoslav embassies and consulates world-wide, that their 
purpose was to create bilateral ties outside the Soviet Union and to counter the effects 
of Soviet influence and propaganda on Yugoslavia. Kardelj only briefly remarks that, 
“The circumstances [from 1948] demanded that we maintain a particularly strong 
diplomatic service …in that way we were able to extend our activities in various 
countries as well as institutions and organizations.”55 But countering the notion that 
Yugoslav diplomacy was concentrating on contacts with Asian and African states in 
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the nascent Non-Aligned Movement, the Foreign Ministry sent delegations to tour 
Latin American states in 1946, 1949, 1954 and 1958. The goal of these visits to 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela was the extension of trade and political ties beyond 
Asia and Africa exclusively. 
The conflict of interest between the Yugoslav Communist Party and its 
Foreign Ministry simply does not appear in the existing scholarship. The Ministry 
receives no separate attention. Summing up the Yugoslav Non-Alignment myth, Fred 
Singleton writes,  
The policy of non-alignment was the obvious one for Yugoslavia to 
take when she was cast out of the Cominform. It has been particularly 
associated with President Tito, who was clearly the inspirer of the 
series of non-aligned summit conferences. His tireless personal 
diplomacy, which included long journeys to Africa, Asia and Latin 
America during the 1960s, indicates the great importance he attaches 
to Yugoslavia’s role in the Third World.56  
 
This dissertation argues that the case for an established Yugoslav role in the 
emerging Non-Aligned Movement by 1957 is hard to sustain. Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
Prime Minister of India since its partition in 1947 visited Yugoslavia briefly in 1956 
in the context of the Suez Crisis and later concurrently with his visit to the Soviet 
Union in 1958. His 1958 visit was not to Belgrade alone, and its purpose was not 
connected to the Non-Aligned Movement alone. In 1954, Nehru had begun to address 
the development of a foreign policy of Non-Alignment for India but within the 
context of Sino-Indian relations. The principles defining this policy included ‘mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty’ and ‘mutual non-aggression’. Nehru 
                                                 




thereupon used the term ‘Non-Alignment’ to describe bilateral relations between 
India and China. In 1955, 29 Asian and African states convened at the Bandung 
Conference in Indonesia to discuss their position in relation to the developing two-
bloc Cold War. The conference was organized by Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka), Indonesia, India and Pakistan. Yugoslavia was not invited to this meeting of 
Asian and African states. Gamal Abdil Nasser did participate in the meeting. He had 
become Prime Minister of Egypt only in 1954, and President in 1956. His founding of 
the United Arab Republic in 1958 with Syria preoccupied him until it collapsed in 
1961. Nasser’s partnership was not fully available to Tito until 1961. Only then did he 
turn to Tito’s Yugoslavia. The three founding leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
Nasser, Nehru and Tito, did meet briefly on Brioni in July 1956 and at the United 
Nations in New York in October 1960. The Brioni meeting is often cited as the one 
that led to the Non-Aligned Movement but  the reason for the meeting was the 
building Egyptian conflict with Britain over Suez.57 The Brioni communiqué issued at 
the meeting identifies three areas of concern, “the Far East, the Middle East and 
Western Europe.”58 It is telling that European issues are included, in particular vague 
references to the unification of Germany. The insertion of this topic relevant only to 
Yugoslavia suggests that no singular focus towards Asia and Africa is present yet in 
1956. The first inaugural conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held only in 
September 1961 in Belgrade.  
 Against the Non-Alignment myth, this dissertation argues that following 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc, the Yugoslav party leadership 
                                                 





increasingly granted its Foreign Ministry resources needed to establish a wider and 
more important range of diplomatic relations than those of any East European state. 
Extensive allocation of personnel, funding and the placement of Tito’s closest 
associate Kardelj as Foreign Minister from August 1948 to January 1953 carried the 
process forward. It created a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that produced political 
analysis independent from that of Tito’s own committee on foreign relations – the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia Commission for International Relations. By 
1953, the ministry explicitly regarded the Finnish model of neutralism as a solution to 
the Yugoslav security dilemma. It came to abandon that in favor of the Non-Aligned 
Movement only after 1958, when it became clear that relations between Yugoslav and 
Soviet parties would not be harmonious even after rapprochement. 
 
Finlandization versus the Finnish Myth of Neutralism 
Scholarship on postwar Finland, like Soviet and now Russian historiography, 
is highly politicized. ‘Finlandization’ as a pejorative notion from 1966, developed 
when the term was coined by German political scientist Richard Lowenthal as 
signifying a partial membership in the Soviet bloc.59 For critics such as Walter 
Laqueur, Finlandization came by the 1970s to mean that the new East-West détente 
might tempt other states to follow the Finnish pattern of avoiding NATO membership 
and accepting Soviet monitoring of foreign policy as including interference in 
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domestic politics.60 Laqueur defined Finlandization as “that process or state of affairs 
in which, under the cloak of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty 
of a country becomes reduced.”61 According to him, Finland was not a unique case 
but a dangerous precedent. He argued against those who in the 1970s believed that 
“Western Europe, at all events, so far has little to fear from Finlandization, certainly 
less than do Russia's East European satellites.” Laqueur pointed out that while after 
the Second World War Finland did not become a Soviet republic, a price was paid. 
Finland became a neutral country, but not vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, to which it had 
special obligations. The Kremlin required that Finland “must not oppose any major 
Soviet foreign policy initiative, or enter into any commitments without Soviet 
approval.” 62  The size of Finland's army was limited by Soviet standards. Only 
political parties approved by the Soviet Union could participate in government. We 
shall return in the Conclusion to Laqueur’s concern as clearly supportable only for the 
period 1958-1961. Alternative postwar accounts praise the maintenance of domestic 
independence against the military power of its neighbor, also highlighting Finland’s 
‘heroic’ war efforts against the Soviet Union during the Second World War. As with 
the historiography of Yugoslavia, critical examination of the 1950s is largely absent. 
Finland’s European Union (EU) membership in 1995 has focused attention on 
political developments since 1961, tracking the Finnish road towards the EU. The 
period of neutralism in the 1950s is neglected in favor of Finland’s role in the détente 
of the late 1970s between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in the drafting 
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of the Helsinki Agreement that created the Organization on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) in 1975. 
  Finnish scholarship tends to exaggerate the historical basis for neutralism. 
Jukka Nevakivi’s journal article “Finland and the Cold War” even dates Finnish 
political inclinations toward neutralism back to balancing between Prussian and 
Russian influences in the 1780s, before Finland’s absorption into the Russian empire 
in 1809. 63 More realistically, neutralism emerged as an outcome of the ‘Kekkonen-
Paasikivi Line’– a strategy in Finnish foreign policy drafted at the end of the Second 
World War, that sought to recognize that Finland’s existence had always depended on 
relations with Sweden and Russia. Nevakivi also argued that neutralism’s 
foundational role lay “in the present philosophy of the nation”, i.e. Finland’s 
commitment to democracy.64  Nevakivi asserts that parliamentary democracy and a 
super-presidential system were also the foundations of neutralism. However, 
President Kekkonen created the Finnish super-presidential system only in 1958, after 
the Kremlin suspended relations with Finland and following the formation of a Social 
Democratic-Conservative government. Kekkonen could thereby oversee and maintain 
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line beyond the influence of the Finnish parliament. Yet 
Nevakivi argues that parliamentary democracy was not compromised by neutralism, 
even if foreign policy priorities were. The limited scholarship on the period discusses 
how and why the events of 1948, namely the signing of the Agreement on Friendship, 
Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with the Soviets did not lead to a Soviet 
                                                 






takeover. There has been no discussion of the subsequent Yugoslav-Finnish exchange 
and mutual interest in each others’ relations with the Soviet Union.  
Two further accounts were written in the 1980s, but without full access to 
Finnish archival sources and with none to the Soviet ones. Max Jacobsen in Finland: 
Myth and Reality (1987) analyzes how and why Finland utilized the policy of 
neutralism to become a stabilized, democratic polity.65 Jacobsen does not, however, 
construct a historical narrative of Finnish-Soviet relations as Nevakivi does, but 
stresses contingency, the influence of international events on Soviet foreign policy 
and their beneficial influence on Finnish-Soviet relations. Roy Allison describes 
postwar Finnish-Soviet relations as a matter of pragmatic co-existence since 1948.66 
While Jacobson, a Finnish career diplomat, had been privy to policy documents 
within the Finnish Foreign Ministry, he had no access to the Presidential Archives of 
Urho Kekkonen. They had been retained by his family and were closed until the late 
1990s. Neither account examines neutralism with reference to bilateral relations 
beyond the Soviet-Finnish case; with regard to Yugoslavia this is a critical omission.  
The secondary literature on the very long presidency of Urho Kekkonen from 
1956 to 1981 is clearly divided into accounts sympathetic to him and those 
challenging both his “super-Presidency” and the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line from the 
point of view of the Finnish Social Democratic Party. The historian recognized as 
most sympathetic to Kekkonen’s persona and, therefore, also to the Finnish policy of 
neutralism is Juhani Suomi. With Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976 he examines the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line emphasizing its constructive role in the politics of détente 
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politics between the US and the USSR.67 Timo Vihavainen’s Kansakunta 
Rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia (A Nation on its Forehead: A Short 
History of Finlandization) describes the 1970s as the culmination of Finlandization 
under the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.68 However, Vihavainen argues that the Kremlin 
sought to influence Finnish domestic politics and that the causes of Finlandization as 
a whole were internal. Kekkonen in return sought to use Finnish-Soviet relations to 
strengthen his own domestic position. 
 What is the myth of postwar Finnish neutralism and why was it constructed? 
According to this myth Finland, since 1945 was a republic with a parliamentary 
democracy that functioned without Soviet control. According to this representation, 
the Kremlin was not able to effectively influence the outcome of Finnish 
parliamentary or presidential elections, and Soviet-Finnish relations did not dominate 
Finnish foreign relations. This myth was created to maintain an untarnished 
reputation for President Kekkonen and support a positive view of Finnish democracy. 
Although Kekkonen remained as President from 1956 to 1981, this unbroken tenure 
and unchecked authority in foreign relations is supposed to have worked strictly to 
the advantage of Finnish parliamentary democracy.  
 This dissertation argues that while President Paasikivi had in 1948 involved 
the Finnish Parliament directly in deciding the course of Finnish-Soviet relations, 
Kekkonen withdrew this oversight from the Parliament in 1958. By breaking up the 
Social Democratic-Conservative government that challenged the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line, and erecting in its place a minority government from of his own party, 
                                                 
67 Juhani Suomi, Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976: Liennytyksen akanvirrassa (Helsinki: Otava, 1998). 




Kekkonen maintained Finnish foreign policy of neutralism, but allowed the Kremlin 
to influence Finnish domestic – not foreign—politics. The Finlandization theory is 
therefore supported in arguing that the Kremlin influenced Finnish politics during the 
course of the Cold War. As we shall see, however, this influence did not appear until 
after 1958. Without the powerful threat of Soviet invasion, Kekkonen would not have 
survived as President for twenty-five years. He would not have been able to break the 
government in 1958.  
 The myth of benign Finnish neutralism, like the Yugoslav myth of early 
Non-Alignment, is centered around the head of state. Both Kekkonen in Finland and 
Tito in Yugoslavia came to be venerated as grand political leaders that defeated the 
Soviet threat without shots being fired. These images resonate in the age of nuclear 
weapons and in the far longer period in which we are tempted to explain a country’s 
foreign relations as the policies of a single striking persona. The desire to protect the 
legacies of these two personas has remained.  It is partly for this reason that it is 
difficult to gain entry to the Presidential archives of Tito and Kekkonen. 
Soviet-Finnish and Soviet-Yugoslav Relations -- 
Yugoslavia’s Northern Connection 
This dissertation engages two broad themes: the formation of the policy of 
neutralism in Finland and in Yugoslavia during the early Cold War (1948-1958), and 
the history of their diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, led by Yugoslavia’s 
surprisingly independent Foreign Ministry and left by Finland’s Foreign Ministry to 




either country’s Foreign Ministry. Some former members of the Yugoslav ministry 
have offered insight. In his Subjektivna Istorija Jugoslovenske Diplomatije 1943-
1991, Ranko Petković provides portraits of the most influential Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministers including Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović and Marko Nikežić.69 Mita 
Miljković and Arso Milatović draw on their personal diaries describing their daily 
work as Yugoslav Ambassadors in the 1950s in Sofia, Bucharest and Warsaw 
respectively.70 Similarly, a Finnish language History of The Foreign Ministry, Volume 
1, 1918-1956 offers short biographies of Finnish diplomats and their work.71  
 The general aim of this dissertation is to revise our understanding of the 
long-term consequences of the Tito-Stalin split. The Tito-Stalin split stands out as an 
unexpected development in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It is 
generally accepted that the split had far-reaching consequences for the internal 
development of Yugoslavia. Largely neglected in scholarly literature are the ways in 
which the split not only broadened, but also changed the practice of Yugoslavia’s 
foreign policy. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, as is well known, the split served as a 
warning to Communist regimes under direct Soviet control. Along its long northern 
border with Finland, Soviet foreign policy faced another independent government 
whose separate interests in neutralism and independent relations with Yugoslavia 
created a complex and less manageable dynamic. That historically neglected 
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dynamic predates Yugoslavia’s turn to the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third 
World after 1961.  
 My inquiry draws on the archives of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet 
Union and Finland. They range from the Archive of the Office of the President Josip 
Broz ‘Tito,’ the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro and the Archive of the Foreign 
Ministry of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, to the Archive of the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
and the Archive of the Finnish Protection Police in Helsinki. The Archive of the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry has been previously opened to two foreign scholars. The 
Finnish Protection Police archive gives permission to selected scholars. At the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry archive I consulted special files that contain the transcripts 
of President Paasikivi’s exchanges with his cabinet during the 1948 negotiations for 
the Finnish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. I 
also consulted the Archive of President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen in Orimattila, 
Finland. I was granted special permission from Kekkonen’s family to read 
Kekkonen’s diary from which only selected entries have been published. I consulted 
documents from the Foreign Ministry Archive of the Russian Federation (Arhiv 
vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii AVP RF), some of which are referred to in the 
collections of documents published by T.V. Volokitina and others. In addition I 
consulted documents from the post-Stalin years not published in these volumes. I 
have also been able to consult documents from the Russian State Archive of Socio-
Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii 




Preservation and Study of Records of Modern History, here referenced by its original 
acronym, RTsKhIDNI. 
  This study is comprised of five thematic chapters. Chapter 1 examines the 
Yugoslav and Soviet leaderships’ appraisals of each other before and after the Tito-
Stalin split in June 1948. It argues that the Yugoslav leadership did not actively avoid 
conflict with the Soviet Union, but instead pursued its foreign political objectives 
despite Soviet objections. Examined here are Tito’s and Kardelj’s letters to Stalin and 
Molotov. This extensive correspondence from March to May 1948 underlines the 
spontaneity of the Yugoslav outbursts at the Soviets that aggravated the brewing 
conflict. Chapter 2 turns to the Finnish analysis of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict and 
the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance in 1948. It argues that the Kremlin placed similar political tests to 
the Yugoslav and Finnish leaderships in 1948. While Tito and Kardelj failed their 
test, Finland was able to pass its by signing the 1948 treaty, and by offering trade 
relations to the Soviet Union. This chapter argues that President Paasikivi’s decision 
to include the Parliament in the process of ratifying the treaty was crucial. It placed 
the responsibility for Finnish policy of neutralism on all political actors represented in 
the Parliament. Attention is also paid to the early formation of Yugoslav-Finnish ties 
in Belgrade immediately after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform.  
 The next three chapters narrate the rise and fall of joint Finnish-Yugoslav 
neutralism from 1953 to 1958. Chapter 3 presents Finnish-Yugoslav collaborative 
analysis of the effects of Josef Stalin’s death upon Soviet policy in Europe in 1953. 




here. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s interest in Finland emerged as a consequence 
of the changing role of the Yugoslav ministry. In 1953 new Foreign Minister Koča 
Popović worked to transform the ministry and separate it from its previous connection 
with the Yugoslav Secret Police (UDBa). I argue that the ministry’s autonomous role 
was solidified during the early years of Popović’s tenure, while Tito and his inner 
circle concentrated on domestic challenges. Yugoslav-Finnish ties are seen to grow in 
the aftermath of Stalin’s death as a result of frequent and broad cultural exchanges. 
This chapter argues that while Yugoslav interest in Finland was born after the Tito-
Stalin split in 1948, the Yugoslav foreign policy of neutralism was born after Stalin’s 
death in 1953. While the Finnish Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had served as an example 
since 1948, under Popović’s influence the Ministry gained enough autonomy to 
institute this policy.  
 Chapter 4 compares Finnish and Yugoslav responses to the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary in 1956. The events in Hungary threatened both Finnish and Yugoslav 
policies of neutralism, and the Yugoslav and Finnish Foreign Ministries carefully 
weighed the other’s responses to Soviet military action in Budapest. While 
Khrushchev’s new regional foreign policy in Scandinavia benefited Finland, 
Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement in 1955 was frustrated by renewal of the ideological 
conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties in 1956. Tito’s personal role in 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations resurfaced in a series of antagonistic statements against the 
Soviet leadership, echoed by Edvard Kardelj and followed by Soviet reprisals. 
However, by 1956, a professional Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, independently 




found the Tito-Khrushchev war of words detrimental to Yugoslavia’s main foreign 
policy goals: world-wide bilateral trade and political relations.  
Chapter 5 analyses the renewed conflict between the Soviet and Yugoslav 
Communist parties in 1958 and the Kremlin’s clash with the Finnish Social 
Democratic-Conservative government. I argue that, as in 1948, so in 1958 the 
Kremlin took similar approaches to Soviet-Finnish and Soviet-Yugoslav relations. 
Frustrated with the Yugoslav party leadership in Belgrade, and the Social 
Democratic-Conservative coalition in Helsinki, Moscow froze relations with both 
capitals. A new direction of the Yugoslav foreign policy away from Europe towards 
Asia and Africa addressed the Yugoslav-Soviet clash. In 1958, the Yugoslav ministry 
decided to prioritize bilateral relations outside of Europe in order to avoid both the 
Soviet bloc and rhetorical Yugoslav-Soviet party conflicts. President Kekkonen, in 
personal, private contact with Soviet intelligence as his diary reveals, repaired 
Finnish-Soviet relations by an unprecedented intervention in domestic politics, 
forcing out an elected coalition government and ignoring the Foreign Ministry 
entirely. My conclusion points to the post-1958 period, when Yugoslav and Finnish 
foreign policies did indeed go their separate ways, ending a decade of close 







Chapter 2: 1948 – The Soviet Test for Yugoslavia and the Tito-
Stalin Split. 
 
On June 28, 1948, the Cominform announced the expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the organization, and called for the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia (CPY) to be replaced. The Cominform Journal of 1 July 1948 publicly 
cited the CPY’s “incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a 
line which is a departure from Marxism-Leninism” as the reason for the expulsion.72 
This document, which appeared within weeks in the languages of all of the Soviet 
bloc states, directly addresses the primary reason behind the Tito-Stalin split, 
Yugoslav disapproval of Soviet foreign policy couched in the rhetoric of Communist 
ideology. 
The CPY was condemned for “beg[inning] to identify the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union with the foreign policy of imperialist powers,” and in particular for 
“defaming Soviet military experts”.73 This the Yugoslavs did. While Tito and Stalin 
bickered over numerous issues between 1945 and 1948, the underlying, but often 
misunderstood, reason for the split was the Tito leadership’s objection to Stalin’s 
post-war foreign policy. The Yugoslav leadership felt that Stalin was overly 
accommodating to the wartime Western allies, ready to grant them their sphere of 
influence in Western Europe, and that the Soviet Union was not ready to recognize 
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the Yugoslav right to a “leading role among the East European Communist parties.” 
Moreover, Tito’s leadership was not willing to compromise its independence from the 
Soviet party, acquired during the war but now rejected by Soviet foreign policy in 
1948.  
The Comintern document publicly declared that the Soviet Union sought the 
replacement of the Central Committee of the CPY, starting with the removal of Tito, 
Milovan Djilas, Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Ranković. The document even lists 
the names of nominees to replace the “purely Turkish terrorist regime.”74 Sreten 
Žujović and Andrea Hebrang were therein characterized as “advocates of friendship 
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.” Both men had in fact already been 
purged by Tito’s regime for their alleged “pro-Soviet views.”75   
The Soviet leadership resorted to these extreme measures toward a fellow 
Communist state in the spring of 1948 as a consequence of the long-standing refusal 
of Tito and his inner circle to accept Stalin’s foreign policy as it emerged in the 
second half of the Second World War. This chapter moves from analysis of the 
origins of this rift to the Soviet response, culminating in the formal expulsion of 
Yugoslavia from the Cominform by June 1948.  
Already in January, we see the Soviet response taking shape. Although 
neglected in Yugoslav accounts, a Soviet offer of a trade agreement during that same 
month was then withdrawn by February 1948. On the Yugoslav side, internal party 
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discussions indicate that its leadership played a more active role in the split than has 
previously been maintained. Contrary to both the original Yugoslav argument of 
Vladimir Dedijer and the more recent revisionist view of Ivo Banac, Tito and his 
inner circle also saw the break coming.76 
The Soviets offered a trade agreement to Yugoslavia in January 1948 as a 
political test of loyalty for the Tito leadership. By then, the Kremlin had grown 
frustrated with the Yugoslav leadership because of their assistance to the Greek 
Communists (KKE) in the renewed civil war, their contention with the Western 
Allies, and their uncoordinated maneuvers to promote a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Balkan 
Federation.77 This political test of Tito parallels the Soviet attempt to consolidate 
political power over Finland through a similar Finnish-Soviet Agreement of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The Finnish agreement, negotiated 
that same spring of 1948, is the subject of Chapter 2. In both cases, postwar Stalinist 
foreign policy prioritized the closely linked goals of territorial security and economic 
gain. As the Tito leadership failed to agree to a trade policy with the Soviet Union, by 
March of 1948 it had also failed the political test. The Kremlin moved swiftly to 
consolidate political power over Yugoslavia alternatively through the replacement of 
the Yugoslav leadership.  
                                                 
76 Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953 (New York: Viking    
 Press, 1970), 129; Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 361; Ivo Banac, 
With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 124. 
77 James Frusetta, “Bulgaria’s Macedonia: nation-building and state-building, centralization and 
autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, 1903-1952” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, (College Park: University 
of Maryland, 2006), 304. 
Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek communism, 1944-1949 (New York: Cornell University 




What then were the consequences of Soviet failure to consolidate political 
hegemony by replacing Tito’s leadership in Yugoslavia? As this chapter illustrates, 
this led to the appointment of Kardelj as Foreign Minister (on August 3, 1948), and 
from there the mandate for the creation of a powerful Foreign Ministry and a new 
Yugoslav foreign policy of neutralism, even before the death of Stalin in 1953.  
Soviet Wartime Collaboration with Western Allies and 
Postwar Yugoslav Objections 
Since the proclamation of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FPRY) on 29 November 1945, its Communist leadership had pursued its own 
domestic and foreign policy goals independent of the Soviets. More importantly, 
starting already in 1941, Tito and Stalin had continuously disagreed about the 
fundamental role and goals of the Partisan force’s war efforts. Although issuing a 
directive via the Comintern on 22 June 1941 urging the CPY to organize resistance to 
the Nazi German dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the Soviet government proceeded to 
accredit royal Yugoslavia’s King Peter II, in exile in London, as the state’s highest 
representative. The Soviet Union and the Yugoslav government in exile raised their 
respective legations to the status of embassies. In contrast, the Soviets had not yet 
accorded Tito’s representation in Moscow the status of an embassy as late as by 
January 1948. While wartime Soviet contacts with the royal Yugoslav government 
cast doubt on the political legitimacy of the Partisan resistance movement, Soviet 
military assistance to Tito was also not forthcoming. The Partisan command first 




Soviet supplies, of mortars, arms and ammunition as early as December 1941.78 
Requests of troops, medical supplies, and military materials from the Comintern 
followed, in February and in March 1942. No such request was ever honored, even 
when a small Red Army mission finally arrived in 1944 and a realistic Soviet capacity 
to provide aid now existed.79  
In official Comintern replies to Tito’s requests for assistance in March 1942 
and March 1943, the Soviets repeatedly advised Tito to cooperate with the non-
Communist Yugoslav government in exile in London.80 In March 1942 for example, 
the Soviets characteristically congratulated the Partisans for their military successes 
while urging Tito to  
take into account that the Soviet Union has treaty relations with the 
Yugoslav King and Government and that taking an open stand against 
these would create new difficulties in the joint war efforts and the 
relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Great Britain 
and America on the other. Do not view the issues of your fight from 
your own, national standpoint, but also from the international standpoint 
of the British—American—Soviet coalition.81   
  
Moreover, the Soviets repeatedly encouraged the Partisans not to emphasize that they 
were fighting a civil war against the rival royalist Chetnik movement, which, like the 
exiled Yugoslav government, expected the return of monarchy to Yugoslavia.  
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Despite Tito’s repeated telegrams claiming that the Chetniks were 
collaborating with the Nazi enemy, the Cominform continued to remind Tito in 
March 1942, that “for reasons of [Soviet] policy…it is not opportune to emphasize 
that the struggle is mainly against the Chetniks. World public opinion must first and 
foremost be mobilized against the invaders; mentioning or unmasking the Chetniks is 
secondary.”82 Tito protested in numerous telegrams to Stalin by openly arguing that 
the Soviet government’s policy was not helpful to the goals of international socialism. 
For example, on 25 November 1941 Tito complained of Russian propaganda in favor 
of Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović being reported in Radio Moscow.83 The Partisan 
correspondence with the Soviet leadership over complaints of Soviet support of the 
Chetnik enemies continued into 1944. This after the Soviets informed the British 
Foreign Office on 21 December 1943 that the Soviet government wished to promote a 
partnership between the Yugoslav government in exile and the Anti-Fascist National 
Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). Stalin seemed to be 
effectively asking Tito not only to resolve his differences with the London 
government but to accept a subsidiary position for himself and the Partisan 
movement.84 It was only in November 1944 after the joint Soviet-Partisan liberation 
of Belgrade that Stalin and Molotov expressed their full support for Partisan 
predominance over the London government, asking the London government’s 
representative, Ivan Šubašić to reconcile with Tito and cooperate in forming a 
Communist-led government.85  
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Launching an Independent Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1945-
1948 
Following the end of the Second World War, Yugoslav foreign policy 
continued to contradict Stalin’s immediate postwar goals in Eastern Europe. With no 
sympathy for the Soviet inability to assist the Partisans during the war, for whatever 
reason, the Yugoslav leadership around Tito adopted, semi-privately, adversarial 
attitudes towards the Soviets.86 In October 1944, Stalin had agreed with Winston 
Churchill in the Kremlin (in their now famous “percentages agreement”) that while 
Russia was to hold 90 percent predominance in Romania, Britain would have 90 
percent in Greece in the postwar period. Hungary and Yugoslavia would be divided 
50-50, and the Soviet Union would have 75 percent control in Bulgaria.87 Between 
October 1944 and January 1948, Stalin held up his end of the percentages agreement; 
but in the eyes of Tito and his leadership, the situation in Greece resembled the 
situation that the Partisans had experienced during the war. The Greek Communist 
Party (KKE) faced an adversary, the royal forces, that like the Yugoslav government 
in exile during the Second World War, enjoyed Allied support for its return to power. 
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British troops had established that authority in December 1944 by putting down the 
Communist-led effort to seize control of Athens in what has been called the Second 
Round of the Greek Civil War.88 A temporary agreement in 1945 with the KKE 
leadership to disarm their wartime resistance movement (EAM/ELAS) broke down 
by the 1946 elections. Reconstructing EAM/ELAS as the Democratic Army of Greece 
(DAG) they launched the Third Round of the civil war, this time from the northern 
region bordering Yugoslavia.89 Without consulting the Soviet leadership and against 
their wishes, Tito supplied arms to the new force in the winter of 1946-1947.90 This 
Yugoslav aid also included the use of Yugoslav territory as sanctuary for DAG 
forces, as well as radio broadcasts of “Radio Free Greece” emanating from 
Belgrade.91 
Yugoslav actions caused immediate difficulties for Stalin. The Truman 
administration was not convinced that the Yugoslavs had independently provided 
support without Moscow’s approval. This perception of Moscow’s intention to align 
Greece with the Soviet Union through the KKE triggered an American agreement to 
pick up the support for the royal government that the British could no longer 
continue. On 12 March 1947, President Truman requested Congress’s approval for 
military aid to Greece and Turkey, on the grounds that it would prevent Soviet 
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takeover and not just Communist victory.92 To complicate matters further, the KKE 
leadership itself had been directly asking the Soviets for military assistance. Between 
1944 and 1946, the Soviet Union had been relatively inactive in guiding national 
Communist movements, preferring what the Yugoslavs then called ‘imperialistic 
agreements’ with the US and UK. The Yugoslav provision of many more arms to the 
Greek Communists than even those promised by Moscow contributed to the 
Yugoslav argument that the Soviets had forsaken the international Communist cause. 
This embarrassment even forced Stalin to provide the DAG with some limited 
assistance in June 1947, following sizeable Yugoslav support.93  
Two key features in Yugoslav foreign policy between 1945 and 1948 
underlined the growing conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s 
ambitions to establish itself as the new regional power: plans for a Communist Balkan 
Federation and the Yugoslav leadership’s vocal anti-Western/ anti-capitalist rhetoric. 
Whether honoring the percentages agreement, the Western powers by the summer of 
1947 had effectively withdrawn their support for internal opposition to the 
Communists’ Bulgarian Workers’ Party (BRP).  Yet, it was not clear what the Soviet 
zone of influence over Bulgaria meant in practice. Party leaders for example, 
interpreted alignment with the Soviet Union in major international questions as still 
offering them some autonomy in their relations with other Communist parties within 
the Soviet zone of influence.94  
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At the Szklarska Poreba meeting in August 1947, held to coordinate the 
activities of these parties under Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe, a new 
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) with its headquarters in Belgrade was 
set up to direct this consolidation. European Social Democratic parties previously 
considered desirable allies were now condemned as “the most dangerous agents of 
imperialism”.95 Yet, it remained unclear to what extent inter-party contacts were to be 
regulated by Moscow.  The mere choice of the Yugoslav capital as the location of the 
Cominform headquarters served as a public Soviet endorsement of Tito’s leadership. 
At the conference the Yugoslavs were praised for their “revolutionary activism”. The 
Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov interpreted Stalin’s endorsement of the 
Yugoslavs’ independent activism as primarily an endorsement of future autonomous 
initiatives of other East European party leaderships.96  
In response, Dimitrov began to cultivate closer contacts with Tito in 1947. In 
August 1947, Tito and Dimitrov signed the Bled Agreement—a treaty of alliance that 
focused on economic and cultural cooperation. Tito and Dimitrov discussed a 
possible future Balkan Federation, an idea first introduced by Stalin in 1944.97 
However, no specific agreement on the Federation was reached. Previous Soviet-
sponsored discussions of a possible Balkan Federation originated from the 
controversy over the conflicting ambitions of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in Macedonia 
after the Second World War. At the end of the war, Stalin had mentioned the 
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federation to Tito as a possible solution to the Macedonian question but abandoned 
the idea a year later.  
The ambitious Yugoslav leadership, especially Edvard Kardelj, considered the 
federation a realistic possibility.98 But from the outset in 1944, the Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian representatives disagreed on its structure. An equal association of two 
states was deemed inappropriate by the Yugoslavs, as this would reduce the status of 
leading federal republics Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The Yugoslav proposal that 
Bulgaria would become a seventh constituent republic of Yugoslavia was not 
surprisingly unacceptable to the Bulgarian leadership. Moreover, such a configuration 
would have bolstered the Yugoslav position too much to have been accepted by 
Moscow and would have been resisted by Britain for fear that it would threaten Greek 
interests and the Mediterranean lifeline to the Suez Canal.  
In 1946 Stalin again flirted with the idea of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation 
but only if the Soviet Union were to be fully in charge of setting the terms and 
conducting the negotiations. The idea was abandoned for the second time in June 
1946 due to lack of interest both in Belgrade and in Sofia. A shift in Bulgarian policy 
over the Macedonian question in July 1946 that allowed more concessions to 
Yugoslavia swiftly sparked a third attempt at the federation between Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia, discussions to which the Soviets were not party. The Bled Agreement of 
August 1947 called for the strengthening of economic ties, simplification of border 
controls, and the forgoing of significant war reparations from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia. 
In Bled, it was agreed that Macedonia would not be ceded to Yugoslavia until the 
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formation of a possible future federation.99 Stalin felt that the Yugoslavs and 
Bulgarians had taken undue advantage of the independence he had extended to their 
parties. He was outraged that the agreement had been signed without Soviet 
consultation. Both the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian leadership were reprimanded by 
Moscow. Stalin immediately wrote to Tito and Dimitrov,  
The opinion of the Soviet government is that both governments have made 
a mistake, having made a treaty, moreover, of unlimited duration, …, 
despite the warnings of the Soviet government. The Soviet government 
believes that the impatience of these two governments has facilitated the 
actions of reactionary Anglo-American elements, giving them an 
additional excuse to intensify the military intervention in Greek and 
Turkish affairs against Yugoslavia and Bulgaria… The Soviet government 
must be given advance notice, as it cannot take responsibility for 
agreements of great importance in the area of foreign policy that are 
signed without consultation with the Soviet government.100 
  
Only after the conclusion of the Bulgarian peace treaty on 15 September 1947 did the 
Soviets agree to the signing of a modified Bled Agreement in November 1947.  
From the fall of 1947 and early 1948, an increasingly negative view of the 
Yugoslav leadership appeared in the reports originating from the Soviet embassy in 
Yugoslavia. Ambassador Anatolii Lavrentev identified an increase in Yugoslav 
“nationalist propaganda” and cited an overestimation of Partisan military credentials 
gained during the Second World War.101 The reports criticized Tito’s self-
aggrandizing speeches and considered him as challenging Stalin’s leading position. 
Through an agent in the Yugoslav Politburo, the Soviets learned that in January 1948 
the Yugoslav leadership within the Central Committee continued to discuss their 
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grievances toward the Soviets in private, as they had done in 1945.102 In the winter-
spring 1948 in the TsK VKP (b) Apparat (the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks)) under Mikhail Suslov wrote secret analytical reports 
and critiques of four Communist party groups – Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia – where charges of nationalism and underestimation of the role of the 
USSR play a central role.103 These culminated in Suslov’s report, entitled “About the 
anti-Marxist positions of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on 
questions of foreign and domestic politics”, filed on 18 March 1948.104 The Soviet 
documents discussed the preparation of replacements for those within the Yugoslav 
leadership who had not expressed views favorable of closer cooperation with the 
Soviets with those who had. Plans to replace key figures were already under way in 
the winter of 1947-1948.105  Denouncing the Yugoslavs served as an opportunity to 
reject all “national roads to socialism.” Stalin worried that the East European regimes 
might defy the Soviet Union if inspired by possible Western collusion with 
Yugoslavia in the future.106 
Stalin was already concerned about independent Yugoslav actions in the 
Balkans, as noted above. Ironically, the foundation of the Cominform in August 1947 
only intensified contacts between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. It coincided with the 
                                                 
102Ibid. 229. Norman Naimark, “Post-Soviet Russian Historiography on the Emergence of the Soviet 
Bloc” Kritika 5(3) (Summer 2004), 577. 
103 T.V. Volokitina, et al. Moskva i Vostochnaia Evropa : stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov 
sovetskogo tipa : 1949-1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002), 787. 
104 RTsKhIDNI, f.19. Op. 128. d.1163. l. 9-24. 
This extensive report lists five chapters on the following descriptive topics: “Contempt for Marxist 
Theory”; “Disregard for the Soviet Union as Deciding Power in the Camp for Democracy and 
Socialism”; “Reevaluation of Achievements in the Development of Yugoslavia on the Path to 
Socialism”; “Underestimation of the Class Struggle in the Countryside and the Threat of the Kulak”; 
“Opportunism and Liquidation on the Question of the Role and Place of the Communist party in the 
System of Social-Democratic Government.” 
105Ibid.  




signing of the Bled Agreement and allowed their leaders to keep talking about a 
future Balkan Federation. On 17 January 1948, Dimitrov was interviewed by foreign 
journalists on his train returning from Romania following the signing of the 
Bulgarian-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance. He 
commented that a larger federation, stretching from Poland to Greece, was possible in 
the future.107 Dimitrov listed as projected members of this future federation, 
“Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
even Greece”.108 Dimitrov told the foreign journalists,  
When in yesterday’s speech I called these treaties alliances, I was not 
throwing out a chance word; I mean alliances, and we are allies. That is 
the sense applied to the treaties Bulgaria has signed with Albania, 
Yugoslavia and Romania, and it is the meaning of the treaties she will sign 
with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. We are allies as we are allies 
de facto with the Soviet Union,….  109  
 
Dimitrov went on to emphasize Moscow’s role in these projected proceedings.  “The 
federation plans to cooperate with Russia on a large scale, and if possible would seek 
trade relations with the United States, Britain and France.”  
Again, the US interpreted these independent Yugoslav and Bulgarian moves 
as being directed from Moscow. The New York Times speculated on 11 January 1948 
that “one of the basic European aspects of Soviet foreign policy seems to be the 
encouragement of a federation of Balkan and Danubian states”.110 The article reported 
Dimitrov’s listing of potential members as “at least Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Rumania – truly Balkans states – and Hungary, their Danubian neighbor [that] 
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have Communist dictatorial governments in common.”111 As evidence, the article 
cited the Soviet Union’s bilateral treaty of military assistance that existed with 
Yugoslavia, and noted that similar pacts were being drawn up with the four other 
countries. The Times considered it “logical to anticipate that the Soviet Union would 
like a federation system extending from Poland on the Baltic Sea to Greece in the 
Aegian, and including all intervening countries.”112 The Western press also cited 
bilateral pacts between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as between 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania. From the perspective of The Times, 
these steps were natural, since “the lands affected already have common foreign 
policies, and all of them are coordinated by Moscow.”113 Moscow’s disclaimer was 
not aided by the placement of two Yugoslav divisions of troops in Albania “to ward 
off the insurgency taking place in Greece” one week after Dimitrov’s statements. 
Again, neither Dimitrov nor Tito had consulted Stalin before making their 
moves.114 On 24 January 1948, Stalin sent a harshly worded letter to Dimitrov:  
The part of your statement at the press conference in Romania 
concerning the federation or confederation of people’s democracies, 
including Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., is viewed by Moscow 
friends as harmful, detrimental to the countries of the new democracy, 
and as facilitating the struggle of the Anglo-Americans against these 
countries…. We consider your statement about a customs union between 
countries having treaties of mutual assistance equally careless and 
harmful…It is hard to figure out what could have made you make such 
rash and injudicious statements at the press conference.115  
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On January 28, Pravda flatly denied any movement towards an East European 
federation as widely reported in the Western press.116 Stalin quickly summoned both 
Dimitrov and Tito to the Kremlin. However, only Dimitrov made an appearance. The 
still defiant Tito sent Kardelj, accompanied by Djilas, in his place. At the meeting on 
February 10, Stalin insisted that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were not to engage in 
provocations of the West at this time. In Stalin’s view, it was unlikely that the Greek 
insurgency would succeed in bringing about a Communist regime to power, and it 
was equally unlikely that the US and Britain would allow a Communist government 
in the Eastern Mediterranean.117 Therefore Yugoslavia’s and Bulgaria’s persistent 
efforts to undermine the percentages agreement were futile and destructive. Stalin in 
no way accepted Dimitrov’s suggestion of a larger confederation, asking of Dimitrov, 
“What historic ties are there between Bulgaria and Romania? None! And we need not 
speak of Bulgaria nor Hungary nor Poland”.118 Stalin accepted only the idea of a 
Soviet sponsored Balkan Federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, into which 
Albania could later enter, with the possibility of separate federations between 
Hungary and Romania and Bulgaria and Poland respectively. Neither Bulgaria, nor 
Yugoslavia were to have any part in these. In the meeting Molotov exalted, 
“Yugoslavia did not warn us and didn’t even inform us about this decision [to send 
troops to Albania] until after the fact. We believe that this speaks of serious 
differences existing between us”.119 The Yugoslavs withdrew their forces at once 
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from Albania but were angered by the Soviet disapproval which quickly extended 
into wrangling over trade relations. 
On February 12, Stalin asked both the Bulgarian and the Yugoslav regimes to 
sign declarations that they would consult the Soviet Union before undertaking foreign 
policy initiatives.120 While Dimitrov and the Bulgarian leadership were willing to 
accede to Soviet warnings, Tito and the Yugoslavs were not. By January 1948 there 
were several areas of disagreement between the Yugoslav leadership and the Soviets, 
including enduring disappointment at the Soviets’ lack of wartime support and 
resentment of the hard Soviet terms, as noted below, in several “joint companies.”  
However, the real conflict between Stalin and Tito underlying the dramatic turns of 
events between 1945 and 1948, was that the Yugoslav leader and his closest 
associates were not willing to let the Kremlin preside over their foreign relations. Not 
only was the Tito regime not willing to give up their independent ties with Bulgaria; 
they were eager to forge close independent ties with other Communist parties outside 
the Balkan border set by Moscow, extending for example to the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party. To show that Tito, unlike Stalin, remained loyal to the 
international Communist movement the Yugoslavs refused to abandon their anti-
Western rhetoric and territorial claims in order to aid Soviet goals of non-conflictual 
relations with the West. Specifically, this meant that the Yugoslav regime was 
unwilling to give up its claim to Trieste in favor of Italy. For Stalin, Tito’s giving up 
this Yugoslav claim would have aided Soviet bargaining with the West on German 
reparations and other issues.  
                                                 




  The Yugoslav claim to Trieste that continued into the postwar period 
received initial Soviet support but soon became a position that challenged the early 
Cold War propaganda of accommodation in Stalin’s foreign policy, just as identified 
in the Cominform expulsion letter. On 24 April 1945, Nazi Germany had surrendered 
Trieste to the Allies. Tito’s Partisan units arrived at the port of Trieste ahead of Anzac 
units from New Zealand.121 The US and Britain demanded that the Partisans 
withdraw from Trieste. On 9 June 1945 a compromise was reached and thereafter the 
border region of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was administered in two zones, 
Zone A and Zone B. Trieste and its route to Austria was placed in the Zone A 
administered by the Allies.122 Included in Zone A was also Pula at the tip of the 
Istrian Peninsula. Zone B would be administered by Yugoslavia. In the summer 1946 
a US proposal for a permanent solution would have placed Trieste in Italy and moved 
the common border even further east into Yugoslavia than previous Allied 
proposals.123 This sent Tito reeling, and Yugoslav army units were moved forward to 
the border of Zone B. Yugoslav air force begun to monitor American overflights with 
increasing hostility. They presented a list of a total of 172 unauthorized American 
flights over Yugoslav territory between July 16 and August 8, 1946. The Yugoslav air 
command forced an unauthorized American C-47 transport plane down in early 
August and shot down another one killing the entire crew on August 19.124 Despite 
these incidents the Yugoslav government did not curtail its anti-Western rhetoric but 
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rather reinforced it. On 20 March 1948, amidst the growing Soviet-Yugoslav 
contention, the American, British and French governments in the so-called “Tripartite 
Proposal” suggested that the whole Free Territory of Trieste would be placed under 
Italian sovereignty.125 When the Tito’s leadership would not nudge, the US 
government moved to release only $30 million dollars from Yugoslav prewar gold 
reserves for 1948.126  
By 1948 these independent actions, together with Tito’s wartime record and 
his widespread popularity in the Communist-controlled Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
constituted a significant problem for Stalin and the Kremlin.127 The Soviets wished to 
maintain their preeminent leadership within the emerging Soviet bloc and sought 
actively from January 1948 to consolidate it. 
Edvard Kardelj’s Prominent Role as Foreign Minister 
The Yugoslav approach was based on the strong convictions of a small group 
around Tito. Between 1945 and 1952 all Yugoslav policy decisions came collectively 
from a core group of three men: Tito himself, Djilas and Kardelj. Kardelj as Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister from 31 August 1948 to 14 January 1953 grew accustomed to 
consulting Djilas and then guiding foreign policy as Tito’s closest confidant. In 
telegrams to Tito across the period 1948-52, Kardelj repeatedly used the sentence “ 
Djidje [meaning Djilas] and I think you should” carry out the initiative put forward.128 
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For 1948 and 1949, Kardelj hardly ever advised Tito on a state policy decision or 
drafted a foreign policy document without consulting Djilas, or at least referring to 
his legitimating concurrence. In his recent survey of Yugoslavia’s foreign relations, 
Ranko Petković points out that, “these dates of Kardelj’s tenure, in spite of the fact 
that they are exact, should be treated conditionally in light of the fact that Edvard 
Kardelj was a special super-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia before and 
after [1948]. Not only because he wanted to be one, but because he was able to act as 
one”.129 Kardelj’s special role is rightly said to stem from the “authority of power”. 
His Partisan credentials were of the highest order, as he had been involved in building 
the movement with Tito all along the way. He was a member of a regional committee 
of the CPY in Slovenia from 1932, on the staff of the CPY Politburo in Paris in 1937, 
and member of the Central Committee of the CPY from 1938 onwards. Kardelj 
became a member of the Politburo in 1940. He participated in the Partisan uprising in 
Slovenia in July 1941 and edited the CPY publication Borba during the war in the 
Serbian liberated area Užice in 1941. He became vice-President of AVNOJ Executive 
Committee in 1942, vice-President of the People’s Committee for the Liberation of 
Yugoslavia (NKOJ) in 1943, and vice-President of Yugoslavia in 1945. In all these 
roles Kardelj had remained loyal and close to Tito. He is the only Foreign Minister of 
Yugoslavia (or any Soviet bloc regime for that matter) to have attained, and 
maintained, this most prestigious party position while acting as Minister. 
Following the Tito-Stalin split, Kardelj followed a list of unimpressive 
predecessors to the post. In fact, Josip Smodlaka, Ivan Šubašić and Stanoje Simić, all 
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lacked any credentials as party members or within the Partisan movement during the 
war, let alone any access to Tito’s circle afterwards. In fact, the position of Foreign 
Minister had remained generally insignificant until Kardelj’s, ascendancy as 
demonstrated by the fact that all three former ministers had been appointed for the 
purpose of appeasing outside actors. Smodlaka (1943-1944) and Šubašić (1944-
1945), both pre-war Croatian political figures who had been representatives of the 
royal Yugoslav Government in exile. They were given their positions only in 
response to Allied calls for cooperation between the Partisans and the Chetniks.  
Simić (1945-1948) was placed in the post to appease the Soviets. He had spent 
three years of the Second World War as envoy of the exiled Yugoslav government in 
London to the USSR in Moscow.130 He resigned in 1944 and made himself available 
to Tito’s government. In the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split, his background was no 
longer viewed as a political asset. Not only was Simić accused of being “the 
Russians’ guy”, due to his prolonged stay in Moscow; his views on foreign policy 
were not far from Stalin’s, which were now considered too “pro-Western.”131 These 
official reasons for Simić’s dismissal do not tell the entire story. After all, if anyone 
was guilty of collaboration with the Soviets, it was Tito and Kardelj. Both of them 
had publicly proclaimed their loyalty to Soviet Union many times since 1945. 
However, Tito feared that Simić was one of the figures like Hebrang and Žujović 
with whom the Kremlin sought to replace his circle. The Kremlin had previously 
endorsed Simić. In March 1945, Stalin, through a letter from Molotov, reprimanded 
Tito and Kardelj for not including Simić in their government. The telegram read,  






In the interest of avoiding misunderstandings, we consider it necessary 
to inform you that the Russian friends of Yugoslavia in Moscow were 
stunned to learn that the new Yugoslav government was to include such 
figures as [Milan] Grol,… This incomprehension is compounded by the 
fact that Simić has been excluded from the government, although his 
sympathy for the national-liberation movement is beyond question. 
Since we had no opportunity earlier to know of these changes in the 
Yugoslav government, we find it necessary to inform you, if only at this 
late date, that we consider these changes to be an effort fraught with 
potential political complications.132 
 
Kardelj was placed in the position of Foreign Minister almost immediately following 
Yugoslavia’s formal expulsion from the Cominform. In the aftermath of the split, the Foreign 
Ministry immediately acquired the extended and significant role of analyzing and countering 
the Soviet anti-Yugoslav propaganda which would soon be circulated though all East 
European states loyal to Moscow. For example, on 13 February 1949, the daily Tribuna Ludu 
in Warsaw commented “Anglo-American occupiers are supporting Tito’s clique in Trieste.” 
133 The article grouped the Yugoslavs with the Western allies claiming that Tito was acting in 
unison with the colonizing powers to “occupy Trieste mutually”.134 On February 19, Radio 
Bucharest commented that  
When the Yugoslav government no longer adopts the unfriendly 
politics which is depriving it from help of socialist countries of the 
National Democracies, and the Soviet Union in the first place, only 
then on its own Yugoslavia will understand that in economic respects 
it can reach the same success as the countries of the National 
Democracies are enjoying with only with the enormous help of the 
socialist countries.135  
 
On February 21, Radio Prague announced,  
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All students are demonstrating and signaling loyalty towards the 
democratic front in the world and love towards the Soviet Union. They 
are insisting with the university, even while holding back horrible 
torment, that ‘we, Yugoslav students in the USSR, completely 
sympathize with the position in which our fellow students in 
Yugoslavia fin themselves in, because after we became aware of the 
Cominform resolution, we were approached by force by strange men 
from the Yugoslav embassy telling us to interrupt our schooling and to 
abandon the brotherly USSR. 
 
On February 22, Radio Budapest stated that “the nation of Yugoslavia (with the 
exception of the kulak and the reactionaries) were it not subject to the [Secret police] 
UDBa terror, would throw out Tito and his clique tomorrow, so far that none of them 
would ever be heard from again. The position of Yugoslavia is as it were facing the 
mouth of a pistol and only the order to fire needs to be given.” 136  
Kardelj was already Tito’s most trusted foreign representative, the one Tito 
had regularly sent in his place when he would not personally meet with Stalin. 
Kardelj’s replacement of “Moscow’s man” Simić was also a symbolic insult to Stalin.  
 Although Kardelj’s selection as Foreign Minister was inspired by political 
loyalty and rhetorical goals, it produced impressive results for Yugoslav diplomacy in 
the next years. Under Kardelj, Yugoslavia quickly became a member of the United 
Nations (UN), and Yugoslavia achieved a term as a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council as early as January 1950. With Kardelj’s political authority also 
came financial leverage. Budgetary resources allocated to the ministry made it a more 
independent body than other Yugoslav ministries. Kardelj sought immediately to 
expand the Foreign Ministry’s network of embassies world-wide. Kardelj desired an 
internationally visible role for Yugoslavia in order to air Yugoslav grievances against 
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the Soviets in a public forum. In 1950, at the UN General Assembly (GA), 
Yugoslavia notoriously accused the Soviet Union of having started the Korean 
conflict. Kardelj’s and the Tito-leadership’s domestic popularity rose accordingly. 
After his participation at the opening of the 6th regular session of the GA, Kardelj 
“returned to Belgrade to be greeted like ‘Ceasar’, because small and independent 
Yugoslavia was chosen as Vice-President of the large General Assembly of the 
UN”.137 Although his actions were directed against the Soviets from within Tito’s 
inner circle, it was through these actions that the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry quickly 
gained international stature. Yugoslavia’s role in the UN body benefited the Ministry, 
which would continue to gain independence from the Yugoslav Politburo and from 
UDBa after Kardelj’s tenure ended in 1953, seven weeks before the death of Stalin. 
Escalating Yugoslav-Soviet Differences, January-March 
1948 
Past scholarship on the Tito-Stalin split maintains, as noted above, that 
although the original Partisan leadership wanted to remain independent from the 
Soviets, it did not seek a split with the USSR. It was supposedly Stalin who acted 
precipitously in expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform.138 Djilas’s memoirs also 
argue for the unintentional nature of the break with the Soviet Union by describing 
the efforts of Kardelj, Ranković and himself to convince Tito of the senselessness of a 
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clash with the Soviets.139 Archival evidence, however, suggests that the Partisan 
leadership was not surprised by the split in March or in June. In fact, an escalating 
confrontation of problems with the Soviets had been predicted, if not sought, by the 
Yugoslav leadership since late January 1948.  
By January 1948, the Tito-Kardelj-Djilas troika in the Office of President of 
the Republic was not willing to compromise on any of their accumulating differences 
with the Soviet Union. This defiance culminated in Tito’s confident, confrontational 
letter to Stalin with a concise statement of independence in April:   
 
We are of the opinion that there are many specific aspects in the social 
transformation of Yugoslavia which can be of benefit to the revolutionary 
development in other countries, …This does not mean that we place the 
role of the CPSU and the social system of the USSR in the background. 
On the contrary we study and take the Soviet system as an example, but 
we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different form. 140 
 
Before then, the personal correspondence of both Tito and Kardelj indicates that for 
both of them their position was based on a belief in their “earned” right to an 
independent but still Communist policy – a right earned by the party’s prewar 
consolidation under Tito and their struggle in the Second World War against the 
various Fascist forces without Soviet assistance. There were altogether six significant 
letters exchanged between Tito and Stalin or Molotov between March and June 
1948.141 Kardelj drafted Tito’s replies.  These show no disposition to compromise 
with the Soviets. With virtually no changes, the drafts were dispatched from the 
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President’s Office to Moscow. For example, their crucial reply of 13 April 1948 to 
Stalin’s complaint over an anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia on 27 March 1948 
was initially handwritten by Kardelj simply on the back of 33 sheets of stationary 
from Tito’s President’s Office.142 Then transcribed verbatim, the letter was signed by 
Tito, and sent to Stalin. Here provocative statements such as “no matter how much 
each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case love his country 
less, which is also developing socialism – in this concrete case FRNJ, for which so 
many thousands of its most progressive people fell” made the Yugoslav argument.143. 
In fact, the decision by Tito’s inner circle to cease ready cooperation with 
Moscow in January 1948 is clear from the course of Yugoslav-Soviet trade 
negotiations. The Soviets had suggested to the Yugoslavs that these negotiations 
begin in Moscow in January 1948. Tito sent Djilas and Bogdan Crnobrnja, only 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade of Yugoslavia to Moscow for the talks. 
Indifferent to the outcome of these trade negotiations, Tito simultaneously provoked 
Moscow by dispatching the two divisions of Yugoslav troops to Albania. There are 
no documents on this Albanian decision in the Archives of Yugoslavia because 
neither the preparations or the decision to send troops across the border were 
discussed in the Politburo. Dijlas was already in Moscow, and not even Kardelj was 
privy to the details. Tito made the decision alone, outside of the party, the Foreign 
Ministry and his inner circle. He only consulted the key military people needed to 
execute the act: Ranković, the head of UDBa,  Koča Popović who would succeed 
Kardelj as Foreign Minister, Ivan Gošnjak a general in the JNA and Lieutenant-
                                                 





General of the JNA Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, who had been in charge of 
Partisan operations in Albania during the war.144 Tito argued that Albania was 
endangered by “’Greek reaction’ and ‘imperialists’ hiding in Greece” and needed 
Yugoslav support to “save and defend Albania.”145 Djilas has suggested that by 
sending in these divisions, Tito was trying to ensure that a potential Yugoslav-
Albanian unification would still be possible in the future. 146 However, it seems more 
likely within the context of the events in Moscow, that Tito was asserting his 
superiority in the Balkans as he had done since 1945 with symbolic acts while also 
testing Moscow for its reaction. Dimitrov’s coincidental comments over the possible 
future of the Balkan Federation on January 11 added to the tension. In response to 
clear Soviet displeasure, Tito sent Kardelj to Moscow where he listened to Stalin’s 
rebuke on February 10. The Soviets announced a delay in the trade agreement on the 
same day. Djilas and Kardelj quickly departed from Moscow without an agreement. 
In order to maintain the appearance of the Yugoslavs still desiring an agreement, 
Crnobrnja remained in Moscow until March 3 at the behest of the Yugoslav Ministry 
of Foreign Trade. Crnobrnja took back with him the first draft of the Soviet Trade 
Agreement now being offered to the Yugoslavs again after the January-February 
delay. But despite a promise from Crnobrnja to the Yugoslav representative in 
Moscow, Vladimir Popović, that he would send back an official Yugoslav reply, such 
a reply was never even drafted. Popović, like the rest of the Yugoslav government 
outside Tito’s inner circle continued to work under the assumption that Yugoslav-
Soviet trade relations would continue.  
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Popović had become concerned over the lack of Yugoslav action to achieve a 
trade agreement even before Crnobrnja’s arrival. Already in January, Popović had 
pleaded in an unusual, direct letter to Tito: “Pardon me, that I am engaging you on 
these questions, but all our previous urging towards the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
until today did not produce results. It is urgent, namely it is needed, that our Ministry 
informs us when we will complete the Soviet Trade Project Agreement.”147 It seems 
that Tito’s leadership had no longer seriously pursued a trade agreement with the 
Soviets since January and expected a serious break with the Soviets from the first 
days of March. Therefore, it was the policy of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to 
continue its work as previously and not to inform people outside of Tito’s immediate 
circle, including Popović in Moscow, of the heated exchanges.  
On 12 February 1948 Popović repeated his complaint, this time to his regional 
section supervisor in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that, “we here have received the 
impression that in Yugoslavia not one institution works seriously and systematically 
to achieve [the trade and technical assistance] agreement” with the Soviet Union.148 
By mid-February, still unaware of Tito’s personal decision not to complete the trade 
agreement with the Soviet Union, Popović had become thoroughly frustrated with 
being unable to determine the shape of trade relations with the Soviet Union, relations 
which were important for propaganda purposes as well as for the economy. Popović 
explained in his letter to the Ministry that this task was especially difficult because no 
such comprehensive agreement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had been 
                                                 





concluded in the three years since the end of the Second World War.149 In the absence 
of instructions from Belgrade, Popović had established “a local position on things, 
because exactly no one [from Belgrade] informed us [in Moscow] what should be 
done despite the fact that there exists a hardworking group and experts who are 
located in Yugoslavia and who are competent on these questions”.150  
The frustrated tone of Popović’s communication reappears in several of his 
February and March 1948 letters.151  He had understood that his role as the Yugoslav 
representative was to seek a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. A trade 
agreement could guarantee commercial exchange with the East European states 
already establishing formal trade relations with the Soviet Union. Popović also hoped 
that it would include some Soviet aid to benefit a Yugoslav economy still recovering 
from war damage.152 The Soviet Union was the largest regional Communist ally of 
Yugoslavia, and since the Second World War it had continued expanding its 
influence and presence in neighbouring Eastern Europe. To reinforce his efforts, 
Popović wrote several memorandums on the promising content of Soviet trade 
agreements with Romania, Bulgaria and Poland.  
Well beyond Popović’s efforts, Crnobrnja was in fact withdrawn from 
Moscow specifically because of Tito’s decision not to conclude a trade agreement 
with the Soviet Union. In addition, Crnobrnja’s analysis of the Soviet proposal that he 
filed immediately upon his return did not favor the conclusion of the agreement on its 
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economic terms. The Soviets had proposed a shipment protocol according to which 
Yugoslav exports would amount to $57,5 million in value and Soviet imports to $58,6 
million.153 Crnobrnja found crucial commodities to be pork, cement, caustic soda and 
dry plums. However, the Yugoslavs could not foresee favorable terms of trade with 
the Soviets on any of these goods: 
Pork we cannot conclude because the Soviets cannot give us this product; 
cement we cannot conclude because cement we can sell on the world 
market for 17-18 dollars per ton, and the Soviets will give us only 
something close to 11 dollars. In 1946 we could agree to this because the 
difference was smaller between 15 and 16 dollars.154  
 
Moreover, Crnobrnja did not appreciate Soviet tactics: “We did not conclude an 
agreement on caustic soda because the Soviets offered too low of a price. In the world 
market Yugoslavia can get $300, but the Soviets will only pay $75, which is how 
much they pay for soda from Romania. This would be against the interests of our 
country. In long negotiations, the Soviets went up to $150, and we lowered our asking 
price to $200 although at the time we were able to receive between $260 and $270 on 
the world market. On the next day the Soviets went down to only $75.”155 
Much more than being denied one-year trade agreement was at stake from the 
beginning of Stalin’s policy decision to offer the Yugoslavs these unfavorable terms. 
From January to March 1948 the Soviets were drafting more comprehensive trade 
agreements with East European states. One was also proposed for Finland. These 
were to serve as the first steps towards a formulation of a comprehensive Soviet 
economic and security bloc in Eastern Europe. The Soviet offer to the Yugoslavs 
                                                 






worked within this framework of these treaties but also served as a political test to 
oblige the unruly Yugoslavs to accept unfavorable terms. 
Despite arguments of economic necessity and the impending danger of a 
conflict with the Soviets, Tito’s all-powerful Office of the President of the Republic 
was no longer seriously pursuing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Having 
sent troops to Albania in January and having been reprimanded over the action in 
February, the Yugoslav leadership was already reconsidering its close cooperation 
with Moscow.  For that matter, the Yugoslav leadership in Belgrade had already 
regarded close relations with the Soviet Union with caution because Soviet technical 
experts attached to the several Yugoslav-Soviet joint companies formed in 1945 
reported to Soviet military intelligence. In addition, there was the exploitative 
reputation quickly established by the several Joint Companies, obliging the Soviets to 
disband them by 1947.156 In his memoirs Kardelj explains that in early 1946 the 
Soviets (wishing to establish joint Soviet-Yugoslav companies) sent a delegation to 
Belgrade to establish cooperative companies for the navigation of the Danube and for 
civil air transport. Kardelj, studying similar Romanian and Hungarian agreements 
with the Soviets, was astonished to find that “no attempt had been made to conceal 
the obvious inequality, the brutal hegemony of the Russians. I did not know what to 
think. The agreements seemed politically stupid and legally absurd.”157 The Soviet 
terms offered to Yugoslavia for the joint companies were similar to those for Hungary 
and Romania. For example, the Soviet-Yugoslav Civil Air Transport Company 
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(JUSTA) had pressed unsuccessfully to maintain all air service between Yugoslavia 
and foreign countries, leaving the domestic Jugoslovenski Aerotransport (JAT) 
without a single foreign route.158 From January 1948, it was therefore not only the 
Kremlin that stalled the signing of a Trade and Technical Assistance Agreement with 
Yugoslavia, but Tito as well.  He made it seem as if bureaucratic problems in the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry were delaying the deal.   
Instead of informing Popović in Moscow of the change in Yugoslav foreign 
policy, the President’s Office simply avoided questions about the trade agreement. As 
Yugoslavia was officially a Soviet ally, the Foreign Ministry was in no position to 
make a decision to abandon serious trade relations and close ‘technical’ contacts with 
the Soviets. Moreover, after discovering Soviet penetration of meetings of the Central 
Committee in Belgrade, the leadership feared that any official communiqué could 
find its way to the Soviets.159 Therefore, only a close circle of officials in Belgrade 
were made aware of this policy.   
In the spring of 1948, Tito’s Office nonetheless continued to analyze the 
content of Soviet trade agreements with other East European states through the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. On 19 February 1948 Romania signed an agreement for 
1948 amounting to net trade of $30 million marking a $5 million increase from 
1947.160 According to the agreement, Romania was to receive cotton, metals, machine 
tools and unrefined fuel from the Soviet Union.161 Oil and petroleum derivatives 
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together with lumber were designated as Romania’s exports.162 The Romanian 
Embassy in Moscow gave the information about the content of the agreement to the 
Yugoslavs in mid-February 1948.  
As Yugoslavia adopted a diplomatic strategy to delay the signing of its trade 
agreement with the USSR, the Soviets sought to limit Yugoslavia’s ability to 
establish international protocols and privileges of independent statehood. The 
Kremlin, for example, agreed to Yugoslavia’s request for the right to engage in flights 
over occupied Berlin only in principle. By insisting in March 1948 that the Yugoslavs 
sign an official agreement with Aeroflot before the privileges could take effect, the 
Soviets effectively denied the Yugoslav request.163 The Yugoslav Military Mission in 
Berlin had made repeated requests to the Foreign Ministry to establish a Belgrade-
Prague-Amsterdam flight that needed to pass over Berlin. Overall, the Soviets 
intentionally prolonged the signing of the discussed Agreement on Air Transport and 
Aviation Affairs that would have authorized overflights.164 
 On 18 March 1948 Nikolai Bulganin, Moscow’s Minister of Defence 
informed General Barskov, the Head of the Soviet Military Mission in Yugoslavia, 
that the Soviet government would abruptly and immediately withdraw all its military 
advisors and instructors from Yugoslavia because “they [we]re surrounded by 
hostility … they [we]re not treated in a friendly fashion in Yugoslavia”.165 The 
following day the Soviet government called for the withdrawal of all civilian experts 
as well. Tito’s leadership cried foul and claimed that they were “amazed and [could] 
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not understand” why the Soviets would withdraw their military personnel without any 
discussion or prior complaint.166  
In fact, a new Soviet complaint was at hand, and it also concerned the 
economy. The Soviet commercial representative Lebedev had made inquiries to 
Yugoslav Assistant Minister Boris Kidrič about Yugoslav economic data. The 
Yugoslavs had simply refused to surrender any economic and industrial statistics to 
the Soviets. Instead, they referred the Soviet representatives to the highest level of the 
Central Committee. These referrals were diversionary tactics both to prevent further 
Soviet espionage and to hold off trade and economic cooperation with the Soviets.  
The original Western analysis of the Tito-Stalin split suggested that the strains 
on the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship grew heavier in early 1948 because of dissension 
over a future Balkan Federation.167 However, as documents from the Office of the 
President of the Republic demonstrate, the exponential growth of Soviet frustration 
with Belgrade was rather a result of Yugoslavia’s tacit refusal to sign a Trade and 
Technical Assistance Agreement and attempts to frustrate Soviet influence through 
other measures.168 The trade agreement was a political test for the Yugoslavs, as 
noted above, but Stalin also sought secure and integrated Soviet influence in Eastern 
Europe, still needing resources to recover from the war and to compete with the West 
in the future. This agreement would have begun to link the Yugoslav economy to that 
of the Soviet Union to the latter’s benefit. Through a trade agreement the Yugoslavs 
could begin making up for some of their previous political independence by 
contributing to the Soviet economy.  
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The Tito-Stalin Exchanges of March-June, 1948 
Tito raised the issue of a Trade and Technical Assistance Agreement in a 
letter to Molotov on 20 March 1948, following the Soviet withdrawal of its technical 
and civilian experts. This would be the first of the aforementioned six letters over the 
next three months. Their exchanges became an airing of old grievances that 
culminated in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform on 28 June. Tito’s letter 
of March 20, rejected Soviet reasons for withdrawing their military personnel, 
claiming that Yugoslav relations with the Soviets in Belgrade were “not only good, 
but actually brotherly and hospitable, which [was] the custom towards all Soviet 
people in the new Yugoslavia”.169 With a certain amount of sarcasm, Tito’s letter 
concluded that he was “forced to reject the reasons about some sort of ‘lack of 
hospitality and lack of confidence’ towards Soviet experts and Soviet representatives” 
and asked to be “informed of the true reason for this decision by the Government of 
the USSR”.  Moreover, Tito reminded Molotov that “none of the [Soviet 
representatives] ha[d] complained to [him] of anything like this, although they ha[d] 
all had the opportunity to do so personally with [him], because [he] ha[d] never 
refused to see any of the Soviet people”. Tito also referred at the end of his letter to 
information “the Government of the USSR [was] obtaining from various other 
people…because such information [was] not always objective, accurate or given with 
good intentions”.170 By “various other people” Tito most likely meant representatives 
                                                 





of other East European governments he believed to be reporting to Soviet intelligence 
through their delegations in Belgrade. 
Popović personally delivered Tito’s letter to Molotov in Moscow. Upon 
receiving it, Molotov “became visibly angry and said little and emphasized that the 
Soviets had sufficient evidence” for their claims.171 As far as Popović, outside Tito’s 
inner circle as we have seen, knew in March 1948, Belgrade was still looking for a 
possible reconciliation with Moscow. He even suggested investigating the “main 
culprit in the affair further”.172 By this Popović meant lower level personnel who 
could be blamed for the emerging rift, perhaps allowing the budding dispute to be 
framed as a misunderstanding from which both sides could then emerge as “not 
guilty.”  In his own description of events, Popović emphasized to Tito personally the 
extreme and unprecedented nature of Molotov’s anger upon reading Tito’s letter. The 
Yugoslav representative also fastened on Tito’s sarcastic offer to meet personally 
with any Soviet representative as a tactical success in keeping the door open for 
reconciliation.  
Yet, Molotov left Popović with no indication that the conflict could be 
resolved. Yugoslav representation in Moscow faced increasing difficulties itself from 
late March 1948. It did not receive even delayed replies to the simplest requests, 
including the licensing and transport of Yugoslav cars from Eastern Europe to 
Moscow for the delegation’s use. The Soviets also refused to send the previously 
promised construction experts from the Soviet Union for the urgent task of starting 
construction on the huge housing project in the Yugoslav capital called New 
                                                 





Belgrade. Popović concluded (and informed Belgrade) incredulously that not only the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry but also the entire Soviet governmental bureaucracy had 
clearly been instructed to complicate relations with Yugoslavia.173 
The correspondence between Tito’s and Stalin’s offices was handled in 
complete secrecy. Tito’s letters as drafted by Kardelj were hand-couriered to 
Moscow, as were Popovic’s full reports of his meetings with Molotov to Belgrade. 
Only the most general information was included in telegrams. The correspondence 
now took on an increasingly argumentative tone. In his letter of March 27, Stalin 
reminded Tito that Yugoslavia had already asked the Soviets to reduce the number of 
its military advisers by 60 per cent and that some high ranking Yugoslavs had 
allegedly said that this was because “the rules of the Soviet army were hidebound, 
stereotyped and without value to the Yugoslav army, and that there was no point in 
paying the Soviet advisers since there was no benefit to be derived from them”.174 
Stalin named names from the ranks of Tito’s closest collaborators in making these 
charges. These included Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, who had 
requested this large-scale reduction of Soviet Military advisers in 1946. The salaries 
of the Soviet military experts were set by Moscow at 30,000 - 40,000 dinars, while 
commanders of the Yugoslav National Army at the same time were paid only 9,000 - 
11,000 dinars. The Soviets refused to lower their salaries, so the Yugoslavs asked the 
Soviets to reduce their numbers. Stalin also claimed that the Soviets had evidence that 
a group of “questionable Marxists –Djilas, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Kidrič, 
Ranković” had circulated rumours “for instance that ‘the CPSU is degenerate’, [that] 
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‘great power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR’, [that] ‘the USSR is trying to 
dominate Yugoslavia economically’ and [that] ‘the Cominform is a means of 
controlling the other parties by the CPSU”.175 Stalin identified Velemir Velebit, as an 
‘English spy’ who had nevertheless been given the position of First Assistant Foreign 
Minister.  
Stalin’s listing of Tito’s closest collaborators served to create a record of the 
people that the Kremlin wanted to expel from the Yugoslav leadership. Later Stalin 
would seek to discredit the leaders closest to Tito by connecting them to the earlier 
enemies of the Soviet state as identified in the purge trials of the 1930s. Hence their 
association by Stalin with the heresy of Trotsky, the mistaken anti-collectivization 
economic theories of Bukharin and the criminal, pre-1917 revisionism of the 
Mensheviks.176 
Stalin sought to present ‘facts’ de-legitimizing the current Yugoslav Party in 
this correspondence, referring to the CPY as not “completely legalized and still 
having only a semi-legal status”. Worse yet, Stalin complained that the “decisions of 
the Party organs [we]re never published in the press, neither [we]re the reports of 
Party assemblies.” Moreover, the Central Committee was criticised because the 
“Personnel Secretary of the party [wa]s also the Minister of State Security [Service] 
UDBa”, placing party cadres under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. 
The Soviet complaint was that instead of the party controlling state organs in 
Yugoslavia, a state agency, namely the Ministry of Security, controlled the party.177 







 Stalin also complained that the Yugoslav security apparatus watched over the 
activities of the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, including the representative of 
the CPSU to the Cominform Pavel Yudin, which indeed they had. Soviet 
representatives had not been subjected to such scrutiny in other East European states 
since 1945.  
 In response on April 13, Tito openly accused Stalin of employing and 
recruiting Soviet spies within Yugoslavia. Another Kardelj-drafted third letter told 
Stalin,   
There are many reasons why we are dissatisfied…it is impossible to 
mention all the reasons in this letter but we will mention a few. First, we 
regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to 
recruit people in our country, which is moving towards socialism,… 
This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and [State Security 
Administration] UDBa have protested against this and made it known 
that it cannot be tolerated…For example, Colonel Stepanov did not 
hesitate in 1945 to recruit one of our comrades who was working in the 
central division of coding and decoding in UDBa…who reported this to 
the present Marshal Tito as he should. Such recruiting is not done for the 
purpose of a struggle against some capitalist country, and we must come 
to the conclusion that this recruiting is destroying our internal 
unity…This work by the agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service cannot 
be called loyal and friendly towards our country.178   
 
The Soviet accusations against the Tito-led Central Committee of the CPY, 
were simply restated for the document expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform. 
Despite Tito and Kardelj’s continued claims of “surprise by the tone and content” of 
Stalin’s letter and the Cominform document, they could hardly have been 
surprised.179 Kardelj was after all the author of Tito’s confrontational letters to Stalin 
between March and May.  
                                                 





Summarizing the Split 
The Soviet justifications for the break with the Yugoslavs had been well 
established within this correspondence from mid-March onwards. Moreover, Tito, 
Djilas and Kardelj had collectively drafted the decision, upon Djilas’s and Kardelj’s 
return from Moscow in early February, to refuse to sign a trade agreement. Surprise 
and disbelief as a response to the expulsion was nonetheless the official policy and 
rhetoric of the Tito-led regime.180 Yet, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the 
Cominform was neither sudden, unforeseen by the Yugoslavs, nor unintended by the 
Soviets. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform was a Soviet attempt to 
replace the Yugoslav leadership with a more subservient one in order to consolidate 
the Soviet bloc in 1948. It was not, as has been suggested by Leonid Gibianskii, the 
consequence of a rogue individual in the Balkan Section of the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry.181 Gibianskii’s analysis curiously corresponds with the official Yugoslav 
argumentation transmitted to Molotov by Yugoslav representative Popović in 
Moscow in April 1948. Popović, completely outside Tito’s circle, offered formulaic 
solutions to Molotov for the conflict between the Soviet-Yugoslav parties. It is 
possible that Gibianskii and historians like him relying heavily on official Soviet 
documents alone have taken Popović’s comments, which he himself discounts in his 
correspondence with Belgrade, at face value.  Relations between Tito and Stalin had 
been strained since 1941, as we have seen. Relations between the Yugoslav and 
Soviet Foreign Ministries in trying to establish protocol for diplomatic relations had 
been strained since 1945. Relations between economic representatives in Moscow 
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and Belgrade had been frozen since early 1948. Although the Tito-Stalin 
correspondence in the spring of 1948 assumed the form of personal attacks, their 
collision course was not due to a simple conflict between powerful leaders. Although 
Tito became unsympathetic to Stalin personally, the Tito-Stalin split resulted from 
broader and more fundamental disagreements. The Yugoslavs simply refused to 
assume a subsidiary role in relation to the Soviet Union, one requiring Soviet 
surveillance of the Yugoslav military, and oversight of or foreign policy. Yugoslav 
resistance to Soviet control interfered with Soviet goals of forming a unified security 
and military defence bloc, or buffer zone, in Eastern Europe.182 Their resistance also 
irritatingly, if less significantly, interfered with Soviet economic goals. 
In response to Stalin’s wild accusations against members of his inner circle, 
Tito’s April 13 letter named Hebrang, and Žujović, together with Simić as anti-party 
elements responsible for “providing inaccurate and slanderous information to the 
Soviet representative in Yugoslavia”.183 Tito’s April letter explained that Hebrang 
and Žujović had given this misinformation about Tito to the Soviets in an attempt to 
“hide their anti-Party work and their tendencies and attempts, exposed earlier, to 
break up the unity of the leadership and the Party in general”.184 In very stark terms, 
Tito explained to Stalin how his domestic future did not depend on Soviet good will. 
Tito wrote that Yugoslav popular support for the Soviet Union, in a country of many 
Orthodox Christians, did not come naturally.  
Among many Soviet people there exists the mistaken idea that the 
sympathy of the broad masses in Yugoslavia towards the USSR came 
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of itself, on the basis of some traditions which go back to the time of 
Tsarist Russia. This is not so.185  
 
Tito had already warned Stalin in March that the support for the Soviet Union had to 
be earned. Now, his April letter elaborated “Love for the USSR did not come of itself. 
It was stubbornly inculcated into the masses of the Party and the people in general by 
the present leaders of the new Yugoslavia, including the first rank, the very ones so 
falsely accused in the letter”.186 Tito threatened Stalin in no uncertain terms by 
referring to the possibility of withdrawing Yugoslav support for the Soviet Union.
 Tito also emphasized the uniqueness and importance of Yugoslavia amongst 
East European states by noting unkindly that in Yugoslavia the CPY “formed the 
nucleus of the People’s Front” and therefore “there [was] no danger of its dissolving 
into a People’s Front” as had been necessary in Bulgaria and Poland.187 Such 
comments reminded the Soviets that, in contrast to other East European countries, in 
Yugoslavia there was essentially no political opposition to the CPY. Some of Eastern 
Europe, Tito’s comments implied, could still be lost to Soviet control. Tito also 
bragged about Yugoslavia’s stature: “the great reputation of our Party, won not only 
in our country but in the whole world, on the basis of the results it has obtained, 
speaks for itself”.188 Moreover, Tito threatened Soviet authority by speaking about a 
larger Yugoslav role within the future Communist bloc: “we are also of the opinion 
that there are many specific aspects in the social transformation of Yugoslavia which 
can be of benefit to the revolutionary development in other countries, and are already 








being used…We are attempting to apply the best forms of work in the realization of 
socialism”.189 It is clear from these statements that Tito had, since early 1945, very 
little intention of subordinating the Yugoslav regime that they were forging to Soviet 
management. Collectively, Tito’s leadership were a hardened group of Party cadres 
from various ethnic and class backgrounds who survived the war by making high-risk 
military and political decisions. Having taken those heavy risks and won, they were 
ready to follow Tito and Kardelj in defying Stalin and Molotov in the spring of 1948. 
The Soviets were unable since 1945 to attach Yugoslavia to its economic 
network in a way which would have benefited Soviet economy and technology. They 
were still unable to achieve this in the spring of 1948. Trade plus technical 
cooperation would have constituted a first step towards a formal ‘Friendship, 
Assistance and Cooperation Agreement.’  It was this kind of an agreement that the 
Soviets attempted first to sign with Yugoslavia that foresaw the fate of the Finnish-
Soviet financial deal in 1948 that was broadly designed as an Agreement on 
Friendship, Assistance and Mutual Cooperation. This treaty and its consequences for 
the Finnish policy of neutralism is the topic of the next Chapter 2. 
 
 





Chapter 3: 1948 – The Soviet Test for Finland and the 
Compromise on Neutralism 
 
On 22 February 1948, Stalin, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of 
the Soviet Union, wrote to Finnish President Juho Kusti Paasikivi, requesting “that 
Finland and the Soviet Union make a Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance 
Agreement similar to those signed between Hungary and the Soviet Union, and 
Romania and the Soviet Union.”190 Stalin reminded Paasikivi that “two of the three 
states bordering the Soviet Union which fought on the German side, Hungary and 
Romania, have already signed treaties of bilateral assistance in case of a possible 
attack by Germany.”191 Finland was the third. On February 22, just as Stalin’s test for 
Finland begun, the Kremlin broke off a comparable test for Yugoslavia. It may well 
be only a coincidence that the high-level Yugoslav trade delegation, led by Edvard 
Kardelj and Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić, were forced to abandon talks on a 
similar agreement on the very day that the Kremlin requested negotiations with a 
Finnish delegation. Yet, from the divergent Yugoslav and Finnish experiences with 
these trade treaties in 1948 would come a common approach to relations with the 
Soviet Union across the 1950s that the remaining chapters will explore. The best 
name for that approach is neutralism. 
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 Finland and Yugoslavia hardly faced common circumstances in these early 
postwar years. Finland shared an 800-mile territorial border with the Soviet Union, 
while Yugoslavia shared a political border with the emerging Soviet bloc in Eastern 
Europe. In the interwar period, both states had emerged as newly independent but 
then faced overwhelming challenges as the Second World War began. Finland lost 
close to 10 percent of its territory to the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939-40, 
and Yugoslavia was broken apart entirely after the German Nazi invasion of 1941. 
Finland had subsequently cooperated with Nazi Germany during the war and futilely 
fought the Soviet Union in 1944. The Finnish-Soviet Armistice of 1944 required 
Finland to pay the Soviet Union $300 million worth of commodities over six years.192 
The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 reconfirmed this heavy obligation. Finland was 
forced to accept a 50-year lease of the territory and waters of Porkkala Island to a 
Soviet naval base in the Gulf of Finland.193 The treaty required Finland to grant the 
Soviet Union the use of railways, waterways, roads, and air routes for the 
transportation of personnel and freight to and from Porkkala.194 In total, Finland 
handed over to the Soviet Union 17,760 square miles, nearly 10 percent of its 
territory, mainly in Karelia.195 Finland was also required to return Petsamo— on the 
shore of the Barents Sea—to the Soviet Union. This area contained a strategically 
valuable ice-free port as well as nickel and copper mines. The territorial losses also 
cut in half the 30-mile canal that connects the Gulf of Finland to the Saimaa Lake. 
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The Finnish armed forces were to consist of no more than 34,400 army troops, 4, 500 
naval personnel with total tonnage of 10,000 tons of equipment, an air force of 60 
aircraft and 3, 000 men.196 No such limitations or loss of territory were applied to 
Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
 The initial Finnish approach to postwar relations with the Soviet Union was 
obviously going to be one seeking some relaxation in the postwar settlement. It was 
driven by the decisions of two key leaders, though it was supported by a broader 
parliamentary process. Their strategy was to regain the domestic sovereignty which 
they believed had been compromised under the Moscow Armistice of 1944. The 
Soviets’ initiation of negotiations in February 1948 did not come as a surprise to 
President Paasikivi. On 18 January 1945, Andrei Zhdanov, the Soviet head of the 
Allied Commission in Finland, had proposed to the then Finnish President Carl 
Gustaf Emil Mannerheim a future assistance treaty between “two sovereign states,” 
similar to those the Soviet Union had signed with France and with Czechoslovakia.197 
Zhdanov asked Mannerheim “not to mention the issue to anyone else because the 
airing of the issue would cause a backlash within the Kremlin.”198 Mannerheim, 
however, informed his Prime Minister, then Paasikivi. In fact, Soviet documents 
show that Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had reprimanded Zhdanov for 
overreaching to redefine Soviet-Finnish relations. On January 18, Molotov wrote to 
Zhdanov in Helsinki, “You have gone too far. A pact with Mannerheim of the sort we 
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have with Czechoslovakia is music for the future. We have to reestablish diplomatic 
relations first. Do not frighten Mannerheim with radical proposals. Just clarify his 
position.”199 Without reference to the corresponding Finnish documents, Russian 
scholar Dmitri Volkogonov has interpreted these events from the perspective of 
Stalin’s relationship with Zhdanov, whose obedience Stalin was testing in January.200 
From a reading of the Soviet documents, Zhdanov’s suggestion for redefining 
Finnish-Soviet relations apparently concludes with Molotov’s rebuff of January 18. 
The more recent study of Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov argues that  
The Finnish attempt to obtain an early, better deal in comparison with 
the general terms of armistice ran contrary to the Stalin-Molotov grand 
diplomacy in Europe. It would certainly have been a violation of the 
principle to settle a postwar world in the concert of three great powers, 
something that Stalin still highly valued. Zhdanov, who was on the 
margins of this grand diplomacy, failed to see this obvious fact.201 
  
Be that as it may, Finnish Foreign Ministry documents show that Zhdanov did not 
drop the inquiry. On January 24, Mannerheim met with Zhdanov again, “informing 
him that both he as the President and Paasikivi as Prime Minister were interested in 
the matter”, but without soliciting a further response from Zhdanov.202 On 12 May 
1945, Zhdanov repeatedly “asked Prime Minister Paasikivi whether Finland would 
support a radical program for the betterment of Finnish-Soviet relations.”203  Zhdanov 
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went on to emphasize revealingly that “the Russians do not wish to touch Finnish 
business or conditions, but that they want Finland to remain independent and 
economically successful, further asking whether Paasikivi had a chance to get 
acquainted with Soviet treaties with France and Czechoslovakia.” Paasikivi replied 
that he considered “the treaty with Czechoslovakia not to be bad, but that this was his 
personal opinion, and that signing of a treaty with the Soviet Union depended on the 
Parliament.” The matter proceeded no further at the time. On 31 May 1945, Zhdanov 
informed Paasikivi that “the Soviet government in principle supported a treaty, that a 
treaty is being prepared in Moscow and the Soviets would inform the Finns further.” 
However, this did not take place until a Finnish trade relations delegation visiting 
Moscow in November 1947 brought up the possibility of a Soviet-Finnish treaty.204  
The 1945 Mannerheim-Paasikivi-Zhdanov exchange suggests that from the 
early postwar period both the Soviet and Finnish sides wished to achieve a political 
solution through an economic agreement on bilateral trade. This was a clearly 
different starting point than that of Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito and Edvard 
Kardelj enjoyed Partisan credentials that encouraged overconfident foreign relations 
with an emotional and tumultuous relationship critical of the Kremlin as argued in 
Chapter 1. The Finns, first under the leadership of Mannerheim and later Paasikivi, 
pursued a cautious working relationship with Moscow from 1945 to 1948. Zhdanov, 
had participated in the Finnish-Soviet armistice negotiations and spent several years 
in Helsinki. He himself proceeded with caution to reveal to Mannerheim Moscow’s 
desire for economic benefit from Finland and the possibility of a permanent solution 
to Finnish-Soviet relations.  The exchange represents more than “Zhdanov 





swallow[ing] Molotov’s remonstration” and Stalin’s simple conclusion that “the 
‘Sovietization’ of Finland would be a bloody and protracted struggle”, an “open 
wound” which the Soviets should not add to the existing struggles in the “Western 
Ukraine and the Baltic.”205 Stalin wished to rebuild the post-war Soviet economy and 
saw Finland as a source of assistance. Paasikivi, and later Prime Minister and 
President Urho Kekkonen, felt that economic concessions were preferable to political 
and territorial ones. They believed that Finland’s unequivocal acceptance of harsh 
Allied peace terms was necessary for any chance of future political independence. 
Nevertheless, the only other person to whom Paasikivi had relayed the information of 
the sensitive discussions with Zhdanov concerning a possible future treaty was 
Foreign Minister Carl Enckell, making Stalin’s letter of March 1948 a surprise for 
most of the Finnish political establishment, if not Paasikivi.206  
 Finnish members of parliament, like international observers, were unaware of 
the 1945 Soviet proposals. Instead, they associated the Soviet initiative with the 
recent coup in Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet-backed Communist Party took 
control of the government in February 1948. Yet the coup signaled to Paasikivi that 
Finland’s position was growing increasingly difficult. Prior to the Communist seizure 
of power, Western observers had been guardedly optimistic that Eduard Beneš’s 
coalition government could remain at least in some measure internally independent in 
exchange for its adherence to Soviet foreign policy.207  Czechoslovakia had already 
established favorable relations with Moscow, on the basis of the Soviet-Czechoslovak 
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Treaty of Friendship in 1943.208 Beneš himself had cultivated such ties during the 
war. The Soviets had wanted to show all states in the path of the Red Army (and 
Western states with large Communist parties, such as France and Italy) an example of 
amicable Soviet relations with a non-Communist leadership. The Czech coup carried 
out in February 1948, in the wake of Georgi Dimitrov’s announcement of a future 
Balkan Federation, helped to convince Western governments that Stalin’s intentions 
in Europe were expansionist. It made the Finnish policy of incipient neutralism more 
difficult to pursue, given its goal of political independence from Moscow.  
President Paasikivi and Speaker of the Parliament Kekkonen therefore 
considered Stalin’s 1948 invitation a political test for Finland based on the 1945 
proposals, a test both leaders were determined that Finland should not fail. In sharp 
contrast to the cocksure attitude of the Yugoslav leadership toward Soviet criticism of 
Yugoslav foreign and domestic policy in 1948, the Finnish leadership considered it 
important to engage deferentially with the Kremlin. The Soviets requested that a 
Finnish ministerial delegation arrive in Moscow for negotiations, but offered 
simultaneously to send a delegation to Helsinki.209 The Finns considered it important 
to appear as agreeable as possible in all non-essential diplomatic matters and dutifully 
arranged to travel to Moscow by Soviet aircraft.210 And so the Finnish leadership 
accepted the Soviet invitation, and the Finnish-Soviet negotiations for the Agreement 
on Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance began in Moscow on 25 March 1948. The 
Finnish Delegation consisted of Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala, Speaker of the 
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Parliament Kekkonen, Foreign Minister Enckell, Deputy Foreign Minister Reinhold 
Svento, Interior Minister Yrjö Leino,  Parliamentarians Karl Gustaf Söderholm and 
Onni Peltonen, and Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Carl-Johan Sundström. By this 
time the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was already underway: the Soviets had proceeded 
to withdraw their military and economic advisers from Belgrade on 18 March, and 
Tito had sent his first letter of protest to Molotov on 20 March. 
The Soviet leadership sought to secure their land borders from the Black Sea 
to the Baltic. Similar treaties for “Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance” signed 
with Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were also supplemented in early 1948 
with trade agreements, the kind of agreement denied to the Yugoslavs in February on 
the grounds that close cooperation with Tito’s leadership under Soviet tutelage was 
no longer possible. Moreover, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian cooperation treaty signed in 
Bled in September 1947, which Moscow had been deemed offensive to Soviet 
interests, and had also been titled a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance.” Tito and Kardelj seemed to have launched a competition over 
“friendship treaties” among states in the Soviet bloc. The leaderships of the Soviet 
and the Yugoslav parties were effectively competing for legitimacy through the 
signing of the friendship treaties.  
Paasikivi, on the other hand, considered Soviet goals for Finland to be 
more geopolitical and economic than ideological. Upon receiving the invitation, the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry had deemed these negotiations primarily a test to determine 
whether Finland could be trusted politically not to join a Western security alliance. In 




other big powers can make attempts to get to the Soviet Union through Finland.”211 
Ambassador Sundström, already in 1947 concluded in Moscow that  
The Russians based on their experiences of Finnish politics in the 
independence period see a close connection between [Finnish] domestic 
and foreign policy. Not to mention that in the previous course of hostile 
political relations [the Finnish leadership] was not even willing to create 
good commercial and cultural relations with the Soviet Union.212  
 
This Sundström considered a foolish misstep not to be repeated. The Finnish Foreign 
Ministry, unlike Tito and Kardelj, generally welcomed an opportunity to better 
relations with the Soviets by any means other than armed conflict. Sundström’s 
analysis emphasized that for the postwar Soviet Union, economic and cultural 
relations with territorially or politically bordering countries constituted political tests 
to secure their foreign policies.  
In fact, based on their analysis of Soviet goals, the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
expected drawn-out negotiations without the signing of an actual concluding 
document. The Finnish Delegation considered “the Soviet leadership to fear the 
international climate” if they forced a military treaty on democratic Finland.213   
Paasikivi also considered the negotiations an opportunity. All Finns were hoping to 
gain concessions modifying the Finnish-Soviet Peace Treaty, especially the harsh 
stipulations of free passage for Soviet troops and personnel to and from Porkkala 
Military Base and cutting off Finland from use the Saimaa Canal. The Finnish 
Foreign Ministry had requested negotiations over the canal in the beginning of 
February 1948.214 The discussions within the Finnish Negotiations Delegation for the 
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Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance in Moscow reveal their 
ambitious judgement that if the Soviets could gain assurance through a treaty that 
Finland would not allow a land-attack on the Soviet Union, perhaps Finland could 
regain sovereignty over both Saimaa and Porkkala. In other words, the ultimate goal 
of the postwar Finnish foreign policy in the spring of 1948 was to better define and 
establish territorial independence. Paasikivi first in 1944, and Kekkonen later in 1946, 
had proceeded to draft a foreign policy strategy for Finland after it became clear that 
Finland would lose the war to the Soviet Union. Both concluded that a new strategy 
would be necessary for Finland to regain and then maintain its sovereignty next to the 
Soviet Union as a non-Communist state. For Finland, neutralism meant limiting 
relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions to economic agreements, refraining from 
security alliances, limiting cooperation with Western intelligence agencies, and 
allowing for the existence of an active Communist Party. This strategy came later to 
be known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line in the sense of upholding a border line as 
noted in the Introduction. It sought through diplomatic means to re-gain and retain 
territorial sovereignty and secure freedom from further Soviet demands.215 However, 
before the 1948 Soviet political test for Finland, and the subsequent conclusion of the 
Finnish-Soviet treaty, the specific content and parameters of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line had not been drawn,  
Finnish-Soviet negotiations in the spring of 1948 demonstrate that, whereas 
Yugoslavia – a Communist state under Tito’s leadership facing the Soviets only along 
a political border – was able to secure Yugoslav independence from Moscow’s 
political influence by refusal to cooperate in a prolonged conflict, Finland – a 
                                                 




democratic republic located on the Soviet geographic border – had to negotiate a 
carefully configured political, security and economic package agreement for its 
independence. In 1948, wartime experience still mattered for the survival of both 
states. Tito’s Partisans had fought exclusively against the German or Italian forces, or 
their presumed local allies the Croat Ustaša and Serb Chetniks. Despite numerous 
disagreements between Tito’s and Stalin’s wartime leadership, these credentials still 
mattered in 1948. Finland had collaborated with Nazi Germany and consequently 
suffered heavy territorial losses, giving the new postwar Finnish leadership no leeway 
to refuse the Soviet request in 1948. The request for a friendship agreement was 
viewed as an opportunity to gain Soviet concessions but also as possibly threatening a 
lose of independence. As in the Yugoslav case, despite the involvement of Finnish 
parliamentary process (through Paasikivi’s appointment of two Parliamentarians to 
the Negotiations Committee), top leaders on the Finnish side were dominant, namely 
President Paasikivi and the then Speaker of the House Kekkonen, in their de-facto 
capacities as Soviet experts.  
 
The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line and the Origins of Finnish 
Neutralism 
Paasikivi’s turn of the century political career combined the experience a 
Tsarist-era advocate for Finnish national independence and an early 20th century 
decision to apply his legal education to finance. Born in 1870 and a Doctor of Law by 




international finance. He became the Head of the Treasury of the Russian Grand 
Duchy of Finland (maintaining that position until 1914) but also entered politics. He 
joined the Fennoman Conservative Party (from 1918 the National Coalition Party-
NCP), which opposed Russian ties and proposed an independent Finnish republic in 
the form of a monarchy. The Party’s slogan, “Swedes we are no longer, Russians we 
can never be, so let us be Finns”, originally coined in 1809, summarises well the 
party’s 19th century romantic-nationalist political ethos.216 Paasikivi was elected to 
the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta in 1907 but resigned in 1909 in protest of Tsar 
Nicholas II’s attempts at changing the laws that governed the autonomy of Finland. 
The Tsar had, for example, proposed the abolition of the Finnish senate.  
The principle of independence for the Finnish state governed Paasikivi’s 
political thinking throughout his career. He was not afraid to resign in political 
protest, and his 1909 resignation was only the first of many such acts. He served 
briefly as Prime Minister of the first government of independent Finland in 1918. 
Staying involved in Finnish-Soviet relations, Paasikivi headed the Finnish delegation 
in Tartu, Estonia that signed the Finnish-Russian peace treaty in 1920. In the interwar 
period Paasikivi established himself as a prominent banker in the private sector, only 
to be appointed in 1936 as Finland’s Ambassador to Sweden a country of primary 
political importance to Finland now facing not only the Communist Soviet Union but 
also Nazi Germany.  
Kekkonen was born in 1900, 30 years later than Paasikivi and thus further 
removed from Finland’s past as part of the Russian Empire. Kekkonen, like Paasikivi, 
sided with the White government during the Finnish Civil War (1918) between the 
                                                 




Reds and the Whites. Kekkonen fought as a troop commander taking part altogether 
in nine battles in six months. Like Tito, Kardelj and Paasikivi’s –  Kekkonen’s career 
prior to 1948 had revolved around intimate knowledge of and relations with the 
Soviets.217 He resigned his commission from the White Army in June 1918 and in 
July he became an investigator for the Military Police. Young Kekkonen was fiercely 
anti-Communist and his primary political ambition was to support independence of 
the Finnish state. In 1921 while enrolling as a student at the University of Helsinki 
Faculty of Law, Kekkonen simultaneously begun his professional career with the 
Etsivä Keskuspoliisi (EK) (Investigatory Central Police). The EK was founded in 
1919 as the Finnish state’s secret police. It became the Valtiollinen Poliisi (State’s 
police) in 1939 and the Suojelu Poliisi (Protection Police) in 1949. Throughout the 
1920s and the 1930s Kekkonen was therefore involved in the creation and subsequent 
organization of the Finnish Protection Police. This was none other than the Finnish 
counter-intelligence service that evolved from in the immediate aftermath of Finnish 
independence and civil war. The EK had its roots in the pre-1917 Finnish 
Independence Movement and intelligence gathering during the Civil War. According 
to its 1919 mandate the EK’s purpose was to “as a police department whose 
jurisdiction encompasses the entire state to monitor and prevent, when possible, all 
attempts and actions that are guided against the independence of the state, or which 
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can hinder general security of the state or its legal system.”218 Kekkonen felt a sense 
of duty to work for this organization whose principal task in the 1930s became 
counter-intelligence against the Soviet Union. His career within the police went ahead 
quickly, and the EK even sponsored his legal studies.219 Already in 1923 he became 
an Investigatory Detective and a Senior Investigator in 1925. Kekkonen worked for 
the Secret Police until 1927. For almost ten years following Finnish Civil War 
Kekkonen’s “primary opponent was the Soviet intelligence service, that practiced 
multilateral intelligence gathering in Finland, as well as on all Finnish 
Communists.”220 In 1927 Kekkonen having become a Doctor of Law entered politics 
by becoming an attorney for the Agrarians’ Party. He served as Justice Minister from 
1936-1937 and as Minister of the Interior from 1937-1939.  
During the Second World War, Paasikivi worked at the center of Finnish-
Soviet diplomacy. From October 1939, Paasikivi served as the Special Finnish 
Representative in Moscow and led Soviet-Finnish negotiations prior to the outbreak 
of the Winter War in November. In March 1940, Paasikivi headed the Peace 
Commission to negotiate the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty. In this capacity, Paasikivi 
was required to sign the treaty by which Finland ceded approximately one tenth of its 
territory. Paasikivi’s long-established credentials as a supporter of independence 
allowed his political career to survive the signing of this increasingly unpopular 
agreement. During the Second World War, he was hardly sympathetic to Nazi 
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Germany. He had served as Finland’s Minister to Moscow from March 1940 but 
resigned from the post in May 1941 when it became clear that the Finnish 
government would side with Nazi Germany against the impending Soviet summer 
offensive. From March 1944 Paasikivi served as negotiator of the Finnish-Soviet 
Peace Treaty in Moscow and as Prime Minister. Paasikivi then became President 
from March 1946 to February 1956, as elected in 1946 by the Parliament and in 1950 
by the Electoral College.221   
During the Second World War Kekkonen did not serve in government, which 
allowed him a more prominent postwar political role afterwards. His patriotic image 
was strengthened through his work with Karelian refugees from 1940 to 1943.  By the 
end of the war, he had become a harsh critic of the Moscow Peace Treaty that 
Paasikivi had signed. Kekkonen served as the Minister of Justice during the Finnish 
war-crimes trials of 1944-1946. Here Kekkonen’s duties included prosecuting those 
political leaders responsible for involving Finland in the war on the German side. 
Kekkonen had also accumulated an extensive amount of information on the Soviet 
and Finnish Communist leadership by 1948. In him, Paasikivi recognised a junior 
partner who was not a socialist and whose political philosophy mirrored his own 
recognition that the future of the state depended primarily on Finland’s relations with 
the Soviet Union. 
Beyond his unwavering commitment to an independent Finnish nation-state, 
Paasikivi was against public ownership of property. His political rivals most often 
came from the ranks of the Social Democrats and the Communists. From the minutes 
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of his meetings as President with his cabinet it is clear that Paasikivi was prone to 
speak frankly, not hesitating to criticize his colleagues. Perhaps because he had not 
supported the Finnish wartime alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941 Paasikivi was 
able to commit Finland to pay heavy war reparations to the Soviet Union in full; this 
Paasikivi perceived as necessary for the development of an untainted, postwar foreign 
policy within a parliamentary democracy. Despite his conservative ties to the private 
sector, Paasikivi was less concerned with the NCP than with the integrity of the 
Finnish state. His career was more alike that of a state representative than a party 
member. Ready to work across party lines, Paasikivi therefore sought out a leading 
role in Finnish negotiations with the Soviet Union. The origins of Finnish neutralism 
came not only from this readiness but also from a disposition to work around 
parliamentary pressures when needed. 
Fateful Negotiations in Moscow, 25 March –6 April 1948 
Paasikivi sent the delegation to Moscow in March 1948 despite the fact that 
nearly 80 percent of the Finnish Parliament were against any negotiations because 
they feared that these might lead to a treaty of military alliance. Kekkonen, attached 
to the Moscow negotiations, made certain that all decisions were finalized in Helsinki 
by Paasikivi. As the earlier discussions between Zhdanov and Paasikivi had indicated 
that the Kremlin unsurprisingly preferred to deal only with a few key figures.  
While Tito had not travelled to Moscow at Stalin’s summons in February 
1948, Paasikivi was also absent from these negotiations. This was most likely due to 
security concerns. The Finnish leadership feared a possible Soviet-led coup against 




most prominent figure, Paasikivi, were to leave the capital. Tito may have had similar 
concerns, but his decision to send his closest advisors, Kardelj and Djilas, in his place 
was primarily an act of defiance. Paasikivi intended no such defiance. He cleverly 
instructed both Prime Minister Pekkala and Minister of the Interior Leino, both from 
of the left-wing Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) to join in the 
Negotiations Committee, simultaneously appeasing the Soviets and cleverly 
removing the two most prominent left-wing figures from the Finnish capital. If Stalin 
intended to orchestrate a coup in Finland on the Czechoslovak model, the absence of 
the two most visible left-wing leaders would stand in his way.  
The content of the actual negotiations was carefully guarded. The Finnish 
President’s Office received only one copy of the record of the meetings and 
scrambled telegrams which deliberately contained only a rudimentary description of 
the proceedings. Shortly after treaty negotiations began, Paasikivi admitted to his 
cabinet, which remained in Helsinki, that “the handling of this kind of matter in this 
type of democracy is very difficult. Finnish plans [discussed in this meeting] cannot 
be made known to the Soviets, and cannot be leaked to newspapers – here [within the 
cabinet] we must maintain strict silence and secrecy… We are now facing a situation” 
in which secrecy is necessary.222  The Foreign Ministry rearranged its operations to 
keep the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry open 24 hours a day, manned only by the 
Secretary of the Foreign Ministry or his deputy in order to maintain confidentiality.223 
In the first two days of meetings, when one telegram (number 6) was accidentally 
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sent without coding the Foreign Ministry responded, in the strongest possible terms; 
“Open telegrams on these issues cannot be permitted to be sent”.224  
Despite Paasikivi’s absence from the bargaining table in Moscow, the 
negotiations were ultimately conducted from Helsinki. Kekkonen served as 
Paasikivi’s unofficial voice within the Finnish Delegation. Kekkonen and Paasikivi 
belonged to opposing political parties, the Agrarians’ Party (AP) and the NCP 
respectively, and Finland was about to face contentious Parliamentary elections in the 
spring of 1948 immediately following the talks with the Soviets. More strikingly, 
Kekkonen’s own Agrarians’ (renamed the Centre Party in 1956) vehemently opposed 
any military treaty with the Soviet Union, while Paasikivi supported one if it could 
lead to retaining territorial sovereignty.225  The electoral atmosphere and the anti-
Conservative but not pro-Soviet propaganda of the left-wing SKDL made Paasikivi’s 
and the cabinet’s efforts to proceed with diplomacy in Moscow more difficult. SKDL 
coalition included the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). Kekkonen regularly 
telephoned Paasikivi personally from Moscow with the news from the Delegation.226  
Most often, Kekkonen would inform other members of the Negotiation 
Delegation of these telephone conversations only after the fact. While the Delegation 
“dragged its feet and delayed informing the President and his cabinet for at least one 
and a half days” after the initial Soviet proposal, Kekkonen in Moscow often deferred 
to Paasikivi; he repeatedly emphasized to the Negotiations Delegation the authority of 
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the Presidency over the Parliament.227 Kekkonen defended Paasikivi in the 
Delegations’ internal discussions by reminding them “that the majority of the 
Parliament opposed Paasikivi’s initial readiness to send a Delegation; the President is 
deliberating whether to support the Delegation, he is isolated; the position of the 
President is even more difficult than ours”.228  
Kekkonen’s loyalty to Paasikivi in 1948, despite their ties to rival political 
parties, was based on their shared vision for the future of Finnish foreign policy, 
centred upon security from the Soviet Union, their common intimate accumulated 
knowledge of the Soviet Union, and also their similar educational backgrounds 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  
In the initial meeting in 1948 the Finns suggested a treaty according to 
“unofficial previous talks providing, in case of an attack on Finland, or through the 
territory of Finland against the Soviet Union, the attack would be defended by mutual 
forces in the circumstance that Finnish forces were not sufficient”.229 Earlier in 
February 1947, Paasikivi had stated that 
 the Finnish nation wishes to remain outside all possible kinds of 
conflicts. The Finnish nation wishes to maintain and develop friendly 
relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and fulfil the Finnish-
Soviet Peace Treaty diligently. The Finnish nation is ready as she is 
obliged by her independence to defend without hesitation her own 
territory against attacks and to resist each attack, which against Finnish 
territorial sovereignty, would be made against the Soviet Union.230  
 
This Finnish formulation for neutralism appeared in their first draft of the agreement 
handed over to the Soviets for consideration. It underlined “Finland’s intention to stay 
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out of international conflicts”, to which the Soviet representatives predictably 
objected.231  
The Kremlin sought instead a treaty comparable to their agreements signed 
with Hungary and Romania.232 Both the Hungarian and Romanian treaties contained a 
clause according to which both states “undertook the responsibility to negotiate [with 
the Soviet Union] in all important international matters”, which was absent from the 
Czechoslovak treaty.233 In response, Finnish leaders again requested that the 
Czechoslovak treaty from 1943 be considered as a model. Paasikivi’s cabinet agreed 
that the Romanian and Hungarian treaties contained ambiguous language that could 
be dangerous to Finland’s future.234 Paasikivi worried in particular that such wording 
could raise international concern over Finland’s political position and might be 
interpreted as extending to Finnish trade relations with the West.235 The long 20-year 
duration of the Romania and Hungarian treaties also troubled Paasikivi, given 
Finland’s ambitions for Scandinavian integration and bilateral trade with Western 
states.236 But he did give “the Delegation permission to go up to 20 years, although 
adding that 10 years would be better.”237 To avoid an analogous agreement, he asked 
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that Finland he recognized as being in a different geopolitical position from Hungary 
and Romania.238  
The Soviet side was however concerned with the treaty’s expeditious signing 
as a show of some Soviet authority and was therefore willing – to the great surprise of 
the Finnish Delegation—quickly to abandon the concept of an analogous agreement 
based upon previous models and to consider a Finnish draft as the basis for 
negotiation. The Soviet-Romanian Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Assistance had been signed on 4 February, only two days after the arrival of the 
Romanian Negotiations Delegation in Moscow on 2 February 1948, and just weeks 
after Dimitrov’s announcement of the future Balkan Federation to the international 
media.239  In mid-March, the Finnish side was not aware that Soviet difficulties with 
Yugoslavia were probably pushing them to come to terms with Helsinki. This 
pressure came clear only after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in June. 
Yet already in March, the Soviet press had signalled the urgency of an agreement 
prior to the commencement of the negotiations. Izvestia published news of Stalin’s 
proposal on March 5, and Pravda on March 14. Izvestia commented that “the 
democratic circles in Finland have received Comrade Stalin’s request with 
approval…as recent historic experience has demonstrated that aggression against the 
great Soviet Union stole from Finland its national neutrality and changed it into the 
weapon of foreign aggressors” (Note that this language hardly defines the Finns as 
“foreign” themselves).240 The official voice of the Soviet government insisted in an 
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increasingly forceful tone that “only politics of friendship with the Soviet Union can 
guarantee to Finland its national neutrality and state sovereignty. As the reactionary 
international forces are currently attempting to resurrect the power of Germany, it is 
natural, that democratic nations begin procedures to prevent the revival of German 
aggression.”241   
Soviet acceptance of a non-analogous agreement guaranteed that the Treaty 
would address only Finnish territory and thus would not obligate Finland to respond 
to an attack outside its borders. The Finnish side considered this an accomplishment. 
However, the Finnish leadership had miscalculated the tactical and strategic Soviet 
goals for the negotiations. Paasikivi had assumed that the Soviets were not actively 
seeking a treaty with Finland, no more than with Yugoslavia. Based on its 
understanding of Stalin’s foreign policy at the time, the Finnish Foreign Ministry had 
anticipated that the Soviet Union wished to avoid a reaction from the Western 
powers, and that they would hold some kind of negotiations to clarify Finnish-Soviet 
relations but stall on signing an actual treaty, as they were doing with Yugoslavia 
since February. But already on March 29, four days after their arrival, the Finnish 
Delegation was handed a Soviet revision of the Finnish proposal “that went very far 
[into detail] very fast” leading Prime Minister Pekkala in Moscow to conclude that 
“our assumptions were completely mistaken”.242  
The Soviets did however push for military privileges in Finland. The Soviet 
proposal countered the Finnish argument that “Finland should in the first place defend 
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its own territory” by suggesting that the Soviet Union would defend the territory of 
Finland “in agreement with Finland”.243 Finnish territorial defence was crucial to its 
goal of maintaining Finnish political and territorial independence. The Finnish 
Delegation, according to Paasikivi’s instructions, countered that Finnish sovereignty 
itself “obliges Finland to fight against an invasion against the Soviet Union through 
Finland…defence will take place because of independence.”244 The Finns feared a 
return to mere political autonomy – a concept that was familiar from Finland’s past as 
a Grand Duchy of Russia until 1917. Paasikivi and political theorist K. G. Idman, 
who had helped the President draft the ideological background of Finnish position of 
political neutrality, had both served under the Tsarist political establishment in the 
beginning of their political careers. They had spent their youth advocating for Finnish 
independence instead of autonomy. 
Paasikivi had briefed the Delegation on several guidelines prior to departure. 
The first was that “the agreement needs to be by its content and wording absolutely 
clear, so that it leaves no room for interpretation, which can violate the [Finnish] 
state’s independence and the nation’s sovereignty”.245 Secondly, “the purpose of the 
agreement can only be to deter an attack by Germany or its allies.”246 Thirdly, “if 
Finland’s own strength is not enough to deter an attack, the Soviet Union should upon 
Finnish request give Finland the necessary help.”247 According to Paasikivi’s 
instructions, “the treaty could only concern Finland’s own land, sea, and aerial 
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defence, and procedures could only become effective during wartime.”248 The initial 
Finnish proposal drafted in the language familiar from Paasikivi stated that “the 
Finnish nation sees it as its duty and its honour to defend its land and territory”.249  
Territorial self-defence was the tool by which, according to the emerging 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, Finland would guarantee Soviet territorial security in order 
to maintain its own political independence. Paasikivi considered the Soviet revisions 
completely contrary to Finnish expectations and goals of independent territorial 
defence, as the Soviets sought to defend Finnish territory “in agreement with 
Finland.”250. The Finnish Delegation in Moscow nervously argued amongst 
themselves about how to approach both the Soviets and Paasikivi. Kekkonen pressed 
the Delegation to consult the opinions of military experts and their knowledge of 
historical agreements between states to enable Finland to define the terms of the 
agreement in such a way that would leave Finland in charge of its own defence.251 
Interior Minister Leino argued that “This is a political question”, and that the 
“negotiations Delegation should itself have enough sense to state its own opinion 
before consulting any experts for theirs”.252 This provoked Kekkonen, to comment, 
“yes, I am ready to state my own opinion, which will not change on account of 
experts, but hearing the opinions of experts would be beneficial” for the analysis of 
texts and subsequent drafting of a legal counter-argument.253  
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Back in Helsinki, Paasikivi was greatly dissatisfied with the Delegation’s 
counter-proposal, which would have changed the revised Soviet wording to read, 
from “Finland would defend its territory together with the Soviet Union” to “Finland 
will defend its territory with the help of the Soviet Union and together with it.”254 
Paasikivi emphasized that Soviet assistance could be accepted only in the event of 
official requests from the Finnish government. He feared that “with the help of the 
Soviet Union” could be interpreted as granting the Soviets power to decide when they 
should “help” Finland – which would undermine his own goal for Finnish-Soviet 
relations: the guarantee of territorial independence. For once, Paasikivi felt 
insufficiently informed of the events in Moscow, and commenting angrily that “the 
proposal of the Negotiations Delegation was not sufficient, and that he himself 
[Paasikivi] did not have anyone to negotiate with” for further recourse.255 Disturbed 
by his own initial miscalculation of Soviet goals, dissatisfied with the proposed 
Soviet language and fearful of his isolation from events in Moscow, where he had 
been privy to key events since 1939 Paasikivi decided to stall the negotiations that 
had been proceeding swiftly up to this point. While the Delegation considered 
changing Paasikivi’s emphasis on the agency of “the Finnish nation” in the treaty’s 
wording to the “Finnish state’s leadership”, Paasikivi did abandon this nationalist 
rhetoric before the Delegation had time to do so. But he then turned to a series of 
stalling tactics. First, he stated that “the signing and empowering of the treaty [would] 
have to take place strictly according to the [republican] constitution”.256 Through the 
Presidential Office, Paasikivi could have authorised the Delegation either to sign or 
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refuse the agreement. Instead, he first called in his cabinet, followed by the 
Government’s Foreign Affairs’ Delegation and the Parliamentary Groups’ Chairmen, 
initiating an independent Parliamentary process of group meetings.257 Involving the 
oppositional Parliament would likely hinder agreement on a treaty with the Soviet 
Union. To make certain that his tactics succeeded, Paasikivi started this process 
without consulting the Delegation in Moscow or the Prime Minister, informing only 
Kekkonen of his decision over the telephone.  
Kekkonen steadfastly refused to support Pekkala’s recommendation to 
overrule the President’s initiative to involve the Parliament in the treaty process, 
announcing in the clearest of terms, “I am not with you, if we hurry this decision in 
order to blackmail [Paasikivi], but I am with you in requesting [further instructions 
from the President].”258 Moreover, Kekkonen refused to comply with the SKDL 
members proposal to remove Paasikivi’s wording concerning “the Finnish nation’s 
desire to remain outside international conflicts” from the Finnish proposal, remarking 
that this was a “sentence pronounced by the authority vested in the [President’s] own 
authority”.259 Paasikivi specifically requested that “Kekkonen and someone else be 
sent to inform him of the events in Moscow” after the first five days of 
negotiations.260  
Paasikivi acted quickly in Helsinki to stall a decision on the unexpectedly 
prompt Soviet proposal. He told the representatives in the parliament “that the 
government through its cabinet, and I as President would like to receive some kind of 
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information regarding the changes so that a treaty might pass through the 
parliament.”261 This invitation made sure that lengthy discussions would follow. 
Paasikivi told his cabinet meeting that in addition to countering the fast Soviet 
response, he wished to place the “Parliament in front of the real decision making 
process.”262 Whatever support this would win for the Paasikivi presidency, this 
approach would force the Kremlin to publicly recognize Finland’s elected, multi-
party Parliament as an equal partner in the negotiations. 263 Paasikivi knew very well 
that “the majority of the Finnish people would rather not have seen such an agreement 
made” and admitted that “we do not make this [agreement] gladly, but now that wars 
are what they are, we cannot do anything [to prevent a treaty].”264 Beyond stalling on 
the treaty, Paasikivi wanted Finland to acknowledge as broadly as possible that it 
could not defeat the Soviet Union or maintain independence through any possible 
war.  The best way for the state to cope with the circumstances was to distribute the 
burden of this acknowledgement across political party lines. Then on that basis, a 
treaty with the USSR could be signed.265  
Although Finnish foreign policy had in Paasikivi and Kekkonen a two-person 
spearhead for its goals and direction, the President’s recourse to the Finnish 
parliamentary process stood in stark contrast to the unilateral decision making of 
Kardelj and Tito. They alone in the spring 1948 determined Yugoslav policy towards 
the Soviet Union, in the form of hastily drafted letters to Stalin. During wartime in 
                                                 









Finland, it had been accepted procedure for the Prime Minister and the President to 
make foreign policy decisions through their executive offices without consultation. 
Now, three years after the war had ended, Paasikivi placed the matter of the Soviet-
Finnish treaty directly before the parliament, stating that “this is the business of the 
entire nation.”266 The Delegation negotiating in Moscow was angered by Paasikivi’s 
actions, as the parliamentary process he had initiated could not easily be curtailed. 
The Minister of the Interior Leino member of the Finnish Communist Party argued 
that irrespective of Paasikivi’s procedure, “the President can despite Parliamentary 
groups [involvement] agree to a particular solution”.267  Nevertheless, the Delegation 
worried that “if the [Delegation] should have to make an agreement, which the 
Delegation has the authority to do, it is possible that the Parliament despite this will 
not accept it.”268 More than anything, the Socialist Unity Party leader Pekkala feared 
that Soviet goodwill would be forfeited by Paasikivi’s turn to the slow parliamentary 
process.269 Both Leino and Pekkala feared losing votes in the impending elections. 
Eventually, in July 1948 their fears turned out to be true when the SKDL to which 
both belonged, became the largest loser in the parliamentary elections dropping a 
total of 11 seats in the parliament. At Paasikivi’s request, Kekkonen and the Finnish 
Ambassador in Moscow returned to Helsinki to brief Paasikivi and the Parliament on 
the course of events.270  
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In the end, after having consulted with Kekkonen, Paasikivi and his cabinet 
decided to authorize the Delegation to sign the Agreement on Friendship, 
Cooperation and Assistance on 6 April 1948. Ratification through the Parliament took 
much longer than the Soviets would have liked, but Moscow seemed satisfied with 
the Finnish agreement. Paasikivi was also satisfied, noting that “Molotov in particular 
had shown a certain amount of fairness by agreeing to the Finnish agreement’s 
wording” in the end rather than insisting the text be based on the Romanian and 
Hungarian agreements.271 This wording showed that Zhdanov in 1945 had been 
correct: the Soviet goal in regards to Finland was not to equate it with Romania and 
Hungary, but instead to benefit economically from the Finnish loss in the war and to 
seek Soviet territorial security. With the signing of the treaty, the parameters of the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had now been drawn in practice to the satisfaction of both 
Paasikivi and Kekkonen. The early Cold War was a time in which Soviet policies in 
Eastern Europe were still difficult to predict. Soviet intentions for the role of the other 
one-party states in Eastern Europe remained unclear as the international press 
polemic over the Balkan Federation discussed in Chapter 1 points out. Paasikivi was 
aware of the unsettled situation across the political Soviet border with Europe and 
cautiously commented in the final meeting with his cabinet over the treaty that 
“matters of foreign policy are such that in them one cannot tell whether the decision 
is the right one or the wrong one until 10-15-20 years after… In my view I am for the 
                                                 





signing of this agreement. But one cannot tell absolutely in matters of foreign policy. 
The chances favor the signing of this treaty.”272  
 
The Trade-Off Policy: Independence, Expanded Economic 
Ties, Curtailed Civil Liberties. 
The day after the signing, the Finnish Delegation quickly began pursuing the 
treaty’s secondary goal: a trade agreement with the Soviet Union.273 Privately, 
Paasikivi had instructed the Delegation that “first the treaty should be concluded, and 
afterwards economic matters could be discussed”.274 Paasikivi sought first to verify 
the political content of the treaty—the guarantee of Finnish independence—before 
fortifying the agreement through economic exchange. On the basis of his 
conversation with Stalin on April 6, Pekkala observed encouragingly that “this idea of 
trade negotiations is not foreign to Soviet goals either”, adding that “in order for us to 
reduce the amount of war reparations there are several tactics at our disposal”.275 The 
Finnish Delegation presented the Soviets with the somewhat tenuous proposition that 
after the signing of the agreement “the entire situation is completely different, the 
whole territory now serves as Leningrad’s security buffer. The Saimaa Canal should 
for also be accounted as a difficult economic issue.”276 With this the Delegation 
pointed out that since a treaty with Finland had been signed, the Kremlin could no 
longer claim a security threat from Finland. Therefore, the administration over the 
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Saimaa canal and other territory lost in the Paris Peace treaty should now be returned 
to Finland. Without mentioning the “deep-seated desire in Finland to regain at least 
some of the territories lost” in the Peace Treaty, the Finns requested “a correction” to 
the quantity of reparations Finland owned to the Soviet Union, as compensation 
earned from the signing of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement.277 Popular 
opinion in Finland urged the initiation of negotiations to regain the lost Karelian 
territories. Paasikivi had publicly and eloquently declared on several occasions that 
“it is impossible to consider the kind of trade-off, that land, which is eternal, is traded 
for a different matter, an agreement, which is legal.”278 Paasikivi and for that matter 
the Delegation also understood privately, clearly that “the Soviets would not negotiate 
over territory.”279  
The Finnish Ministerial Delegation had been told in meetings as early as 
November 1947 that “war reparations are an economic [and not political] matter.”280 
After the signing of the 1948 treaty, People’s Commissar for Internal and Foreign 
Trade Anastas Mikoyan and the Finnish Ministry of Economy were placed in charge 
of the negotiations. Yet for Kekkonen, the Finnish politician most skilled in Soviet 
matters in Moscow at the time, the question of reparations “[was] not an economic 
question, but a political one.”281 The Yugoslavs, having pursued trade negotiations 
through the Ministry of Economy, failed to reach an agreement. They had failed the 
test of granting the Soviets favorable economic terms to reaffirm political loyalty in 
the aftermath of Tito’s dealings with Dimitrov. Kekkonen considered it crucial to 
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pursue the economic counterpart for the political Agreement on Friendship, 
Cooperation and Assistance precisely as a device for political leverage.  He stated that 
“even if the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty passed within the Parliament, I am 
certain, that the Delegation will be heavily criticised if it leaves without proposing 
some amendment to war reparations.”282 Kekkonen, using the ratification of the treaty 
as leverage and political capital, directly initiated the Finnish approach to Molotov 
the very next day.283 
Kekkonen succeeded in his initiative to consolidate this Finnish policy of 
neutralism. The economic negotiations proceeded according to the Finnish plan. In 
June 1948 the Soviet Union announced that it would reduce its claims for the 
remainder of war reparations by 50 percent, which amounted to approximately $75 
million.284 The reduction was mostly applied to timber and cable deliveries.285 On 
November 10, a Finnish Ministerial trade Delegation arrived in Moscow. The new 
trade agreement signed on 17 December 1948 was greeted by the Finnish government 
as a success.286 Although the Soviets had focused on acquiring metallurgy and 
machine tools, the largest Finnish exports to the Soviet Union were to become 
500,000 m² wooden houses and cellulose products.287 The most important Soviet 
imports to Finland were wheat, corn, sugar, iron, petrol, petrol-chemical derivatives. 
The Soviet Union agreed simultaneously to reduce two-thirds of the penalties applied 
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towards goods not delivered in the previous year 1947. This amounted to $600,000. 
The Finnish-Soviet trade in 1948 grew by 80 percent from the previous year 1947 to 
$90 million.288  
Transformation of the Finnish Foreign Ministry Following 
the Finnish-Soviet Treaty. 
 
The role of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, like that of its Yugoslav counterpart, 
was transformed as a consequence of the events of 1948. While the Yugoslav 
Ministry became a more extensive and professional organization throughout the 
1950s, the Finnish-Soviet treaty established a new domestic role for the Finnish 
Ministry, curtailing the public expression of anti-Soviet views. It struggled, especially 
in the early postwar years, with this new task of restraining various expressions of 
anti-Soviet, anti-Russian, and anti-Communist sentiment in Finland. Ministry 
officials tended not to discuss the reasons behind such feelings or to argue against 
their existence. But in their correspondence they recognised, especially following the 
Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the detrimental effect of the expression of anti-Soviet 
sentiments on the maintenance of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Their correspondence 
did discuss the unfortunate consequences of anti-Soviet expressions in Finland for 
Finnish foreign policy. The Soviets themselves carefully monitored Finnish popular 
sentiment and used evidence of anti-Communism to suggest a security risk to the 
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Soviet Union given the border with Finland. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was based 
upon the elimination of any security risk to the Soviet Union along this territorial 
border. The Foreign Ministry did not consider that pursuing this strategy would 
crucially jeopardize the functioning of Finnish civil society and thus have a 
detrimental effect on Parliamentary process, but they nonetheless felt obliged to limit 
freedom of expression in Finland. From 1946, the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
considered the preservation of autonomous Finnish parliamentary procedure a goal 
best served by observing the Kekkonen-Paasikivi Line even if it meant curtailing the 
freedom of expression.  
Pushing Ministry officials into this new role were Moscow’s protests against 
anti-Soviet manifestations directly to them rather than to other ministries or to the 
judiciary. In December 1948, Soviet Ambassador Fedorov wrote an official complaint 
against the staging of the Aarne Sihvo play “Infantryman’s Bride” and Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s “Dirty Hands” in two theatres in Helsinki.289 The Soviets claimed that these 
plays were “mean-spirited and served as provocations against the Soviet Union…[and 
that] these and other cases are not in harmony with Finland’s obligations”.290 In the 
difficult conditions following the Tito-Stalin split, Enckell and the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry staff had developed a formulaic response to Soviet attempts to control 
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Finland’s civil society. Upon reading the Finnish translation of Fedorov’s letter, 
Enckell simply crossed out Fedorov’s typewritten word “obligations” and wrote over 
it by hand, “neutrality” in private protest.291 He requested an official response from 
the Ministry of Education to the Soviet complaint, which now read,  
The Ministry of Education has asked for an explanation [of the staging of 
Dirty Hands] from the Director of the Finnish National Theatre, Eino 
Kalima, and from the Secretary of the Finnish Theatre Organizations 
Union, Verner Veistäjä…our understanding is that it is impossible to 
think that Professor Kalima, who is known as a sincere friend of the 
Soviet Union, would have staged the play Dirty Hands with the intention 
of humiliating the Soviet Union. The musical ‘Infantryman’s Bride’ is 
not being shown in its original format but as a musical comedy.292   
 
Both plays were then removed from the stage within five days of the original Soviet 
complaint.293 The Interior Ministry ordered the Ministry of Education to carefully 
consider whether the showing of the original film version of “Infantryman’s Bride” 
should be banned.294  In response to this incident (and a concurrent physical 
altercation between Soviet Embassy officials and Helsinki police officers in 
December 1948), the Finnish Interior Ministry filed a “general note to the department 
of criminal investigations” on the day the plays were officially removed from the 
stage bill.295 This note asked that,  
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for the purposes of the common good of the country and the nation it 
is indispensable that irresponsible persons do not commit acts or 
propose statements which can create a danger that the relations of 
Finland towards a foreign state are harmed. On this account, the 
Minister of the Interior encourages the police to carefully observe 
these, R.L. number 4, a section of the Law of 8 May 1948, declaring 
that punishable acts endangering the country will not take place in 
any shape or form and that expedient and effective procedures will be 
carried out immediately upon discovery of any such acts.296  
 
The Finnish strategy in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split and the signing of 
the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was thus entirely different from that of the 
Yugoslavs. While Tito’s leadership answered complaints over anti-Soviet feelings 
with contempt and sarcasm, the Finnish Foreign Ministry dutifully and efficiently 
appeased the Soviets in controlling civic and cultural conduct. Copies of the internal 
instruction to prevent anti-Soviet manifestations were included in Enckell’s reply to 
Fedorov, along with a reassurance that “the Finnish authorities have continuously 
paid careful attention to the expression of anti-Soviet opinions.”297 As the extent of 
the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s response to Soviet demands was still being defined, 
Enckell had added in his first draft of the letter to Fedorov that on that very day, “A 
construction worker at a shop in Nokia had been arrested on the order of the President 
of Finland to the Interior Ministry; this person had made insulting comments against 
leading persons of the Soviet Union in Tampere and has been placed under subpoena 
on account of his insulting statements”.298 In the final version, Enckell scratched out 
this sentence, so as not even to inform the Soviets of the incident. The arrest itself 
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nevertheless illustrates the determination of the Finnish authorities to prevent any 
occasion for Soviet complaint.   
It was the Foreign Ministry that was initially responsible for spelling out the 
specifics of Finnish neutralism as its Soviet policy. Enckell, of secondary importance 
in Paasikivi’s cabinet and correspondence until May 1948, now acquired a key role in 
shaping how the neutralism would be implemented as a domestic policy. As indicated 
above, Enckell himself would decide which information to forward to the Soviets 
regarding anti-Soviet demonstrations, and how to subsequently appease the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry. The success of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, Finland’s territorial 
security and economic future rested on his performance. In Yugoslavia, the initial 
response to Soviet attempts to confirm Yugoslavia’s loyalty was set by Tito, Kardelj 
and Djilas. Yet, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, after Kardelj became the 
Foreign Minister in the second half of 1948, the content and execution of this new 
policy of independence begun to transfer with him to the Foreign Ministry of 
Yugoslavia. After Kardelj’s departure in 1953 the independent role of the Yugoslav 
Ministry increased throughout the 1950s, culminating in the Ministry’s role in turn to 
Non-Alignment after 1961. The Yugoslav Ministry grew into this role through the 
increase of resources and the placement of Tito’s trusted confidant as Foreign 
Minister. The Finnish Ministry received no additional funding to execute its 
complicated task of enforcing neutralism across all state institutions, especially 
through the domestic police and judicial system. At the same time, the Finnish 




connection with the Yugoslav counterpart that would fall into place after Stalin’s 
death in 1953.  
Western and Yugoslav Responses to the Soviet-Finnish 
Agreement  
Western observers were concerned that the Finnish trade agreement and its 
political trade-offs with the Soviet Union would undermine the neutralism promised 
by the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. On 1 March 1948, the New York Times linked the 
Soviet proposal to Finland directly to the recent coup in Czechoslovakia. The article 
warned that,  
In the familiar style introduced by Hitler, Stalin his erstwhile partner 
and eager imitator in enslaving other countries, has quickly followed up 
the conquest of Czechoslovakia by reaching out to grab Finland. He has 
served a blunt demand on the Finnish government for an immediate 
‘pact of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance’ which, like 
similar Soviet pacts with the Baltic and the Balkan states, could only 
mean the end of that country’s independence and a first step towards its 
ultimate sovietisation.299   
 
The Times article further concluded that the Soviet-Finnish “pact is also directed 
against the United States” because the Soviet proposal mentioned Soviet agreements 
with Romania and Hungary, “treaties that are not merely against Germany but also 
against ‘any other state which would directly or in any other form unite with 
Germany in a policy of aggression. Since Germany is included in the European 
Recovery Program, and since that program is denounced by Russia as a measure of 
                                                 




American ‘imperialist aggression,’ the pact is also directed against the United 
States”.300  
The Finnish leadership was aware of international wariness about neutralism. 
The Delegation’s military advisor had reminded them in Moscow,  that they should 
carefully consider that “this agreement will be interpreted in the world, and especially 
in Sweden and Norway, under a magnifying glass. For this reason, its stipulations on 
territorial defence should be as clear as possible” to avoid unnecessary international 
fears over the Soviet military’s role in Finland. In the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin 
split and the signing of the Finnish-Soviet Agreement, individual analysts and policy-
makers were questioning neutralism’s ability to succeed next door to a strong military 
power. Did not the Soviet ability to directly monitor Finnish public life represent a 
dangerous level of Soviet influence over Finland?  
No government was more sceptical of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line’s ability 
to succeed in securing Finnish political independence than that of Sweden. In 
November 1947, a rumour reached the Dutch Ambassador in Stockholm, according to 
which “the government of the Soviet Union had proposed to the government of 
Finland that it join the Soviet Union”.301 Such baseless reports were taken seriously, 
as Finnish neutralism after the Second World War depended on the careful 
configuration of security arrangements between Scandinavian countries. While 
Norway and Denmark would quickly join NATO in 1949, Swedish membership 
would have brought the Western alliance to the border with Finland. The Swedish 
leadership, from the early postwar period in 1947, felt that the Finnish commitment to 
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neutralism was not stable enough to prevent overt Soviet predominance in any period 
of increased tension. The Swedes did not wish to exchange their Finnish neighbor for 
a Soviet one. While neutral status had helped Sweden to escape most burdens of the 
atrocities of the Second World War, the Swedes remained suspicious of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line from its inception and fearful of Soviet infiltration. From the Swedish 
perspective, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line forced Sweden to remain formally outside 
any Western security alliances. Rumors of the permeability of Finnish domestic and 
foreign policy to Soviet influence, as reported by the Swedish government, were 
commonplace in the late 1940s and early 1950s.302 
Despite the critical attitude in the Swedish government and the American 
press, Finland found superpower support for its neutralism from the US State 
Department. It led the way in strong, but mostly unpublicized Western support for 
Finnish policy in 1948 and later in more public support for the Yugoslav version of 
the 1950s. The Finnish Foreign Ministry kept the United States informed through its 
Washington embassy on the status and progress of Finnish-Soviet relations. By 1946 
the Finnish Foreign Ministry had established a pattern of consultation with the State 
Department on the course of Finnish-Soviet relations. In the spring of 1946, on the 
concluding day of the visit of a Finnish Ministerial delegation to Moscow, Finnish 
representative Lauri Havinki in Washington visited the State Department to provide a 
briefing on Finnish-Soviet relations. For its part, the State Department “expressed 
optimism toward the progress of Finnish-Soviet peace treaties negotiations in Paris”, 





concluding that the early success of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations “points towards 
the Soviet Union being increasingly more interested in cooperation”.303  
These periodic debriefings became routine even as US expectations of “Soviet 
cooperation” faded after 1946. During the Finnish-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation 
Treaty negotiations, Finnish representative M. Waltimo visited the State Department 
to brief officials on the events in Moscow. The Truman administration, unlike the 
American press, did not worry about the implications of the Soviet-Finnish 
negotiations but had expected them and understood the difficult Finnish position as a 
state physically bordering the Soviet Union. “The State [Department] expects Finland 
to sign some kind of a treaty with the Soviet Union, [and the State Department] has 
been very pleased with the way Finland has handled the negotiations so far.”304 The 
State Department’s judgement of the Soviet approach at the time, as communicated to 
a Finnish diplomat, was that “the attacks against Scandinavian countries in the Soviet 
press serve the purpose of frightening these states away from the Marshall Plan, but 
the State Department is convinced that the actual effect [of the Soviet policy] will be 
opposite, heralding a closer than before cooperation with Scandinavian western 
powers.”305 
The Finnish leadership also kept the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry informed 
over the course of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations in the spring 1948. On 15 March 
1948, during the reception for the 100-year anniversary of the Hungarian revolution 
in Belgrade, Finnish charge d’affaires Ville Niskanen described to the Yugoslav 
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Foreign Minister Simić the Finnish outlook on Moscow’s proposal for treaty 
negotiations.306 Niskanen explained the parliamentary opposition to the proposed 
pact. Simić expressed the somewhat surprising view that Finland should agree to a 
pact with the Soviet Union “now especially after the war when [according to the Paris 
Peace Treaty] Finland is only allowed minimal army; [Finnish] domestic forces are 
not enough even to begin a defence” of the country.307 But Simić and the Yugoslav 
leadership were also interested in finding out “whether the Soviets had proposed any 
special protocols” for Finland. Niskanen underlined Moscow’s growing pressure on 
Finland in recent months as exerted through the Soviet press. Simić remarked that “if 
Finland refused to sign the pact sooner or later this will lead to an accident. While 
Tito and Kardelj had abandoned any Yugoslav opportunity for a treaty, Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister Simić was not, as noted in Chapter 1, a member of this inner circle. 
Like his Ambassador in Moscow he would not have known about the abandonment, 
helping us to understand why was suggesting here that Finland should agree to a 
treaty. Simić asked Niskanen “if Finland was afraid that a pact with the Soviets would 
mean that the old relations with the West would get cold, or whether Finland feared 
‘all-consuming Communism’?” Niskanen cautiously replied that “Finns fear both.”  
Niskanen sent the report of this conversation as a special communiqué for the 
Negotiations Delegation being prepared in Helsinki, with the curious remark that 
“Simić is neither a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, nor a ‘secret 
Communist”, indicating that the diplomatic exchange between the Finnish 
representation and the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry should be marked as one 
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coordinated by the Communist leadership in Belgrade of Moscow but as an 
autonomous and informative exchange. Niskanen even compared Simić’s political 
background to Paasikivi’s. Niskanen knew that Simić, a veteran of the Serbian army 
in the Balkan Wars and the First World War, had served in the Foreign Ministry of 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1920 and as Counsellor in the 
Yugoslav legation in Paris from 1935 until retiring in 1938. Reactivated in 1939, 
Simić became the London government’s Ambassador to Moscow from 1943 to late 
1944. Only then did he resign from that government to join Tito’s, first as its first 
Ambassador to the US from April 1945 to January 1946 and then as Foreign Minister 
from February 1946 to August 1948. Like Paasikivi and Kekkonen, Simić had special 
experience with the Soviet leadership, having spent part of the war in Moscow. While 
the two Finnish leaders’ Soviet experience would be counted a valuable asset by the 
Finnish political establishment in 1948, Simić’s background cost him the position of 
Foreign Minister in the same year. The need for some non-Communist presence in the 
postwar Communist governments of Eastern Europe, initially at Soviet insistence, had 
long since passed in Yugoslavia when the split with Stalin pushed the Tito regime to 
advertise its own Communist credentials. 
In addition to such personal conversations, Niskanen in Belgrade noted in 
April 1948 that the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations “received much 
attention from the official circles in Yugoslavia…because it was recognized that 
[Finland and Yugoslavia] were approximately in the same geopolitical position.”308 
On 9 April 1948, adding the Yugoslav daily Politika republished an article on the 
Finnish-Soviet treaty from Izvestia complete with the Soviet announcement that 
                                                 




“from the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland it can clearly be seen 
that the Soviet Union treats Finnish national independence and state sovereignty with 
full respect”. State sovereignty was already an issue which the Yugoslav Communist 
Party wished to emphasize in April 1948. After the treaty was signed at the very end 
of May 1948, Niskanen marked a change in the way he was treated by Simić: “I feel 
that the Foreign Minister has become more helpful; we have been looking for some 
space for the representation for three months without being able to gain the Foreign 
Ministry’s permission. Now after the signing of the treaty, the Foreign Ministry 
instead helped us to find a property where we can move into”. Moreover, Niskanen 
remarked all of a sudden the Yugoslav Ministry of Trade had begun to approach the 
Finns. From the end of May 1948 there were frequent negotiations over imports of 
Finnish cellulose, wooden structure and paper. 
Finland after the Split 
The eruption of the Tito-Stalin split seems to provide only a sharp contrast to 
the Finnish agreement with the Soviet leadership guaranteeing Soviet border security 
along its territorial border, along with favorable trade relations in exchange for 
Finnish state sovereignty. There were however important similarities that paved the 
way for Finnish and Yugoslav policies towards the Soviet Union. Finland and 
Yugoslavia were both close to the expanding and solidifying Soviet influence in 
Eastern Europe. Both states were led by strong political partnerships in Tito and 
Kardelj, Paasikivi and Kekkonen, who guided their national political frameworks in 
determining the course of their foreign relations with the Soviet Union. Following 




Finnish-Soviet negotiations, Kekkonen ultimately emerged as Paasikivi’s successor 
as President in 1956. Kardelj similarly emerged as Tito’s closest collaborator in 
Yugoslavia after solidifying his relationship with Tito through his role as Foreign 
Minister in the difficult times of 1948. In the end, Helsinki was able to secure a 
treaty. Initially risking parliamentary opposition in order to gain time and build multi-
party consensus, these key leaders’ steadfast collaboration and cautious vision for the 
postwar Finnish-Soviet relations prevailed.  
The events of 1948 admittedly spelled out different futures for the Finnish and 
the Yugoslav states, aside from providing independence from the Soviet Union. 
Finland continued to function as a multi-party parliamentary democracy, while Tito’s 
party alone governed Yugoslavia. Tito, unlike Paasikivi, was not interested in a 
negotiated relationship with the Soviet Union in 1948, and the Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations did not find stability until the very late 1950s when the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry gained primacy in Yugoslav-Soviet relations.  
In Finland, Paasikivi would retain the office of President until 1956. Although 
losing his Presidential bid to Paasikivi in 1950, Kekkonen remained Prime Minister in 
separate governments, 1950-1953 and 1954-1956. He served as Foreign Minister in 
1953 and 1954 as well. It is no coincidence that Kekkonen, with his professional 
police background, became Paasikivi’s formidable successor, purposefully taking 
control of Finnish neutralism policy back for the executive office of the President 
from 1956 to 1981, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Paasikivi had involved the 
Parliament in the 1948 treaty negotiations to prevent a treaty similar to Soviet treaties 




Kekkonen Line. Only by underlining the difference between the Soviet political 
process with one-party Communist states and Finland with its freely elected 
parliament did Paasikivi feel that he could establish neutralism as a policy in 1948. 
However, the cooperation between Paasikivi and Kekkonen during the 1948 
negotiations shows that both clearly wanted to manage Soviet relations themselves 
despite referring to the parliament for the ratification of the treaty. This was tactical. 
As Soviet-Finnish relations in 1948 after the ratification of the treaty showed that the 
Foreign Ministry would be in charge of handling Soviet demands for curtailment of 
Finnish anti-Soviet public expressions and anti-Soviet politics, Kekkonen after 
Paasikivi asserted complete control over the Ministry. These longer term 
consequences of 1948 for Finland stood in stark contrast to the consequences of the 
Tito-Stalin split in Yugoslavia. While the Finnish Foreign Ministry became an 
institution subservient to and led by President Kekkonen after 1958, the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry after tenure of Tito’s confidant Kardelj as Foreign Minister became 
a bureaucracy autonomous from the top party leadership and able to initiate policy 
independently in 1958. That could not have taken place without the many times 
multiplied demands that the Kremlin’s attacks against Yugoslavia across the Soviet 
bloc placed on the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry from July 1948 forward. While fending 
off Soviet demands eventually placed the Finnish Foreign Ministry under Presidential 
control, the need to fight Soviet propaganda gave the Yugoslav Ministry under 
Kardelj eventual autonomy in policy analysis. Kekkonen more than Paasikivi felt that 
successful policy of neutralism could only be conducted from the executive office of 




and the Finnish police, redirected the execution of these policies to the President’s 
Office in the uncertain circumstances of the Hungarian revolution, rescinding most of 
the parliamentary (civic) responsibility Paasikivi had granted the Foreign Ministry in 
1948.  
Despite the different trajectories of the Finnish and the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministries which set off from their Soviet relations in 1948, Yugoslavia and Finland 
found themselves in similar positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at the end of that 
year. Both states, outside the Soviet bloc but under continuous Soviet political 
pressure, placed high value on correct analysis of their relations with the Soviet 
Union. Contacts between Finland and Yugoslavia begun to be built in Belgrade in 
1948 after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform. But they could only solidify, 
as we shall see in Chapter 3, once the death of Stalin had opened the way for 
Yugoslavia to come to terms with the Soviet Union on a path that was now 







Chapter 4: The Death of Stalin and the Beginning of a Beautiful 
Yugoslav-Finnish Friendship 
 
At the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948, we had a ‘moderate’ 
opinion about the significance of the agreement, while now we must 
say that the results of the agreement exceeded our most daring hope.309  
 
6 April 1953 V.M. Molotov 
 
Josef Stalin’s death was announced on 5 March 1953. Finnish and Yugoslav 
representatives were both reporting that members of Moscow’s international 
diplomatic corps feared an immediate hardening of the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union.310 These accounts predicted that this hardening would manifest itself in the 
Soviet-controlled territories of Eastern Europe, and especially in East Germany. 
Many in Moscow did not perceive Soviet foreign policy as directed toward East Asia, 
despite the Korean conflict. At least for the diplomatic observers quoted in Finnish 
and Yugoslav reports for March 1953, Europe was more important for Soviet military 
strategy. Although the growing East-West competition would probably become 
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global, the prospect of further consolidation in Eastern Europe was unsurprisingly 
more worrying to regimes bordering the Soviet bloc. 
On the eve of Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia’s representation in Bonn reported an 
American expectation “of the onset of a period of internal accounting [in the Soviet 
Union] which could lead to unforeseen consequences…demonstrating a concern that 
Moscow could at any moment easily enter into threatening war adventures. Stalin had 
been against such threats and now the onset of the strengthening of the danger of war 
is widely expected in all local diplomatic and political circles.”311 The Yugoslav 
diplomats in Bonn were confused. After his death, Stalin’s leadership was suddenly 
being regarded as having maintained pragmatic restraint in postwar Europe. 
Diplomatic observers from Sweden and Norway as well as West Germany feared the 
onset of a military-led reactionary leadership in Moscow.  
The Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs, highly sensitive to any such turn 
in Soviet leadership, directed its immediate attention to Helsinki in March 1953.312  
The ministry, keen to gauge the perhaps dangerous but also possibly opportune future 
for Soviet-Yugoslav relations after Stalin’s death ordered the Helsinki Embassy 
separately and specifically to note “all, and the least, details which would demonstrate 
the changing of Soviet internal and external politics; these need to be recorded 
diligently, analysed and inform Belgrade about.”313 The Yugoslav Ministry did not 
look for advice in the NATO capitals of Western Europe that expressed fears of a 
hardening in interpreting the consequences of Stalin’s death because their position 
was different. Instead, the Ministry sought out the position and sources of information 
                                                 
311DASMIP, F-84, “SSSR”, 5.3.53. 43026. 
312 DASMIP, F-26, “Finska”, 20.4.1953. 45671. 




of Finland, termed in a March 11 report, as “a Nordic state… on the Soviet-European 
border,” to be of best use to them immediately upon Stalin’s death.314 On the basis of 
his sources in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Yugoslav Ambassador in Helsinki Slavko 
Zore completed a five-part, 21-page analysis titled “Stalin’s Death” by early April.315 
According to Zore, the Finnish Foreign Ministry disagreed with the fearful 
expectations originating in Bonn. His main argument was that the Finns perceived 
Stalin’s death as a political opportunity and were not fearful of the future of Finnish-
Soviet relations. Zore concluded that the Soviet Union was instead actively seeking 
engagement in Europe. Yugoslav interest in the Finnish reading of Soviet affairs 
would grow from this point forward. This Finnish position, and the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry’s interest in bettering relations with Moscow, formed the basis for 
Yugoslav-Finnish dialogue in 1953 and is the main topic of this chapter. 
Stalin’s death would irrevocably alter the power structure of Soviet domestic 
politics, although these changes were not immediately apparent. At the top, these 
changes culminated in Nikita Khrushchev becoming Soviet party leader in 1953 and 
Soviet Prime Minister in 1958.316 His accession combined with the focus of Soviet 
foreign policy on Europe worked to the strategic advantage of Finland and 
Yugoslavia. As the Soviet leadership sought internal order in the aftermath of Stalin’s 
death, both states were able to extract political and economic concessions from the 
Soviet Union between 1953 and 1955. Helsinki and Belgrade found themselves in the 
common process of renegotiating their respective bilateral relations with Moscow. 
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Cultural, political and economic contact between Finland and Yugoslavia grew 
exponentially from 1953 forward. As a consequence of these contacts, and the 
appointment of Koča Popović to succeed Edvard Kardelj as Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister in 1953 Yugoslavia adopted a foreign policy of neutralism similar to that of 
Finland in its relations with the USSR. Simultaneously, as already noted in Chapter 2, 
in 1953 Urho Kekkonen served as both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister in 
separate governments between 1953 and 1954 under President Juho Kusti Paasikivi 
as his partner in guiding a Finnish policy of neutralism. Kekkonen was instrumental 
in solidifying Helsinki’s bargain of neutralism with Moscow. His focus on Finnish-
Soviet relations is also an element that attracted the Yugoslav Ministry’s attention. 
Subsequent exchanges between the two foreign ministries demonstrate that 
first Finland, and then Yugoslavia, situated along the border of the Soviet bloc found 
Stalin’s death to be an opportunity to improve their relations with Moscow. Already 
in June 1953, Yugoslavia re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.317 
In 1955, the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement liberated the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
from its previous concentration on monitoring the Soviet’s anti-Yugoslav propaganda 
acts and deflecting military threats. The Ministry could now pursue international 
bilateral contacts outside the Soviet bloc with its extensive international network of 
embassies.  
Instead of a military takeover, Lavrenty Beria and Georgi Malenkov nearly 
succeeded in taking over Soviet foreign policy.318 Beria and Malenkov initially vied 
with Vyacheslav Molotov and Khrushchev for the political leadership of the Soviet 
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Union. But the feared Beria was soon executed and Khrushchev then defeated all 
other political competitors, including the hard-line Molotov. Khrushchev’s rise to 
power incorporated political concessions to Finland and Yugoslavia, far from the dire 
expectations first reported from Moscow.319  
 
Helsinki’s Predictions for Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe. 
Finnish newspapers initially reported that the death of Stalin was a threat to 
world security and especially to Finland’s. It was feared that Molotov – “publicly 
known for his unfriendly attitude towards Finland” – would eventually come to 
power. Molotov had served as Soviet People’s Commissar and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 1939 to 1949, from the Second World War through the Tito-Stalin split. 
The Finnish public remembered him as the leading figure in the Soviet attack on 
Finland in 1939-40 and the 1944 offensive, dubbing the most effective new Finnish 
weapon in the warfare as the “Molotov cocktail.”320 Similar fears were put forward in 
the Belgrade popular press, where Molotov’s role in the expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform in 1948 as Stalin’s then most trusted foreign advisor remained 
infamous. Yet early on – contrary to the international speculation of the dangerous 
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future of Soviet foreign policy in Europe – the Finnish Foreign Ministry noted signs 
of a softening of Moscow’s foreign policy stance.321 Its reports saw this relaxation to 
be the result of three factors: 1) the need to address internal conditions, particularly 
the low Soviet standard of living, 2) a power struggle among high level Soviet 
leadership for Stalin’s position that was expected to continue for an extended period 
of time, and 3) external pressures, including problems posed by the emergence of 
South Korea and West Germany.322 This information was passed on to Belgrade 
through its Helsinki Embassy in reports of April 1948. As key evidence, the Finns 
pointed to the Soviet approval of Dag Hammarsjöld’s election as United Nations 
Secretary General on 10 April 1953. Following the November 1952 resignation of 
Trygve Lie, whose second term as Secretary General the Kremlin had not supported, 
the Soviets vetoed several candidates before the nomination of Hammarsjöld of 
Sweden. His near-unanimous election in early April despite his pro-Western 
reputation, was interpreted by the Finnish Foreign Ministry as a conciliatory Soviet 
gesture. 
When their trade negotiations with the Soviets reached a standstill in March 
1953, the Finnish Foreign Ministry became further worried by the decreased 
production of metallurgy and fuel in the Soviet Union.323 While still seeking to pay 
war reparations to the Soviet Union in full after the death of Stalin, the Finns now 
refused to accept valueless imports from Moscow. As the deliveries of valued fuel 
products as well as cotton and wheat became scarce during 1952 and early 1953, the 
Finns now refused Soviet offers of other imports as substitutes. In order to renew the 
                                                 
321 DASMIP, F-26, “Finska”, 33, 11.4.1953. 45830. 
322 Ibid. 




five-year trade agreement with Finland (originally signed following the Finnish-
Soviet Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in December 
1948), the Soviets resorted to exports from Czechoslovakia and Poland.324 Out of a 
total of 38 billion Finnish Marks of imports to Finland, 12 billion originated from the 
two bloc members.325 The Finnish foreign ministry took such outsourcing as evidence 
of serious internal Soviet difficulties already in place by 1952. By early 1953, the 
Soviet export obligations to Finland were in chronic arrears. The Soviets had been 
scheduled to deliver 10,000 tons of sugar for January and February but by March had 
sent only 3,000 tons. For 1952, only 5,000 tons of the cotton from the promised 7,000 
tons had been delivered and them at the last minute.326 The Finnish Foreign Ministry 
was dismayed over the missing of Soviet deliveries, surely needed in Finland, but 
equally encouraged at the same time by Soviet economic difficulties. They presented 
Finland with an opening to ask for concessions in the overall trade agreement, now up 
for renewal after its initial five year term from 1948.  
Unlike the Finnish popular press with its fears of Molotov, the Foreign 
Ministry, foresaw Nikita Khrushchev as the likely candidate for the leadership 
position in the Kremlin. In contrast to US predictions, the ministry did not make 
much of the elevated position of Malenkov as expected heir to Stalin’s leadership in 
the Beria- Malenkov-Molotov troika.327 As early as April 1953, Finnish 
representatives in Moscow were telling the Ministry in Helsinki that the status of all 
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three members of the troika was in question and that Khrushchev’s rise could be 
expected. The Finnish Foreign Ministry considered these to be signals as well of a 
significantly weakened Soviet position in its European relations. By early April 1953, 
reporting judged the position of Malenkov as not consolidated, with no equilibrium in 
his relations with Molotov and Beria.328 Beria had replaced Andrei Zhdanov as 
Stalin’s closest associate after Zhdanov’s death in August 1948. Malenkov’s position 
had been further weakened by Beria’s long tenure as the head of the dreaded secret 
service (NKVD, now MVD) and by Molotov’s re-established control over the 
Foreign Ministry.329 Matters were made worse, the reports continued, by Nikolai 
Bulganin’s ability as Defence Minister to strengthen his own position by appointing 
the key Marshalls Aleksander Vasilievski and Georgi Zhukov as Deputy Defence 
Ministers. “If the power balance became any more uncertain for Malenkov” the 
Finnish analysis concluded, “he would give up his position as the Secretary of the 
Party to Khrushchev; Khrushchev is [Bulganin’s] guy and his closest friend.”330  The 
Finnish Foreign Ministry considered that these signals made a long, harmonious 
future for a collective Soviet leadership unlikely.331 Rather than fearing a military 
take-over in Moscow, the Ministry calculated that the political power struggle would 
force a more conciliatory Soviet stance towards Finland. As evidence, the Finnish 
Embassy in Moscow pointed to the unusually cordial behaviour of Anastas Mikoyan 
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and Molotov towards them in celebrating the anniversary of the Finnish-Soviet 
Friendship and Cooperation treaty in Moscow in early April 1953.332  
 
Finland’s Focus on Soviet-Yugoslav Relations 
Based on these observations, Finnish Foreign Ministry analysts considered 
that Yugoslavia’s status as a state bordering at least the Soviet bloc could become 
similar to theirs. They decided that Soviet-Yugoslav relations should be closely 
watched and could be used to test  hypothesis of likely future Soviet positions toward 
Finland. From April 1953 onward, one of the two architects of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line took charge of the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Urho Kekkonen served 
as Foreign Minister for 1952-1953, and in 1954 while acting as Prime Minister 1954-
1956. As President from 1956 forward, he systematically led the Ministry to pursue 
Yugoslav contacts in Belgrade, Helsinki and Moscow, questioning them persistently 
about changes in the Soviet approach to dealing with Yugoslavia. Kekkonen’s 
leadership in the Ministry immediately prior to and immediately after Stalin’s death, 
and his dual role as both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister in 1954 focused the 
Ministry’s analytical work on his special interest in Soviet policy. This strategy 
promoted talks between Yugoslav and Finnish representatives in East European 
embassies and at the highest level of Finnish officialdom. Only one month after the 
death of Stalin, Finnish representative Mäkinen invited Yugoslav representative 
Božić to a sauna in Moscow and told Božić that he believed Stalin’s death would 
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mean a swift improvement in Soviet relations with Yugoslavia. This had been 
suggested to him indirectly by a Russian representative he would not name.333 
Mäkinen asked Božić directly, “Has Molotov invited you over yet? Have the Soviets 
begun contacting you with complete courtesy? Have the Soviets requested re-
establishing diplomatic relations or opening an embassy in Belgrade?”334  
But Božić in Moscow and the Yugoslav Ministry’s Soviet desk in Belgrade 
found Finnish candour initially alarming. They worried about “the lack of evidence” 
for the Finnish conclusion, but also the consequence for a comment being passed on 
by a Finnish official in Moscow to a Yugoslav one given Soviet intelligence’s interest 
in such information. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry contacted Helsinki in disbelief, 
suspecting that Mäkinen might have become a rogue element, taking initiatives 
without the knowledge of the Finnish Foreign Ministry. After all, it was possible that 
the sauna in Moscow was under Soviet surveillance. Despite Božić’s cautious 
reaction, the Finnish Embassy in Moscow continued to press on in the same direction, 
suggesting that Yugoslavia should consider the death of Stalin as a basis on which to 
pursue Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union. Åke Gartz became the new Finnish 
Ambassador to both Moscow and Bucharest simultaneously in early 1953, as the 
Bucharest representation was attached to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Finnish 
Embassy. During his inaugural visit to Bucharest in May, Gartz approached the 
Yugoslavs directly. Over a dinner, the insistent Gartz asked Yugoslav Ambassador in 
Bucharest “whether Božić in Moscow had already been received by Molotov?”335  
The Finnish Foreign Ministry predicted that despite Molotov’s promotion of the Tito-
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Stalin split, he would seek to reopen diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Gartz, 
certain of a shifting mood in Moscow, suggested that “there are many changes in the 
latest period in our relations [with Moscow]; we could use this situation” for political 
gain.336  
Throughout the spring and summer of 1953, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
thought it best to officially defer Finnish speculation on Soviet moves toward 
rapprochement. A report of this conversation with Gartz to Belgrade argued that the 
Yugoslav Ministry should be cautious in adopting the Finnish advice without 
hesitation: “after all, the Finns have no proof of the future”.337 Yet Gartz and several 
of his colleagues continued to address Yugoslav officials openly and repeatedly 
throughout May, June and July, setting out their belief that “changes are coming in 
the position of the Soviet Union towards [Yugoslavia]” in the next few months.338   
According to the Finnish analysis, Yugoslav-Soviet conflict was grounded in 
the personalities of Stalin and Tito. Stalin’s passing meant that “those relations could 
be easily and quickly reorganized”.339 The Finnish Foreign Ministry suspected that if 
the hypothesis about the Soviet need to relax policy towards Europe along the Soviet-
European border were accurate, the Soviet Union would first and foremost seek 
restoration of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomatic and then trade relations. 340  
 
                                                 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 DASMIP, F-87 “SSSR”, 8.4.1953. 44624. 
      DASMIP, F-45, “Jugoslavija”, 106, 6.5.1953. 45924. 
      DASMIP, F-26, “Finska” 32, 10.4.1953. 44999. 
      DASMIP, F-87, “SSSR”, 180, 21.4.1953. 46006.  





Belgrade’s Reaction to Stalin’s Death and the Finnish 
Connection 
 
Although hesitating to accept officially or publicly Finnish encouragement for 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry had 
immediately turned, as noted at the start of this chapter, to their counterpart for the 
Finnish reaction to Stalin’s death. Koča Popović already replaced Edvard Kardelj as 
Foreign Minister on 14 February 1953. He was most interested in furthering those 
foreign relations that moved Yugoslavia from ideological arguments with the Soviet 
party into bilateral trade relations with alternative partners. This appointment also led 
to significant changes in the role of the Ministry. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s 
First and Second Divisions, under their chiefs Arso Milatović and Aleš Bebler, 
quickly put forward an argument for a new approach towards the Soviet Union after 
Stalin’s death.341 As outlined in a communiqué of April 6, this approach recognized 
the need to appraise changes in the Soviet Union for their effects on the bordering 
states.342 Bebler asked that as a separate matter, Yugoslav embassies investigate in 
detail all Soviet exchanges with Yugoslav representatives, reporting immediately on 
all contact with Soviet state personnel officially and unofficially, as well as reporting 
contact with Soviet bloc members. The Finnish Foreign Ministry had predicted that 
Soviets would first allow Yugoslav diplomats to attend diplomatic events in Moscow, 
and that they would subsequently begin to approach the Yugoslavs in a cordial 
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manner. While the Yugoslavs continued adamantly and publicly to deny the Finnish 
hypothesis of a fast Soviet turnaround in their Yugoslav policy, Bebler and Milatović 
took the suggestion seriously. A new, faster delivery network for reports, together 
with media and news analysis, were set up between Belgrade and a few select 
embassies, including those in Helsinki and Moscow, in April 1953.343 London, 
Washington, Paris, New Delhi and Bonn were also identified as key locations, along 
with Rome, Stockholm, Helsinki, Tokyo and Tehran.344 Additionally, if still more 
information was needed, the Moscow representation was told to seek a permission to 
travel by train to four key locations: Leningrad, Warsaw, Helsinki and Tehran. The 
requests were to be made under the pretence of visiting the Yugoslav representation 
in these four cities. Their real aim was to “obtain good information throughout travel 
by private [communications with others] and personal observations” and simply to 
test whether the Soviet Foreign Ministry would grant a Yugoslav representative a visa 
for travel across Soviet territory that had been barred since 1948.345  
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry instructed the ten key embassies listed above 
to follow the events resulting from the death of Stalin in light of events in Warsaw 
and Balkan Pact countries, and Tito’s concurrent visit to Britain.346 In February 1953, 
Yugoslavia had signed the Tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with 
NATO member states, Greece and Turkey. The treaty outlined cultural, economic and 
technical cooperation between the three states, but its true aim was to create an 
alliance to prevent Soviet expansion and influence in the Balkans and the 
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Mediterranean.347 A formal military alliance was signed in Bled on 9 August 1954, 
making it officially the Balkan Pact.  
Unlike the Finns, who placed emphasis on material conditions within the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslav analysis paid more attention to “the reconstruction of the 
state and the party leadership in the USSR as revealing the further course of Soviet 
politics.”348 For Kardelj and Tito, Stalin and Molotov had caused the split. The 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry officials were aware of the highly personalised view of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations held by the party leadership. Kardelj had left the position 
of Foreign Minister only a mere two weeks before Stalin’s death. Despite the 
independent position Ministry analysts had achieved by 1953, many must have been 
cautious of departing from the party-political focus. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s 
analysis found it difficult to predict “the correct place of the Soviet party leadership’s 
position in future relations towards the state apparatus”.349 Yugoslav analysis 
expected unforeseeable changes to take place in the Kremlin in the course of the 
summer and fall of 1953. Unlike the Finns, who considered this intermediate period 
of uncertainty as an important opportunity to assert pressure on Finnish-Soviet 
relations, the Yugoslav Ministry cautiously categorized this period as 
unrepresentative of the future and thus a dangerous time for making policy changes. 
The Yugoslav leadership of a multi-ethnic, increasingly republic-based yet resolutely 
one-party state understood the broad impact from the removal of an undisputed leader 
of both the party and the state like Stalin. More than their Finnish or European 
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counterparts, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry appreciated the difficulty of foreseeing 
the internal political consequences of the impending restructuring the Presidium and 
the Secretariat.350 The Yugoslav leadership had faced great difficulties in maintaining 
an alternative yet still one-party state structure in Yugoslavia after 1948, once the 
initial Soviet model was no longer appropriate. This included empowering the 
republic-based party structures, disbanding the apparatus for central economic 
planning, and forming local workers’ councils, all in order to improve on the Soviet 
model for a Communist state. The republic parties in Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia were to become the basis for socialist democracy 
and Communist power. The Yugoslav leadership also changed the name of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY) in 1952, in order  to differentiate themselves further. Milovan Djilas explained 
to the November party congress that Karl Marx himself had envisioned a looser 
association or a league in place of a hierarchical party. 
Any restructuring of the Soviet’s own one-party state would doubtless, the 
Yugoslavs assumed, alter the balance of power between the higher echelons of the 
party and the army. Its anticipation discouraged the Yugoslav Ministry from 
commenting on Finnish speculation about betterment of Soviet-Yugoslav relations or 
even from embracing the Soviet’s requests for a normalization of relations until 
1955.351 Rapprochement with the Soviets, although desired by the Ministry, was still 
considered dangerous to a Yugoslav foreign policy that sought above all to preserve 
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the country’s independence.352 Having survived the tense five years following the 
Tito-Stalin split, the Foreign Ministry was wary of re-establishing ties that could 
allow Soviet pressure on Yugoslav affairs.  
The Ministry was concerned that the Finnish hypothesis underestimated the 
significance of ideological differences between Soviet and Yugoslav Communism. 
For Yugoslavia’s elevated significance in Europe to continue after Stalin’s death, 
their differences with Soviet Communism would need continued emphasis.353 
Moreover, Tito and Kardelj, who had orchestrated the highly personal Yugoslav-
Soviet diplomacy around Yugoslavia’s expulsion, were very likely to resist any 
renewal of relations with the Soviets. Not only had Stalin and Molotov sought to 
engineer a regime change in Yugoslavia in 1948. Since then Yugoslavia, and Tito and 
Kardelj in particular, had been the targets of Soviet attacks propagated by Moscow 
through Eastern Europe. From 1948 to 1953, it was a major task of the Foreign 
Ministry to gather statistics and accounts of the countless Albanian, Bulgarian, 
Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Romanian and Polish criticism of Yugoslavia and its 
leadership in their domestic press, public events, radio and television. The demand for 
gathering this data from within the Office of the President soon preoccupied the 
Foreign Ministry. Simply generating counterpropaganda led to diversion Ministry 
away from focusing on bilateral relations with non-hostile states. 
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Koča Popović and the Emergence of an Autonomous 
Foreign Ministry 
Koča Popović (1908-1993) became Yugoslav Foreign Minister upon the 
conclusion of the Balkan Pact and immediately prior to the death of Stalin, on 14 
February 1953. He would hold the post for over twelve years until 25 April 1966. He 
was the longest-serving Foreign Minister in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Popović’s term is 
considered one of the most successful in Yugoslav foreign relations, and is even 
termed by Ranko Petković “a star-studded time for Yugoslavia”.354 He is particularly 
appreciated for the political independence of his position and persona, by which he 
transformed the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. Unlike his predecessor, Popović was not 
one of Tito’s inner circle. He was never a member of the Politburo, and unlike 
Kardelj and Tito, he had spent no time in the interwar Soviet Union.  
His background was unusually diverse, but his wartime credentials were 
unchallengable. Born into a wealthy and renowned Belgrade family of Vlach origin, 
Popović spend his childhood in Switzerland, attended high school in Belgrade and 
studied philosophy at the Sorbonne, graduating in 1932.355 Popović joined the CPY in 
Belgrade in 1933 while he was pursuing a career as a journalist and surrealist poet. 
From 1937 to 1939, Popović served in the International Brigade in Spain as a military 
officer. In 1939 he was briefly interned in a camp in France. Popović played a crucial 
role in the Partisan uprising in Serbia in 1941, leading the Kosmaj mountain units 
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close to Belgrade, finally rising to command the First Proletarian Brigade of the 
Second Yugoslav Army by the war’s end. Popović then became the Chief of General 
Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) after the war’s end and remained in that 
position until 1953. 
In the postwar period, Popović was celebrated as a war hero and could have 
sought out a position more closely connected to the party leadership. “All or almost 
all who passed through the Second Yugoslav Army, and without exception all in 
leading positions,” according to Ranko Petković “could also form party careers, most 
securely and directly climbing the ladder of power. Nearly all became members of the 
Politburo”.356 Yet Popović, considered by some of Tito’s closest associates to be “a 
salon communist” or “a man who fitted better in a tailcoat than in a uniform”, had no 
desire to join the Politburo or Tito’s circle.357 Despite his long-held Communist 
loyalties,  Popović considered Tito and Kardelj’s approach too full of 
“ideologisation,” Marxist rhetoric without practical value for the practical goals of 
Yugoslav independence and prosperity which Popović wished to pursue. Moreover, 
Popović made his general feelings public, leading Radio Free Europe to comment, 
“he never hides how proud he has always been of his intellectual brilliance and expert 
knowledge”.358  
Tito’s naming of Popović as Minister of Foreign Affairs was therefore a major 
surprise to much of the Yugoslav leadership. Several explanations for Popović’s 
appointment have been put forward, for example that Popović was “well known by 
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Tito even before the Second World War”, or that Tito and Popović became close 
during the war. These views tend to support the impression passed from Yugoslav to 
Western historiography of a foreign policy operating closely under Tito’s guiding 
hand, with the Foreign Ministry in the subordinate position common in other 
Communist regimes.359 Yet Popović was already known for his independent persona, 
which survived first military, then party discipline, always being “seen to go on his 
own”. It is therefore, certain that the appointment of nonconformist Popović was 
significant for the relative autonomy of the ministry, whether intended or not, 
following Kardelj’s departure. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry did need a leader 
capable of successfully initiating new negotiations with a wide range of international 
actors, especially with Western governments. Outside the Soviet bloc, loyalists like 
Kardelj held less sway than Popović, the Sorbonne-educated intellectual who was 
more persuasive for not repeating Kardelj-coined rhetoric on Communist ideology. 
That such a capacity served Tito’s purposes seems to be a more likely reason for his 
appointment. 
But there is another likely reason. Kardelj did not want to leave the post to a 
competitor within Tito’s innermost circle, but to a “lesser,” more remote figure. 
Those competitors included the then-Deputy Foreign Minister Veljko Mićunović 
and Vladimir Velebit. Velebit would also have been a Yugoslav diplomat whose 
skills were appreciated by Western governments, but he could not be considered. 
He had been portrayed as a British agent by the Soviet leadership in 1948. Leading 
ideologue Milovan Djilas was already at odds with Tito. Thus, the way was open 
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for Ivo Vejvoda, the Deputy Foreign Minister who had as the Head of Regional 
Nordic Section in the Foreign Ministry not incidentally been a major figure in 
establishing Yugoslav-Finnish relations after 1948, to purpose Popović as 
Kardelj’s successor to Kardelj personally.360 
Popović inherited an internally well-organized Ministry that had by 1953 
established a wide network of embassies as a significant asset for global 
communication. Many within the Ministry expected Popović to reorganize its 
relationship to the State Security Administration (UDBa) which was now ominously 
located on the fourth floor of the Foreign Ministry. Its head, Aleksandr Ranković, was 
indeed one of Tito’s inner circle. In 1952, Kardelj, had institutionalized the presence 
and influence of the UDBa in agreement with Tito within two departments of the 
Foreign Ministry: the Foreign Political Department and the Coordination Division.361 
The UDBa’s “invasion” of foreign affairs was managed by Kardelj’s Deputy Minister 
Mićunović and his associate and head of Coordination, Anton Vratuš.  
Kardelj saw some influence for the UDBa within the Foreign Ministry as 
essential in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split. Kardelj like Tito, feared a Soviet 
effort to replace them and wanted everyone suspected of Soviet contacts to be 
observed closely. Membership of the CPY had grown close to a half a million by 
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1948, and there was no shortage of suspected Soviet sympathizers.362 Between 1948 
and 1949, 27,000 party members, were charged with being “Cominformists” and 
16,000 of then were sent to one of a dozen camps for hard labor.363 Of these camps 
Goli Otok is the most infamous one. The importance of UDBa in the state bureacracy 
grew exponentially. In the aftermath, Ranković and Kardelj became even closer to 
Tito. The presence of UDBa was not welcomed by the civil servants in the Foreign 
Ministry. Popović resented it from the start. It was generally known that he “did not 
care very much for Edvard Kardelj, nor did he especially appreciate Aleksandar 
Ranković”, and he had no interest in interfering in their internal conflicts.364 Popović 
did not want the UDBa to become a force above diplomacy in the Foreign Ministry. 
Thus, many expected him to attempt to move Ranković’s offices from the building 
and thus out of the Ministry immediately. Popović cleverly did not attempt a 
maneuver that was unlikely to succeed in the still insecure atmosphere of 1953. 
Instead, he simply replaced Vratuš, since UDBa’s oversight had depended on his 
loyalty as the head of the Department of Coordination of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to UDBa. 
Popović worked from there to institute the kind of discipline and attention to 
protocol in Yugoslav diplomacy that was common to West European governments. 
For this, he need not directly challenge the UDBa, but simply worked to limit its 
access to diplomatic reporting and analysis. Already in 1953, Popović was rushing to 
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centralize the analysis of reporting from Yugoslav embassies and to apply this 
analysis more directly to questions of current state interests. One of Popović’s most 
important legacies remains the Ministry’s integrated system for recording 
information. Unlike the organization of many counterparts, including the US State 
Department and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Yugoslav Ministry’s files are 
organized not only by geographical location or original source, but by the subject 
under investigation. For example, all information on the topic of Stalin’s death, from 
all Yugoslav embassies, is located in a file titled “Yugoslavia 1953” in the folder for 
March, under the topic of Stalin’s death. This information is cross referenced in the 
files of the Embassy source countries such as “Finland 1953” and “the USSR 1953.” 
Included here are reports of diplomatic chatter on the topic of Stalin’s death from 
Yugoslav embassies in Istanbul, Teheran, Mexico City and every other country where 
a diplomatic report mentioned the subject.  
After his term, Popović was criticized for concentrating solely on diplomatic 
procedures and failing to remove the UDBa from the Foreign Ministry. According to 
this argument, Popović had enough authority as a military leader in 1953 to push the 
security service out. This argument neglects the aforementioned severing of the 
intimate connection between the Coordination Department and Ranković. There were 
still complaints from the Ministry’s diplomatic personnel regarding the “incorrect” 
and crude behavior of UDBa colleagues when traveling to the fourth floor. These 
complaints were understandable given the stark distinction between UDBa’s political 
police officers, often Partisans from poor rural backgrounds, and Foreign Ministry’s 




the Division of Analysis and Planning or in the Coordination Division. Popović 
helped the Ministry to work around the existence of the UDBa on its fourth floor until 
Ranković’s purge from power in 1966 (also Popović’s final year as Foreign Minister), 
only then did the UDBa finally move out of the Foreign Ministry. As evidence that 
their influence had not always been contained, a report of the Investigating 
Commission at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee purging Ranković from 
his position included the charge that he had replaced two top Foreign Ministry 
officials with UDBa agents in October 1964 without informing Popović.365 
Popović’s term had begun with the signing of the Balkan Pact, an agreement 
with Greece and Turkey which had already been pursuing while acting as the Head of 
General Staff of the JNA. When named to the Central Committee in November 1952, 
he was given responsibility for the negotiations with Greece and Turkey. Soon after 
he became Foreign Minister Popović worked to end the Yugoslav dispute with Italy 
over Trieste in October 1954. This was a dispute over the Yugoslav-Italian border to 
the south and east of the port city, which Tito and Kardelj had been reluctant to 
conclude. Tito objected because of the presence of US troops in Trieste and Kardelj 
because the border was with his native Slovenia. Popović was required to address the 
intense postwar tension with Italy already at the end of October 1953, when Tito 
publicly threatened that Yugoslavia would enter into armed conflict with Italian 
troops, if they replaced British and American troops in Trieste.366 A year later, in 
November 1954 Popović and his Ambassador to Great Britain Velebit persuaded Tito 
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to accept the London Agreement of 1954, which effectively fixed the border and 
ended potential conflicts between Yugoslavia and Italy.  
From 1953 to 1955, it was Popović who turned Yugoslav foreign relations 
toward a policy of Europe-centered neutralism comparable to that of Finland, but 
without moving toward Non-Alignment until 1959-1961. Curiously, scholarship 
dating Yugoslav Non-Alignment back before these years rarely mentions Popović but 
focuses instead on Tito’s visits to Asia and Africa in 1954 and 1955.367 These visits 
did not shift the focuses of Yugoslavia’s foreign relations away from Europe in 
general and a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union in particular. Indeed, Popović was 
not enamored of the Non-Alignment Movement because of its ideological pretentions 
and its main concern with advancing the position of formerly colonial, non-European 
states. Later Popović would comment that he “never saw in Non-Alignment a real 
ideology”.368  
For Popović, as for Paasikivi, neutralism was not an ideology but a political 
strategy. In itself, it did not seek political goals beyond independence and avoidance 
of conflict, here the East-West conflict. Paasikivi only turned to neutralism when 
independence from the Soviet Union through military defense was no longer possible. 
Yugoslavia was in a similar position to Finland in the post-1948 period: facing the 
prospect of Soviet military intervention as the major threat to independence. As 
Foreign Minister, Popović had the reputation of “an official who rarely ‘rose up’ from 
his strategic overview to address the party or act as a political preacher or 
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arbitrator”.369 Popović understood that in the Yugoslav system of government, large 
decisions originating “from above” from Tito were inevitable, but would not of 
themselves create an effective foreign policy. Popović concentrated on improving the 
Ministry’s analytical and administrative capacity. As demonstrated in this chapter and 
the next, the Ministry also begun to formulate policy that used Finland as a point of 
reference in the aftermath of Stalin’s death.   
Popović replaced his old adversary Ranković as Vice-President of Yugoslavia 
in 1966, and was then a member of the collective Presidency from 1967 to 1972. 
Popović’s appointment as Vice-President prompted Western analysts to note that “in 
their efforts to separate state and party functions, Tito and his colleagues are 
appointing people who have the highest of reputations but are not members of the 
Politburo”.370 In fact, Popović was so independent that in 1972 resigned permanently 
from the government as a protest against Tito’s purge of the liberal leadership of the 
Serbian party. 
 
Finnish-Soviet Relations and the Yugoslav Perspective, 1953-
1955 
 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry had generally committed itself to not raising 
anti-Soviet and anti-Warsaw Pact propaganda efforts in Finland between 1948 and 
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1953. Finland had since 1948 been considered a friendly country facing a problematic 
geopolitical position in relationship to the Soviet Union similar to that of Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslavs had accurately identified the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), a 
faction of the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL), as an organization 
essentially committed to the distribution of Soviet propaganda and furthering Soviet 
foreign policy positions in Finland. The Yugoslavs therefore termed the SKP 
“Cominformist.” Indeed, the party had spread Soviet propaganda against Yugoslavia 
since 1948. However, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry also identified the SKP as 
hostile toward the official positions of the standing Finnish government, a party that 
was made illegal in the interwar period but resurrected in the postwar period to serve 
Soviet concerns, and in order to conclude the Finnish-Soviet Treaty in Paris. To help 
preserve the balance in Finnish-Soviet relations, the Yugoslav Ministry had generally 
not attacked the SKP in Finland. For the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade,  
the basic characteristics of the Finnish political reality demonstrate 
on one hand loyalty in fulfilling obligations which originate from 
the Finnish-Soviet Friendship and Co-operation Agreement, and on 
the other hand in the real and extensive Finnish effort to 
incapacitate directly and indirectly the influence of the USSR in the 
internal political development of the country.371  
 
In addition to this duality, the Yugoslav analysis also noted a third element, “the 
increasing importance of Western and especially American influence” in Finnish 
economic policy.372 The Yugoslavs thought that by 1953 if trade with the Soviet 
Union continued to decline with difficulties in promised Soviet supplies, then Finland 
would have to increase its trade with the Euro-Atlantic economies. As such a shift did 
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not conflict with the Yugoslav foreign policy goal of political independence from the 
Soviet Union, Belgrade had refrained from any efforts in Finland for fear of 
decreasing the overall Finnish ability to counter Soviet pressure. By December 1953, 
the Yugoslav Embassy in Helsinki admittedly concluded that the “dialectic of the 
Finnish foreign policy has succeeded [since 1948] in making free internal 
development stronger” by accepting limited foreign political obligation to the Soviet 
Union in order to strengthen the domestic and international political independence of 
Finland.373 The Ministry’s year-end report shows that, the First and the Second 
Divisions of the Foreign Ministry, with Milatović and Bebler, as their chiefs were 
paying close attention to Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
drawing on the initial authority that went with Kardelj’s tenure as its head, the 
Ministry became a force in itself except in cases like the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4, where Tito himself chose to intervene. There was thus an 
ongoing incentive to look at Finnish-Soviet relations and to find out, how Finland had 
been able to manage this relationship since 1948. Undoubtedly, the strong anti-
Russian feeling manifested in Finland also appealed to the Yugoslav analysts in the 
bitterly anti-Soviet atmosphere in which they worked.   
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s analysis of Finland concluded that despite 
political bartering, “[the] tendency towards political independence and national 
sovereignty are related characteristics of the Finnish political reality. Development of 
these tendencies especially accelerated after Stalin’s death.”374 The Yugoslavs 
observed that “the relative reduction in tensions in the world and the strengthening of 
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the idea of collective security [in Europe] together with the reduction of danger from 
local aggression” made the Finnish position more viable, and perhaps should be 
applied to Yugoslav foreign policy as well.375 As evidence, Ambassador Zore in 
Helsinki observed key changes within the leadership of the Finnish Army in May 
1953 that he related to the death of Stalin and the increased stability in Finnish-Soviet 
relations of which the Finnish Foreign Ministry was convinced, the General Staff and 
Ministry of Defence dismissed a number of important personnel. In the summer of 
1953 high ranking officers, among them several Colonels who had been found in 
previously non-disclosed internal investigations to have political connections with the 
Soviets. These officers in fact had been under surveillance since the end of the 
Second World War. Paasikivi had not ordered their internment (as Tito had of 
suspected “Cominformists”). They remained on active duty but under suspicion. Zore 
observed that “without a doubt the initiative by [the Finnish political leadership] 
comes now as a result of the stabilization in the Finnish position in general in 
reference to Russia.”376  The Finnish Foreign Ministry, under Kekkonen until July 
1953, waited only two months after the death of Stalin to pension off these suspected 
Soviet informants. Zore was disappointed that they would not be tried but concluded 
that,  
Without consideration for the manner in which the dismissals were 
carried out, they still constitute a strong blow [to the Soviets] because 
their people will in the least be removed; [the Finns] are expecting a 
reaction from [the Soviet] side… They are expecting that the Russians 
will not easily accept this and will characterize all eventual changes as 
further strengthening American influence and pro-American people [in 
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Finland] and will characterize this further as an attack on the friendly 
governmental relations between the Finnish and Russian relations.377  
 
 
Building Yugoslav-Finnish Ties from Sports to Trade 
 
Milatović’s and Bebler’s elevated view of Finnish analysis of the Soviet 
Union in April, and Zore’s reporting of the personnel changes within the Finnish 
Army in May, helped to reconfigure this Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s view of 
Finland. By December 1953 Yugoslav Ambassador Zore in Helsinki told Belgrade 
that “in these conditions…we need to operate in regard to the propaganda activity in 
Finland with maximal use of opposition…in our opinion propaganda efforts in 
Finland should be developed during this stage and direct the center of gravity of our 
work”.378 Following Stalin’s death, the Yugoslav Embassy now launched propaganda 
efforts within Finland that had previously been rejected as potentially damaging to 
Finland’s Soviet policy. Yugoslav Embassy Reports from Helsinki regarded the 
period immediately following Stalin’s death as a time when “Moscow wants to make 
further use of [amicable] Russian-Finnish relations as evidence of Russia’s peaceful 
politics and the possibility of good relations with capitalist states even on their 
[European] border.”379 The Yugoslav delegation sought from late 1953 to develop 
“various activities in political, economic and propaganda spheres, on organizational 
matters and work between these countries deepening of the associational relationship 
[between Finland and Yugoslavia].”380 Under Zore’s leadership, the Helsinki 
Embassy undertook a renewed effort to “inform responsible governmental officers 
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and leading political persons of individual parties of [the Yugoslav] foreign policy 
positions…especially on the Trieste question.”381 The Finnish position was 
considered as essentially pro-Western given its trade interests. Under Popović, the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry began to view the unresolved status of Trieste as 
hindering Yugoslav relations with Western governments. In 1953, Finland was 
considered “Western enough” for Belgrade to worry that Trieste stood in the way of 
improving Yugoslav relations not only with Italy, but the UK and the US but also 
Yugoslav-Finnish relations.  
The increased Yugoslav interest in Finland allowed the Foreign Ministry to 
learn that the Finnish press generally held a very sympathetic view toward the 
Yugoslavs and their famous resistance to Soviet pressure.382 Yugoslav representatives 
also characterised Finland as   
…sports country where almost everyone practices some sport and 
of course attends sports events. It can be said without hesitation that 
for [Yugoslavia] the victory over Russia in soccer in 1952 gave 
Yugoslavia the kind of public popularity from the broad Finnish 
masses which would not be possible to attain through any kind of 
propaganda action.383  
 
Efforts to increase Yugoslav popularity and importance in Finland in 1953 were 
therefore focused on athletic exchanges. The Finnish Foreign Ministry 
enthusiastically responded to the increased Yugoslav interest. In keeping with Finnish 
neutralism, the cultural and economic spheres were best suited for Finland to develop 
contacts with states considered hostile by the Soviet Union. Yugoslav track and field 
stars Ceraja and Mugoše toured Helsinki and smaller towns in southern Finland. All 
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Finnish publications carried stories on the tour, and in Finland 50-60 percent of each 
town’s population attended these events.384 In response to this tour, Finland sent its 
own delegation of track and field athletes to Yugoslavia along with reporters who 
prepared a total of three half-hour reports from Yugoslavia that played repeatedly on 
Finnish Public Radio (YLE) throughout 1953. In pursuit of their anti-Yugoslav goals, 
the Communist SKP criticised the YLE in their publications for “granting Yugoslavia 
lengthy coverage while sending no reporters to either Hungary nor Romania” within 
the Soviet bloc. The Finnish Foreign Ministry, like their Yugoslav counterpart, was 
not interested in expanding relations with Hungary or Romania. Relations towards the 
two Soviet bloc states were formal and properly maintained, but there was no interest 
in promoting cultural exchanges for political goals. 
In July, the Split soccer team ‘Hajduk’ toured Helsinki, Tampere and Turku, 
attracting crowds of 15,000 or more.385 The Yugoslavs also sent a representation of 
the Yugoslav railroad workers soccer association, which toured the cities of Kuopio, 
Kotka and Kemi.386 These activities were “recorded in detail in sports columns of all 
news sources stressing the high level of sports performance in Yugoslavia.”387 In 
addition to athletes, an eight-person delegation from the Invalid Association of 
Yugoslavia was sent. Most members, like their Finnish counterparts who they met, 
were veterans of the Second World War. The 14-day tour included events coordinated 
with the Finnish Association for Invalids. The delegation’s visit was covered in all 
major Finnish publications with a special attention to photographs that could portray 








the suffering from the Second World War. Press coverage emphasized parallels 
between Yugoslav and Finnish sacrifices in the war despite the fact that Yugoslavia 
had fought with the Soviet Union and Finland against it. Symphony conductor Sama 
Hubada was even sent on a tour of Finland, sponsored interestingly by the Yugoslav 
Interior Ministry. 
Yugoslavia also sent a trade delegation to Finland. It was given the broadest 
possible publicity within the Finnish mainstream media and was welcomed by 
Minister of National Defence and later Minister of Economy, Päivö Hetemäki. His 
prominence alone made the occasion significant in Finland. At the end of the year, the 
Yugoslav Embassy in Helsinki concluded that public relations efforts in Finland had 
been an unprecedented success. Due to these efforts, Zore calculated that by the end 
of 1953 “there was hardly a day when the Finnish publications did not give attention 
to Yugoslavia in at least in one of its agencies’ news, columns, reports, travel 
accounts, tourist reviews or foreign affairs reportage.”388 According to Yugoslav 
calculations Finnish newspapers wrote about Yugoslavia one hundred times more 
than coverage of Finland received in Yugoslav newspapers. Zore suggested to 
Belgrade that “by copying similar sports events we can achieve in Finland coverage 
writing and discussion about [Yugoslavia].” Thus, he added, that it is not only the 
sports achievements of the United States and the Soviet Union that receive attention 
in Finland. Further, “on the whole the position of publications and radio towards 
Yugoslavia [in 1953] was positive, well intentioned and sympathetic,” excepting only 
the newspapers of the Finnish Communist Party. 





To celebrate the 1953 anniversary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 
November 29, the Embassy invited altogether 350 Finnish guests to their reception in 
Helsinki. The President of Finland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, President and 
Secretaries of Parliament all attended the high-profile event.389 Yugoslav 
representatives observed that “respected political people” in Finland felt that the 
history of this Second Yugoslavia shared many similarities with the history of 
Finland. When informed of “our national liberation, consistent peace-seeking foreign 
policy, conflict with the Eastern bloc countries and a well-defined stance towards 
England and America”, the Finns exhibited sympathy towards Yugoslavia.390 
Moreover, the Helsinki Embassy reported to Belgrade that by the end of 1953 “the 
average Finn knows that [Yugoslavs] resisted the Russians and that we consistently 
protect our independence, and those are elemental things which the Finns 
appreciate.”391 Zore informed Belgrade that he had chosen Päivö Kaukomieli 
Tarjanne, the highest ranking official in the Balkan section at the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry to be a trusted confidant, someone with whom “to exchange political 
thinking periodically”.  Discussions between the two focused on how to “strengthen 
political, economic and defensive position of Europe” from the joint perspectives of 
their countries.  
In June 1953 the Finnish Foreign Ministry requested that it’s combined 
residence and representation in Belgrade be upgraded to an Embassy and the Ministry 
acquired a second residence in Belgrade. After the concerted efforts of Finnish charge 
d’affaires Ville Niskanen and his personal negotiations with Vejvoda since 1948, 
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Finnish interest in Yugoslav trade also grew in 1953.392 In early 1953, the head of the 
Bank of Finland Sakari Toumioja begun to develop a personal relationship with the 
Yugoslav economist Bogdan Crnobrnja, the Deputy Foreign Minister with whom 
Popović had replaced Tito-loyalist Mićunović in February.393 In June, Finland sent a 
delegation from the Economic-Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
to Belgrade in June 1953. The Yugoslavs increased their import of Finnish wood 
materials for paper production for that year to $200,000 doubling the total value of 
Yugoslav imports from Finland in the process.394 
 
Yugoslavia Tries Turning to Finnish Neutralism 
Following Stalin’s death, close Yugoslav attention to Finnish analysis of the 
Soviet Union, the sharp increase in cultural contacts, and the simultaneous arrival of 
Popović as Foreign Minister combined to lead the Yugoslav Ministry to consider 
neutralism as an explicit policy. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry began to recognise 
the benefits of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line as a successful road to a renewed 
relationship with the Soviet Union. For Finland this neutralism had reduced the threat 
of armed conflict but left domestic politics to proceed on their own course. For 
Yugoslavia, such a strategy would leave the still Communist regime free to pursue its 
separate course and develop its bilateral relations with states outside the Soviet bloc. 
The Yugoslav foreign policy team in Belgrade under Popović was willing to consider 
rapprochement, so long as Yugoslavia’s Western ties remained in place. Still the 
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party leadership around Tito and Kardelj, whose very survival had depended on the 
split, were reluctant to consider diplomatic rapprochement with the Soviet Union. 
Those closest to them, notably UDBa chief Ranković, benefited from maintenance of 
the status quo. The dependence on UDBa’s counter intelligence in determining policy 
towards the Soviet Union would lessen with the renewal of formal relations. In any 
case, renewal would come at a price, including the public Soviet admission of 
wrongdoing against Yugoslavia that Tito and Kardelj considered  essential. 
Negotiations had to include issues especially sensitive to Soviets, such as the Balkan 
Pact and the Yugoslav decision to abolish their collective farms—all of which the 
Yugoslavs were adamant to defend.395 Already in June 1953, Popović won approval 
for a delegation to be sent to Moscow to discuss the renewal of diplomatic relations. 
Over the course of the year 1953 and into 1954, Popović pursued a two-pronged 
strategy: to negotiate with the West as noted above in order to bring the Trieste 
conflict to an end, while simultaneously seeking the re-establishment of formal 
relations with the Soviet Union. Although not widely understood in Belgrade, the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was already pursuing a strategy similar to that of the 
Finnish Ministry toward the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death – seeking political 
concessions in return for established, formal bilateral relations. 
 As a part of its Soviet strategy, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry asked its 
Moscow representatives in April to prepare a list of concrete demands on which to 
engage the Soviet government. They were put forward in negotiations that began in 
June with Molotov still in place, at least as Foreign Minister.396 The Yugoslavs 
                                                 





demanded among other things the return of Yugoslav school children trapped in the 
Soviet Union without exit visas since 1948 be allowed to return. After the conclusion 
of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1948, the Finnish Foreign Ministry had 
made similar efforts to inquire about any Finnish citizens remaining in the Gulag 
from returnees to Western Europe. When some 52 were identified in April 1953, the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry requested that the Soviet Foreign Ministry return them to 
Finland. Surprisingly, the request was granted, and in three separate transfers 50 adult 
Finnish citizens were returned to Helsinki between July and September 1953.397  
Initial discussion within the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry led some to argue that “we 
cannot expect that Russia will change its stance on the question of children,” mostly 
adults by now, and that there was nothing to be gained from asking their return. Yet, 
the contrary view prevailed, and Belgrade continued to request the return of an 
indefinite number of “children.”  
This was surprising given the significant difference in age and experience 
between the potential returnees on the Yugoslav and Finnish sides. The majority of 
Finland’s 1953 returnees had voluntarily left the country before or during the Second 
World War to support the Soviet Union, even to fight against Finland in the war.398 
Why would Tito and Kardelj welcome the return to Yugoslavia of an indeterminate 
number of people whose parents had been pro-Soviet and manage to flee the wide-
ranging purge of such persons following the split in 1948? Why would the Soviets 
allow the children to return and turn against their parents? Apparently some of the 
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Yugoslav leadership saw the likely Soviet refusal as a good way to delay any 
rapprochement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations or to test the Kremlin’s resolve. Others, 
including Popović’s man Milatović believed that “at the moment [the Yugoslavs] 
should go around all those questions for which [they] knew before hand would 
sharpen [Yugoslav-Soviet] relations and look for a way by which [Yugoslavia] can 
take the initiative in questions whose resolution can be accepted by both sides.”399 As 
a modest start, Belgrade suggested that its Moscow representation begin by asking for 
a permit to visit the Crimea, relaxing the restrictions that had confined them like their 
Western counterparts to one section of the Soviet capital.400 
Although Yugoslav representatives requested that the Soviets in Belgrade also 
make “concrete suggestions to the Yugoslav government,” the negotiations proceeded 
ahead on the basis of Yugoslav demands.401 Unrealistically, the Yugoslavs demanded 
freedom of the press for Yugoslav immigrants in the Soviet Union. They demanded 
the repatriation of all Yugoslav children. These requests were surprisingly met by the 
Soviets. Yugoslav citizens were granted amnesty retroactively from three days before 
the official announcement of the death of Stalin, on 2 March 1953.402 All those who 
wished to be repatriated were to be handed over the Yugoslav authorities at the 
Vojvodina border in Subotica. On 10 June 1953, the Soviets agreed to the repatriation 
of Yugoslav children identified as “residents of boarding schools.” The repatriation of 
course demanded that the Yugoslavs themselves be able to locate their citizens in 
order to make their request. In exchange, the Yugoslavs granted the Soviets very few 
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concessions. The Soviet request for additional visas for more diplomatic personnel in 
Belgrade was denied, with only permission to substitute one person for another being 
allowed. The Yugoslav team in Mosocw directly in contact with Popović in Belgrade 
repeatedly rejected Soviet requests for commercial overflights of Belgrade en route 
from Moscow to Tirana. The Yugoslavs did not even reply to several Soviet requests 
for “cultural collaboration in various forms.”403 
 As predicted by the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s analysis, the Kremlin 
increasingly demonstrated willingness to work toward rapprochement. Already in 
June the Soviet Foreign Ministry requested accreditation and exchange of 
ambassadors.404 In response, Tito wanted to underline Yugoslav demands. In an 
official statement in June, he explained that,  
The Soviet Union has recently shown a desire for ambassadors to 
be exchanged…We shall accept the offer…However, the 
exchange of ambassadors does not necessarily imply 
normalization or improvement of the relations between two 
countries, in so far as the worst enemies exchange diplomats. The 
harm they did to Yugoslavia will not easily be repaired…We need 
relations that are normal, if need be formalized.405  
 
While the Yugoslavs agreed to exchange Ambassadors in June 1953, and Moscow 
sent Vasilii Valkov to Belgrade in July, Belgrade waited until September to appoint 
Dobrivoje Vidić to Moscow. 
The Yugoslav representation in Moscow reported that each month between 
April and August “Soviet publications wrote less criticism of Yugoslavia than in the 
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previous month”.406 As the Finnish counterparts had predicted, by November 1953 
“meetings with Soviet officials [had become] friendly and in fact [the Soviets] were 
more than warm, in many meetings they are acting as if there never was anything” to 
a Yugoslav-Soviet split.407 Despite the ideological reinforcement and security benefits 
to Yugoslavia of a possible rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry was not able to carry through a full-scale rapprochement while Tito 
and Kardelj continued to deem it better to wait and see the nature of changes in 
Moscow before taking further steps.  
 
The Limited Revival of Soviet Relations with Yugoslavia 
1953-1955 
To the Finns, this Yugoslav approach was not optimal. The Finnish Foreign 
Ministry anticipated a relatively rapid Yugoslav agreement with the Soviets. Finnish 
predictions failed to account for considerable Yugoslav resistance to the Kremlin’s 
overtures. Tito, hailed as victorious in this conflict by Yugoslavs, remained leader 
even when Stalin had died. Molotov’s position was weakened by late 1953, but he 
was still present as Foreign Minister. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was based 
entirely upon the assumption that maintenance of proper foreign relations with the 
Soviet Union was the best mechanism by which to maintain domestic political 
independence while avoiding military conflict and economic or diplomatic 
confrontation. The Finns expected the Yugoslav leadership to arrive at a similar 
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conclusion. The delay caused analysts in Helsinki to question their initial hypothesis 
of Soviet relaxation following Stalin’s death. Explaining their position to the Finns, 
the Yugoslavs cited the continuing series of border incidents noted in Tito’s speeches 
in 1953.408 In November, Bulgarian forces were still occasionally firing across the 
Macedonian border, acts that were “not in the spirit of normalization”.409 Finnish 
representatives commented on Yugoslav reluctance several times during regular 
exchanges in the course of 1953. For the Finns, the Yugoslav approach of making the 
Kremlin demonstrate that rapprochement was their initiative did not serve a useful 
purpose. The Finnish Foreign Ministry relayed to the Yugoslavs that they should 
remember that “the pride of large countries does not allow them to say ‘Pardon, 
please’ and that the Yugoslavs should accept the Soviet response” without further 
ado.410 The Finnish Foreign Ministry hoped that the Yugoslavs would alter their 
attitude to rapprochement because only the re-establishment of viable Soviet-
Yugoslav diplomatic relations could lead to Yugoslavia’s adoption of a neutralism 
policy that would be mutually supportive to Finland. Employment in Belgrade of a 
similar strategy to that practiced by Helsinki could only further Finland’s goal of 
managing the course of its relations with the Soviet Union.  
For the Soviet leadership, rapprochement with the Yugoslavs was problematic 
as well. Molotov had been one of the key architects of Yugoslavia’s expulsion from 
the Cominform and Tito’s isolation from the Soviet camp that had not however, 
produced desirable outcome of the replacement of the Tito-leadership. Since the Tito-
Stalin split the Soviet leadership had followed the Anglo-American exchanges with 
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Yugoslavia and the establishment of Yugoslavia’s relations with other Western 
countries. Khrushchev came to count these ties as a mistake resulting from Stalin’s 
and Molotov’s foreign policy. By 1953, Tito’s leadership had not only survived but 
proceeded to form the Balkan Pact. According to Zinjanin, Chief of the Balkan 
Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1953, the agreement was a military pact 
against the USSR “making normalization of relations especially difficult”.411 
Moreover, Soviet overtures also through the Foreign Ministry’s Balkan desk toward 
re-establishing relations with the Yugoslavs, emphasising the difficult nature of the 
Balkan Pact for the Soviets, did not receive a favorable response in Belgrade. The 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, with the Pact’s chief architect Popović as its head, 
insisted on preserving the agreement. At the instructions of the Yugoslav Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Yugoslav representatives defied Soviet requests by raising their 
alternate option of becoming a member of NATO. The Yugoslavs reiterated that 
“against all opposite expectations from many sides [Yugoslavia] has not become a 
member of NATO,” telling the Soviets in their characteristically confident manner to 
accept the Balkan Pact as the lesser of two evils.412 
The tone of most of the Yugoslav part officials  responses to Soviet overtures 
was sarcastic, hostile and suspicious throughout 1953-1955. High Yugoslav officials 
loyal to Tito like Mićunović, refused in 1953 to speak Russian with the newly arrived 
Soviet ambassador. He mockingly said that he could not speak Russian anymore 
because of the lack of practice since the Tito-Stalin split, though “before 1948 [he] 
                                                 





often had the opportunity to speak with the Russian representatives”.413 Undeterred, 
Mićunović responded to Soviet Ambassador Valjkov’s friendly comments (regarding 
Georgii Malenkov’s July initiative to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs), saying 
the Soviets should know that: 
The maintenance of peace has been the thesis of [Yugoslavia] before 
1948, in the last 5 years, and today. With regards to the initiative of 
Malenkov, we are aware that Malenkov gave the [normalization of 
relations] initiative, but, also similarly it is true that I do not know 
who, Mr. Malenkov or one of his predecessors, also took the initiative 
of 1948 in the infamous politics of the USSR towards Yugoslavia. 
Regarding that we find if completely natural that also now initiative 
can only come from your side.414  
 
Soviet officials sometimes replied with similar sarcasm and hostility. In the 
later months of 1953, they often needled the Yugoslavs by evoking their problems 
with Milovan Djilas. They cited Djilas’ publication of views dissenting from those of 
the Yugoslav party as an embarrassment to the Yugoslav party. In October 1953, 
Djilas published a pamphlet in which he criticized Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet 
party and said that could be also applied to the LCY.415 In the party daily Borba in 
November 1953, Djilas stated that in a real democracy there should be no monopoly 
on ideology of the sort which the LCY in Yugoslavia maintained. The Soviets thereby 
questioned Tito’s ability to control his own party. More generally, the Soviet officials 
also presented Djilas’ critique of the Communist system as hindering the 
normalization of relations. 
The Yugoslav-Soviet dialogue, in its frank and, sometimes, hostile 
confrontations, differed from Yugoslav communications with Finland and other non-
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Communist states. The Yugoslavs directly related their European foreign policy to 
that of the Finnish Social Democrats, as the Finnish Communists had adopted the role 
“Cominformists.” Yugoslav-Soviet communications in 1953 always involved 
comparisons of their one-party state systems’ respective levels of success. With 
Finland and Western states such comparisons were never made.  
The Yugoslav relationship with the Soviet bloc also changed as a consequence 
of Stalin’s death. Anti-Yugoslav propaganda had been heavily distributed through the 
satellite states. As Moscow now curbed all its anti-Yugoslav propaganda, East 
European states began overall to improve their relations with Belgrade during the 
normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. In December 1953, the Yugoslavs 
exchanged views on the Trieste question with Czechoslovak representatives in 
Moscow.416 On Soviet orders, the Yugoslavs began to receive invitations to the 
diplomatic events in Soviet bloc states abroad and in Belgrade. In December 1953 
Yugoslavs representatives were invited to the ‘Polish Day of the Army’ celebration 
and the Romanian opera ‘Momcil,’ although they chose not to attend the latter. They 
did, however, attend the football match of Moscow Spartak and Warsaw Doza at the 
invitation of a Hungarian representative; an event considered more interesting.417 
Overall, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry took less interest in Eastern European states 
after 1954. For the growing international Yugoslav diplomatic corps, destinations like 
Bucharest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw were considered the least prestigious and 
desirable destinations, where low-ranking officers or those facing demotion might be 
sent. Paris and Washington were preferred. 
                                                 





Forming Finnish and Yugoslav Neutralism along the 
Soviet-European Border  
Yugoslavia and Finland scored diplomatic success in being able to extract 
concessions from the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. The events of 1953 point to 
the strength that neutralism offered them. Finland was able to better its trade terms 
with the Soviet Union in 1953. Between 1953 and 1955 Yugoslavia, according to the 
Finnish model, was able to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, while 
maintaining its independent position despite being a competitor amongst Communist 
states. Most importantly, in 1953, Yugoslavia and Finland were able to establish a 
mutual dialogue vis-à-vis their relations with the Soviet Union. In December 1953 
from Helsinki Zore informed Belgrade that in the period following Stalin’s death,  
It should be emphasized that we succeeded in good measure in 
creating individual trust towards us from the side of the reliable 
[Finnish] governmental officials and political figures who in 
general can be characterised by aloofness and caution in making 
any remarks on delicate international questions. However, [to us] 
they gave some definite evaluations. By developing friendly 
activity we succeeded in producing intimate and informal relations 
in good measure in that competent persons conversed with us with 
exceptional freedom, directly and with noticeable amount of 
trust.”418  
 
The identification of similar geopolitical positions in reference to the Soviet 
Union strengthened the analysis and positions of both the Finnish and the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministries. It had long been assumed that as the leader of a single party 
emerging victoriously from the Second World War, Tito as President was also 
primarily responsible for the direction of Yugoslav foreign policy in the 1950s. Here 
                                                 




in this chapter, instead, we see the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry beginning to step 
forward to produce its own independent analysis, and then to a consider policy of 
neutralism based on that analysis. Tito continued to serve as a decision-maker in 
Yugoslav foreign policy when he chose to intervene, but after the conclusion of 1953 
he no longer took sole charge of its direction. His closest collaborator Kardelj had 
moved on to tackle domestic questions relating to the republic-based form of 
Communism now pursued in Yugoslavia. Both Yugoslav and Finnish ministries were 
equally interested in trade relations with Western states: both wished to remain 
independent of Soviet influence. The example of Finnish-Soviet relations after the 
establishment of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line in 1948 demonstrated to the Yugoslavs 
that this could best be achieved through formulaic diplomatic relations which made 
use of analysis of Soviet politics. When situations such as the death of Stalin 
presented themselves in Soviet politics, Finland could through its bilateral relations 
seek gains. Although on the one hand Yugoslavia and Finland would face a high 
likelyhood of Soviet invasion upon trying to join NATO, their position on the border 
could at times of foreign policy relaxation contain crucial strength. In the end, the 
Kremlin was both unwilling and unable to give up East Berlin or their military 
positions within Eastern Europe. Strategic thinking on Soviet defense as bound to 
Eastern Europe would not allow any military concessions. For Finland and 
Yugoslavia the post-Stalin Soviet Union seemed increasingly inclined to equate 
satisfactory diplomatic relations with sufficient military security. However, for the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s commitment to Finnish neutralism to prevail, it would 




that final turn, along with evidence from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 that 
neither Yugoslav nor Finland were prepared to promote their neutral separation from 










Chapter 5:  Surviving Hungary 1956: Khrushchev, Tito and 
Yugoslav/Finnish Neutralism.  
 
On 23 October 1956, Hungarian protestors staged large-scale demonstrations in 
Budapest to support the new reformist leadership in the Polish Communist Party. By 
that evening a growing crowd was pulling down a statue of Stalin and demanding the 
return of reformist Communist Imre Nagy to power. The following day, a shaken 
Politburo appointed Nagy Prime Minister after making him a Politburo member. That 
same evening Soviet tanks entered the streets of Budapest in an attempt to crush the 
demonstrations. Locally garrisoned Soviet tanks were met with defiance by the 
Hungarian crowds who fought them to a standstill until Soviet troops were withdrawn 
by Moscow on October 28. Thus began a series of events that would challenge the 
post-Stalin balance of Yugoslav and Finnish relations with the USSR. 
On October 30, Nagy announced the discontinuation of the one-party system. 
The Soviets now sent additional troops into Eastern Hungary and Nagy responded by 
declaring Hungary’s neutrality and threatening Hungarian withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact and requesting help from the United Nations in resolving the crisis in 
Hungary. 419 On November 4, the reinforced Soviet troops remobilized against the 
demonstrators in Budapest and in other Hungarian cities and suppressed the 
demonstrations in a bloody conflict that lasted over a week. The Yugoslav Embassy 
in Budapest offered Nagy and more than dozen officials asylum, which they accepted. 
This offer, according to Charles Gati’s newly documented account, was “made in 
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collusion with the top Soviet leadership, [and] was intended to trap and neutralize 
Nagy’s government.”420 
The Soviets simply installed a new, pro-Soviet government under János Kádár 
and Ferenc Münnich. During the conflict, 2,500 Hungarians died and over 19,000 
were wounded.421 Soviet losses were 720 dead and over 1,500 wounded. 182,000 
Hungarians fled the country.422 In the aftermath of the crisis, more than 100,000 were 
arrested and nearly 26,000 sentenced to prison.423 
The events of 1956 in Hungary came to dominate Eastern Europe’s self-
perception of its political relationship with the Soviet Union for the next three 
decades. Soviet documents suggest that Nikita Khrushchev would have tolerated the 
Hungarian uprising had Nagy confined its demands to additional autonomy to reform 
the Communist party, as Władysłav Gomułka had done in Poland.424 In the long run, 
the Soviet crushing of the emerging Hungarian revolution demonstrated to Eastern 
Europe itself that neutrality might be possible on the borders of the Soviet bloc but 
not inside it, as the Soviet military withdrew from Austria after 1955. Tito could keep 
his own road to socialism after rapprochement with the Soviets that same year. 
Finland could pursue neutralism. But the Soviet-installed leadership of the Warsaw 
Pact nations could not seek independence from Moscow. Through images widely 
disseminated on television screens and in newspapers everywhere, the events 
demonstrated that reform Communism independent from the Kremlin’s control would 
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remain impermissible for the foreseeable future. In the short term, the Soviet 
suppression of the Hungarian revolution also triggered serious concern within the 
states bordering the Soviet bloc, primarily in Finland and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry noted with particular interest Finland’s strong reaction to the Soviet 
invasion. Yugoslav Ambassador in Finland Slobodan Sardelić reported from Helsinki 
on 13 December 1956,  
 
All political parties with the exception of the Finnish Communist Party 
have made great efforts to collect aid for Hungarian refugees through 
schools, across large sections of the public and the working class 
organizations…the donation of aid was not the only demonstration of 
sympathy – meetings, lectures and parliamentary assemblies were put 
to the same purpose…within the highest leadership circles a similar 
feeling and same emotional reaction of can be observed… several 
reasons to ‘justify’ this type of a reaction can be heard in Helsinki, for 
example, similar ethnic origin, respect for traditional Hungarian 
liberalism, the right of the people to revolution, etc… Also, before the 
second intervention of Soviet troops on 2 November, [President] 
Kekkonen talked to me with an embittered tone only about the 
presence of those [Soviet] troops and saw nothing positive in their 
presence in Hungary thus far.425  
 
Since Sardelić and the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry expected that the Finnish 
position would be concerned mainly with the country’s own security and any role the 
Soviet troops might play on Finnish soil in the future, they were taken aback by the 
openly critical Finnish reaction. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was surprised that at 
private discussions Urho Kekkonen, now President, was critical of the Kremlin since 
he had carefully constructed a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviets, as Foreign 
Minister in 1953 and as co-founder of postwar Finnish neutrality.  
                                                 





For Tito and Kardelj, their reaction to the events in Hungary was personal. In 
1953, Imre Nagy, had become the Prime Minister of Hungary, heading the new 
collective leadership that favored relaxed controls in the spirit of post-Stalinism. It is 
true that Nagy had cooperated with the Soviet secret police in Moscow in the 1930s, 
and it was the Soviet Politburo that had both approved his appointment as Prime 
Minister in 1953 and dismissal from the post in 1955. Nagy nonetheless was a 
reformist. Tito and Kardelj favored Nagy for his reported interest in Yugoslav-type 
workers’ councils. Nagy was personally well disposed towards Yugoslavia. After his 
ousting in 1955, Nagy had sent copies of his plans for reform Communism to Tito 
through a personal contact at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.426 
In February 1956, Khrushchev’s secret speech at the 20th Party Congress of 
the Soviet Communist party announced the start of official de-Stalinization.427 By the 
spring and summer of 1956, intellectuals, students and industrial workers began to 
form groups demanding change. In June 1956, Nagy’s successor Mátyás Rákosi was 
dismissed by the Soviets in part at Yugoslav urging during Tito’s first state visit to 
the Soviet Union since the Tito-Stalin split.428 Tito and Kardelj resented both Rákosi 
and his immediate successor Erno Gerö for their virulent attacks on Yugoslavia 
during the Tito-Stalin split and afterwards as part of Soviet anti-Yugoslav campaign 
from 1948 to 1953.429 Tito and Kardelj had been disappointed to see Nagy ousted in 
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1955. Even in the political context of Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement, Kardelj and 
Tito made public speeches calling Rákosi and Gerö Stalinists while emphasizing their 
anti-Yugoslav views.430 
The Hungarian events also increased public awareness of the proximity of 
Soviet troops to Finland, the ubiquitous Cold War dynamic, and the Soviet control 
over Warsaw Pact states and their citizens. The memory of Hungary 1956 would not 
quickly fade in Helsinki. In the press, photographs of the Hungarian uprising and the 
Soviet invasion showed bodies hanging from trees and Soviet tanks firing into 
buildings, emphasizing for the Finnish public the individual’s helpless position 
against the state at their own doorstep.431   
The Hungarian uprising and its Soviet suppression are well recorded in the 
literature of the Cold War. Little attention, however, has been paid to Finland and 
Yugoslavia, two states whose growing connections as independent but neutral while 
bordering the Soviet bloc were challenged by the Soviet intervention in Hungary. 
Their initial reactions were contradictory. Despite the December condemnation 
passed on privately to the Yugoslavs, Kekkonen and his Agrarians’ Party worked to 
curtail public Finnish condemnation of Soviet military measures in Hungary. Foreign 
Minister Ralf Törngren evaded the actual issue of Soviet intervention in Hungary by 
speaking mainly of the goals of Finnish neutralism in terms of ending of superpower 
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conflict in Europe, refraining from direct statements on the events in Hungary. 432 In 
his speech in London at the end of November he stated that,  
As a member of the UN, Finland purposefully sought further to remain 
out of conflicts of the great powers. Her efforts are known and 
acknowledged. Her intentions are to carry out independent and neutral 
politics. In view of Hungary, Finland consistently supports measures 
which can facilitate the improvement of the tragic state of things. 
Naturally we cannot reconcile with resolutions which would only 
intensify conflict between great powers, and would not contribute to a 
peaceful solution of the Hungarian question. I believe that when the 
positions which we took are considered as a whole, it will be seen that 
they are in most part in agreement with [Finland’s] foreign policy 
orientation which is accepted from us by all.433 
 
After initial sympathy and support for Nagy, Tito even sanctioned Soviet military 
action in Hungary after Khrushchev visited him on November 2. This was two days 
after the Soviet Politburo had decided to crush the Hungarian revolution, and two 
days before they did it on November 4.434  
Subsequent Finnish and Yugoslav policy returned to the common ground of 
assertive neutralism. Their analysis of each other’s reactions to the Hungarian events 
restored their common ground in the post-1956 period. Each had by 1956 bargained 
for its status through hard negotiations, which involved guaranteeing the Soviet 
Union’s security along its bloc borders, and through trade relations with the Soviet 
Union. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, both states feared a 
possible retreat from Khrushchev’s foreign policy of accepting Finnish and Yugoslav 
independence on its own terms. When the Soviet Union did not, after all, retreat from 
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its accommodation after the Hungarian uprising, both states continued to pursue 
unaltered security guarantees and economic exchange with the Soviet Union.  
This chapter will move from an analysis of Khrushchev’s post-Stalinist 
foreign policy as it applied to Finland and Yugoslavia to the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry’s analysis of Finland’s Soviet policy in 1955 and 1956. Prior to 1956, 
Finnish analysis of the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement concentrated on trade 
relations. As we shall see, however, the Ministry discovered that Tito, Kardelj and the 
Yugoslav party had a different, ideological role to play in rapprochement from that of 
the Yugoslav Ministry. The Ministry sought formal, not extensive relations with 
Moscow similar to Finnish-Soviet relations. How that approval survived Tito’s 
ideological support for and subsequent opposition to the Hungarian uprising 
concludes this chapter and introduces the next one.  
 
Neutralism and Soviet Foreign Policy in 1955-1956 
 
Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin and the consequent rise of 
Khrushchev as the Soviet leader did not anticipate a Hungarian intervention. 
Domestically, Khrushchev was initially interested in introducing more flexibility into 
the Soviet system. He sought to relax trade regulations within the bloc in order to 
diversify the Soviet economy.435 Political detentions were curtailed, and some social 
space freed up.436 Khrushchev’s main foreign policy goal in Europe was to 
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consolidate the Soviet bloc. To that end, Khrushchev was also willing to explore a 
wider set of regional relations along the bloc’s border. Khrushchev’s Kremlin was 
engaging in political negotiations in the north with the Scandinavian countries and in 
the south with Yugoslavia.437 True, the Warsaw Pact was formally concluded with the 
bloc members in May 1955. But overall, the goal of the Pact and this wider regional 
policy was to strengthen European security for the Soviet Union. 
Khrushchev launched his new regional policy by publicly admitting in June 
1955, even before his Secret Speech in February 1956, that the expulsion of 
Yugoslavia from the Cominform was a mistake resulting from the excesses of 
Stalinism. To underscore this new direction, Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade in 
1955. Hardliners within the Soviet foreign policy establishment such as Molotov were 
incensed. Given the preponderance of Soviet military power, Tito should have 
traveled to Moscow. During his visit to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev publicly lamented 
the mistakes resulting from the split. He expressed his regrets broadly on behalf of 
“the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, of the government of the Soviet 
Union and of the CC of the CPSU, on behalf of the Soviet people”.438 Upon his 
arrival at the Belgrade airport, Khrushchev stated that the heroic, anti-Fascist wartime 
collaboration and friendship between the Soviet Union and new Yugoslavia had been 
“disturbed in the years that followed,” finally apologizing unequivocally: “We 
sincerely regret that, and resolutely sweep aside all the bitterness of that period”.439 
Tito and Kardelj had in fact demanded that Khrushchev apologize, and that he do that 
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upon his arrival at Belgrade airport. Khrushchev, however, was willing to accept even 
this stipulation in order to establish his new policy. 
In the Belgrade meetings, Khrushchev did most of the talking. Tito guided the 
conversation by making short comments such as “at first, we will discuss 
international affairs and, then secondly our bilateral relations. I give the floor to 
Comrade Khrushchev.”440 After his apology, Khrushchev instead engaged several 
issues of the past by referring to people and events while circumventing any direct 
statements,  
 
How should I say it, Russian Communists, and the Communists of the 
USSR wish at the moment to be blocked away from Berija and 
Abakumov [who were responsible for Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the 
Cominform], but where were you? Yes, we are comrades; we were 
there where you knew we were. Comrade Kardelj (pointing to 
Kardelj), when you were in the USSR in 1937. Oh, that is not protocol. 
From then onwards we lost much and many good people. And then 
what happened? … we are some of those people, and in that majority 
who returned and again recently returned to the party. And therefore, 
after the death of Stalin, when that activity [of Berija] was developed, 
recently, those people returned to the party.441  
 
Khrushchev first placed over all blame on Berija for executing the anti-Yugoslav 
campaign of the past, and then reminded Tito that they had fought on the same side in 
the Second World War. Khrushchev went on to separate himself from the party of the 
past, which had had the conflict with Yugoslavia. He also suggested that only now 
had he, and Tito, returned to the respective correct policies. Khrushchev seems to 
have not understood the fact that Kardelj’s pre-1945 cooperation with Soviet 
Communists was no longer a merit in Yugoslavia after the commencement of the 
Soviet anti-Yugoslav campaign. 
                                                 





At the time of Khrushchev’s visit, Tito and Kardelj, under prodding from 
Koča Popović and his Foreign Ministry, were willing to re-establish economic trade 
relations and some limited cultural cooperation between the two states. Close to two 
years had passed since Belgrade and Moscow had exchanged Ambassadors in 
September 1953 as we saw in Chapter 3. The Foreign Ministry needed formal 
relations if it were to pursue a policy of neutralism. Creating relations globally 
outside of the Soviet bloc was underway, but for neutralism to work as a policy, 
relations with the Soviet Union needed to be stable and established. Tito and Kardelj, 
were focusing on the visit as primarily an occasion for a Soviet apology to the 
Yugoslav Party leadership. They were not yet willing to renew relations between the 
Yugoslav and Soviet Communist parties. Khrushchev’s visit did however result in the 
signing of an agreement between the Yugoslav and Soviet states.  
This Belgrade Agreement, signed in June 1955, asserted on Tito’s terms the 
that bilateral cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union could only 
proceed upon the establishment of “mutual respect and non-interference for any 
reason in internal affairs -- whether of an economic, political or ideological nature – 
since questions of the internal structure, differences of social systems and differences 
of concrete forms in developing socialism exclusively were to be a matter for the 
peoples of the different countries”.442 By April 1956, Khrushchev further agreed to 
disband the Cominform, the institution from which Yugoslavia’s formal expulsion in 
1948 had marked the start of the Soviet campaign to further Soviet military threats to 
Yugoslavia’s borders as staged from Bulgaria and Hungary between 1948 and 1953. 
These runs at the Yugoslav border were also disavowed. 
                                                 




After Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, which was interpreted as a sufficient 
Soviet apology, Tito promised to visit the Soviet Union to renew ties between the two 
Communist parties. This he did in June 1956.  The Moscow visit resulted in the 
signing of two declarations: one between Prime Ministers Tito and Nikolai Bulganin 
and a declaration between the party Secretaries Tito and Khrushchev. Reaffirming 
Yugoslavia’s independent position as agreed in the previous year, the governmental 
document declared that “the principles of the Belgrade Declaration signed 2 June 
1955 will be applied to the official policies of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.”443 
However, it also stated that “because there have been formed two sovereign states 
over the German territories, negotiations between these two states are necessary for 
finding a solution to the German question. Both signatory states insisted, that other 
states and especially the Great Powers adopt this position.”444 The document balanced 
Yugoslav independence from the Soviet bloc with the obligation to support the Soviet 
Union on key questions such as the division of Germany and support for Communist 
China.445 The second document correctly identified as ‘the Moscow declaration’ re-
established ties between the two parties. As an additional concession to Tito, the 
former Foreign Minister and major adversary Molotov who had in 1948 worked with 
Stalin to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform was made to even resign from his 
post as Soviet Foreign Minister during Tito’s state visit.446  
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Finnish analysts of the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement were particularly 
impressed both with the length of Tito’s 1956 visit to Moscow, from June 1 to 23, as 
well as with the high level of attention he received from the Soviet hosts. Tito visited 
Leningrad in the north and the Black Sea in the south during the stay. Ambassador 
Eero Wuori reported to Helsinki that “out of the state visits I have had the opportunity 
to follow here [in Moscow] Josef Broz Tito’s was – perhaps with the exception of 
Nehru’s visit last year—staged with the most elaborate trappings”.447 The Finnish 
reporting of the visit underlined the general enthusiasm of the Soviet public in 
receiving Tito. His wartime reputation as an anti-Fascist leader seemed to have 
survived the Soviet propaganda attacks in the aftermath of 1948. Public enthusiasm, 
even if in part the result of official Soviet efforts to require participation in Tito’s 
reception in Moscow, illustrates Khrushchev’s strong desire to renew relations 
between the governments and two parties in order to pursue his new foreign policy.448  
In a grandiloquent manner, the Soviets held a large public peoples’ ceremony 
in honor of Tito in Moscow’s Dynamo football stadium. Khrushchev assured the 
crowd that “already last year, when we were in Yugoslavia we had a friendly and 
open exchange of opinions. The spirit of the conversations is even more open and 
friendly now when Comrade Tito and his friends are in the Soviet Union”.449 The 
international diplomatic corps in Moscow speculated that the rather unfriendly 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations which had in fact continued to prevail behind closed doors 
during the pervious year’s Belgrade visit of Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin had 
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now improved.450 It is more likely that by elaborately staging Tito’s visit, Khrushchev 
wished to do more than show the outside world that the Soviet-Yugoslav rift was 
over. He wanted to match Tito’s and Kardelj’s dramatic demand that Khrushchev 
apologize upon his arrival at Belgrade airport without proceeding further. Khrushchev 
brought Tito before a Soviet crowd at the Dynamo stadium considerably larger than 
any stadium in Belgrade could accommodate.  
Khrushchev made several key changes in Finnish-Soviet relations in 1955, 
which paralleled the 1955-1956 shift in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Following 
Khrushchev’s June visit to Yugoslavia, President Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Prime 
Minister Urho Kekkonen visited Moscow together in September 1955. Although the 
Kremlin insisted on the extension of the Finnish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for an additional 20 years, Finland received the 
Porkkala Naval Base back from the Soviet Union 37 years ahead of the lease’s 
scheduled end. Both Paasikivi and Kekkonen considered this a major achievement for 
Finland as they believed that Soviet access to the Finnish naval base had violated 
Finnish sovereignty. In the opinion of its founders, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had 
already restored Finnish state sovereignty by 1955. Moreover, Khrushchev lifted the 
Soviet objection to Finland’s membership in the Nordic Council, stating that “the 
admission of Finland to the Nordic Council is the internal affair of Finland in which 
[the Soviet Union] does not interfere.”451 From the inception of Finnish neutralism, 
Paasikivi had envisioned a focus on bilateral trade with other Scandinavian countries 
and welcomed the parliamentary cooperation that the Nordic Council was formed in 
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1952 to promote. Finland was admitted in November 1955 and became a member of 
the United Nations in December 1955.  
Khrushchev’s new foreign policy also allowed Finland and Sweden to engage 
in promoting the Scandinavian regionalism as already endorsed by Norway, Denmark 
and Iceland. Khrushchev’s acceptance of Scandinavian regionalism in the north 
established the Nordic countries as gateway partners by which goods available in the 
West could be obtained for the Soviet Union without significant political 
compromise. This harmonized with the Paaskivi-Kekkonen Line, which wanted to 
avoid Communist intimidation in Finland, but seek trade with the Soviet Union as 
well as with other Nordic countries. What did the Soviet Union have to gain? If the 
Nordic states could be considered a group promoting neutralism of some kind, 
Soviet-Danish and Soviet-Norwegian trade would be viewed as trade between the 
USSR and two Nordic states rather than with two NATO states. 
As the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry noted about Finland, “the characteristics of 
Soviet politics towards Scandinavian countries until Stalin’s death were underlined by 
pressure and intimidation, calculated to separate these countries from the West and 
leave them to Soviet dominance”.452 Stalin opposed the mutual association of the 
Scandinavian countries, “characterizing the Nordic Council as an intimate part of 
NATO,” and pressured Finland to abstain from joining.453 After Stalin’s death, 
Khrushchev instituted a series of new efforts in 1955 to improve relations with the 
Scandinavian countries as a whole. He sought to reestablish friendly political and 
trade relations, calculating that these would weaken Western political influence in 
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Scandinavia. Regarding Khrushchev’s intentions, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
concluded that “the independence of these countries from the influence of the West 
and the independence of their politics in relations with the West” would serve Soviet 
foreign policy best, since subjugation to Soviet control was unattainable.454 By 1955, 
the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry had been largely independent of Tito’s and Kardelj’s 
LCY Politburo for two years. The leadership of Koča Popović, was thus able to 
pursue increased Yugoslav bilateral trade and other contacts with states outside the 
Soviet bloc. If Finland was allowed to trade freely and associate with other Nordic 
countries, Yugoslavia might also use normalization of relations with the Soviet Union 
to advance its contacts with West European states. Khrushchev had encouraged the 
strengthening of the Nordic Council, calculating that the organization could “help its 
Scandinavian countries to carry out independent politics in relations of the West”.455 
The new Soviet policy saw the non-threatening aspects to Scandinavian 
membership in NATO as an asset, whereas Stalin’s foreign policy had only perceived 
such a threat. Norway and Denmark had since 1953 refused to accept NATO military 
bases on their territory, and all Scandinavian countries had since reduced military 
budgets despite NATO requests for their expansion; public opinion in Denmark and 
Norway generally rejected military engagement.456  
Just as he had apologized for Stalin’s offenses to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev 
began to institute his new regional Scandinavian policy with similar expressions of 
regret. During the visit of the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen to Moscow 
in November 1955, Khrushchev declared that “the Soviet politics had made many 







mistakes towards Norway and that the USSR is also responsible for the circumstances 
that could naturally lead Norway into NATO”.457 Gerhardsen, a member of the Labor 
Party of Norway, had been a socialist in the interwar period and took part in the 
gradual conversion of the Norwegian labor movement into a Social Democratic party. 
By 1956, all Scandinavian governments except Iceland’s were led by Social 
Democratic prime ministers.458 Khrushchev was especially interested in seeking 
cooperation with such parties. They focused on the creation of a welfare state. These 
parties also opposed the expansion of NATO from Denmark and Norway to Sweden 
and favored more Nordic integration.459  Khrushchev proceeded to establish trade 
relations with each of the Scandinavian countries, visiting Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland personally in August 1956 (in between Tito’s visit to Moscow in June and the 
Hungarian uprising in November) seeking to expand trade through Scandinavia with 
Western Europe in order to help the Soviet economy.  
Despite Finnish requests to be included on his itinerary, Khrushchev opted not 
to visit Helsinki. This decision indicated that his foreign policy did not yet envision 
parity between Finland and the other Scandinavian countries. But acquiring 
equivalence with the other Nordic countries was Finland’s next foreign policy goal in 
1955, after stability in Soviet relations had been followed by Soviet troops leaving 
Porkkala. Since Finland could not join NATO, Nordic regionalism offered the best 
option to build a strong relationship with Western Europe. While Khrushchev sought 
to promote Nordic regionalism as a tool to divide Scandinavia from Western Europe, 
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the Finnish leadership of Paasikivi and Kekkonen saw it as an opportunity to extend 
ties with the West. As Yugoslav analysis of Finland in 1956 noted, “The Finns are 
interested in [Khrushchev’s] visit because it would be in the framework with the other 
Scandinavian countries; Finland would not be treated as separate”.460  
Khrushchev’s Scandinavian regionalism in fact reflected the favorable 
experiences of the Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1955.  Because Finland and the 
Soviet Union shared a long border, the Soviet interest in connecting Finnish 
neutralism more tightly to Moscow persisted, even under Khrushchev’s new more 
flexible regionalism.  The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line still guaranteed the security of 
the border for Finland.  While the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) was still 
the more desirable political partner for the Yugoslavs, the conservative Agrarians’ 
Party (AP) with Kekkonen at the helm was the most important connection for the 
Soviets in dealing with Finland, even under Khrushchev. Kekkonen could be trusted 
by the Kremlin to maintain the Kekkonen-Paasikivi Line even when less Soviet 
pressure was applied in 1955’s atmosphere of rapprochement. 
Khrushchev’s policy of improving relations with Western Europe faced a 
variety of criticism. The Western governments were suspicious of its underlying 
intentions toward Scandinavia and Yugoslavia.  Khrushchev’s political flexibility was 
also criticized by the hardliners in the Kremlin and the East European party 
leaderships that had been installed during Stalin’s time. These groups feared that they 
would loose their positions. As early as 1955, the new Soviet leader’s criticism of 
Stalin extending from the cult of personality  into his foreign policy was rejected at 
first by Khrushchev’s former supporters in the Presidium Viacheslav Molotov, Lazar 
                                                 




Kaganovitch, and Kliment Voroshilov. They considered that “to investigate Stalin’s 
activities would mean revising the results of the entire great path of the CPSU!” 461 
They asked Khrushchev in exasperation “Who would benefit from it? What purpose 
would it serve? Why stir up the past?” One view suggested that rapprochement with 
Yugoslavia could be interpreted as a relaxation in the role of Soviet troops in holding 
the Warsaw Pact together.462 Hardliners could also link Khrushchev’s vulgar and 
unpredictable, on at least one occasion drunken behavior during the Belgrade visit of 
1955 with the notion that Khrushchev had mistakenly given too much away to Tito.  
The importance to Soviet security of Khrushchev’s reformulation of relations 
with Yugoslavia became clearer however, during the sequence of Hungarian events. 
Tito’s reciprocal visit to the Soviet Union in June 1956 had completed initial 
Yugoslav support for the new policy with the reestablishment of relations between 
their two Communist parties. In order to counter Tito’s initial support for Nagy, 
Khrushchev visited Tito on his island resort of Brioni on 2 November 1956. There, 
Khrushchev managed to secure Tito’s tacit support for the decisive Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary. Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow Veljko Mićunović 
recorded the conversation between the two leaders, 
We explained that we the Yugoslavs were also concerned at the swing 
of events to the right, towards counterrevolution, when we saw Nagy’s 
government allowing Communists to be murdered and hanged. There 
would have to be intervention if there was counterrevolution in 
Hungary, but it should not be based exclusively on the weapons of the 
Soviet Army.463    
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Foreign Minister Koča Popović did not participate in the Brioni meeting, nor is he 
mentioned by Vladimir Dedijer or Mićunović, who have provided the most frequently 
quoted account on the meeting.464 Mićunović had hoped to become Foreign Minister 
in 1953. As noted in Chapter 3 he was part of Tito’s inner circle. According to post-
Communist Yugoslav scholarship, “the position towards the events in Hungary was 
dictated by the Politburo, and theoretically justified by Edvard Kardelj. He called the 
first phase of Soviet intervention unacceptable but justified the second for preventing 
of a counter revolution.”465  Khrushchev left Brioni on November 3, and the 
following evening Soviet tanks attacked the Hungarian rebels in Budapest and in 
other smaller Hungarian cities. Tito apparently feared an anti-Communist government 
in a former one-party state on Yugoslavia’s physical border more than a Soviet-
governed Communist regime. Following the Soviet intervention, Nagy nonetheless 
sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. According to Kardelj’s later 
memoirs, Nagy requested asylum and was granted it by Ambassador Dobrivoje Vidić 
without the authorization of the party leadership.466 The role of Popović in the events 
has not been made clear in the scholarship that rarely mentions the Foreign Minister, 
but it appears that Vidić was a closer to him than to the party leadership. On 
November 7, Khrushchev informed Mićunović that Nagy should be handed over to 
the Soviets.467 On November 23, the Yugoslav officials discharged Nagy from the 
Embassy under an improbable agreement with the Soviets that Hungarian authorities 
                                                 
464 Vladimir Dedijer, History of Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). 
465 Ranko Petković, Subjektivna Istorija Jugoslovenske Diplomatije 1943-1991 (Belgrade: Službeni 
List, 1991), 43. 
466 Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences: the Struggle for Recognition and Independence: the New 
Yugoslavia,  
     1944-1957.  (London: Blond & Briggs in association with Summerfield Press, 1982), 133. 




would return him to his home. Nagy was immediately seized by Soviet security 
personnel and moved to Romania. In June 1958, Soviet newspapers published the 
information that Nagy had been executed following a trial in Hungary.468 
The strong Finnish public and official Western reactions to the Hungarian 
intervention would have been still more damaging for Soviet foreign policy without 
the agreements in place which Khrushchev had established in 1955 with Finland and 
in 1956 with Yugoslavia. Kekkonen in particular had appreciated the very early 
return of Porkkala to Finland, and the country was in a better position having gained 
membership in the Nordic Council and UN in 1955. However displeased he was with 
the Soviet military measures, he would not jeopardize the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line 
over the events in Hungary.  
While the Soviet Union benefited Tito’s sanctioning the suppression in 
Hungary, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry expressed serious misgivings about the 
return of the party and ideology to the forefront of decision making in the matter. The 
active engagement of Tito, Kardelj in foreign affairs led to the renewal of rhetorical 
conflicts between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties. These did not serve the purpose of 
Yugoslav policy of neutralism. The Foreign Ministry’s specific objections are the 
subject of the next section.    
 
The Yugoslav Response to Khrushchev’s New Foreign 
Policy 
 
                                                 




The reformulation of Soviet-Yugoslav relations would not have been possible 
without public overtures to Belgrade by Moscow. Tito and Kardelj demanded them, 
not only for personal vindication but also as domestic currency in consolidating the 
one-party but multi-national state, just celebrating its first decade in 1956. However 
by 1956 Yugoslav foreign policy was directed chiefly through its Foreign Ministry, 
with Tito asked to do the hard bargaining when needed. Kardelj was still drafting 
Tito’s speeches when the party’s ideological position was the main concern. 
Popović’s Foreign Ministry on the other hand paid attention to how Western Europe 
and the United States perceived Yugoslavia seemed ready as diplomatic partners to 
support Yugoslav independence.469 The ideological contest with the Soviet Union 
received much less attention.  
Instead, by the end of 1956, the Foreign Ministry had come to concentrate on 
the position of Finland in relation to that of the Warsaw Pact countries in its analysis 
of the Soviet Union.470 Uninterested in pursuing direct diplomacy with Moscow, the 
Ministry was trying to create a space for itself outside the Soviet bloc similar to that 
afforded to Finland through neutralism. Reestablishment of permanent relations with 
the Soviet Union was needed for this goal, but here Tito, Kardelj and Popović’s 
Ministry were all agreed on rejecting any Soviet attempt to incorporate Yugoslavia 
into the Soviet bloc.  
Khrushchev’s conciliatory position made the assumption that the Yugoslav 
leadership welcomed, or at least would publicly embrace rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union. The reconciliation contained several clear benefits to Yugoslavia. The 
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Belgrade and Moscow Declarations were not however intended by the Yugoslavs to 
rebuild a close political relationship with Moscow. Instead, as the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry noted in its analysis of Tito’s 1956 state visit to the Soviet Union, the two 
agreements “reflect the development of our bilateral relations and worked in the sense 
of neutralization [of previous conflict] to establish and freeze the status of our 
concrete stance and our principles as stated precisely in both documents”.471 In 1955 
and 1956, the Foreign Ministry together with Tito’s Presidential Office, sought to 
ratify the status quo with the Soviets over foreign policy. The Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry hoped to direct Yugoslav bilateral relations away from the Soviet sphere and 
toward the rest of Europe.  
The Yugoslav leadership remained collectively critical and suspicious of the 
Kremlin and its political goals. The Foreign Ministry surveyed Soviet relations in 
December 1956 with problems highlighted under the heading “some negative 
tendencies in bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR”.472 The first and 
the most important problem was “the ignoring of the Moscow [Declaration] 
documents in official statements and in Soviet propaganda immediately after their 
signing.”473 The Foreign Ministry noted that “internal and important statements of the 
Soviet leadership (Khrushchev in the [the Dynamo] Stadium, [Mikhail] Suslov and 
[Anastas] Mikoyan in Hungary, Suslov in the Congress of the Communist Party of 
Finland, [Nikolai] Bulganin in Poland etc…) in general did not mention the Moscow 
documents” at all.474 The Yugoslav analysis concluded that “Moscow’s complete 
                                                 







silence on the party document is also not possible to explain by its campaign-style of 
work”.475 Instead, Moscow’s suppression of the document and, therefore recognition 
of the full independence of the Yugoslav party was felt to be intentional. 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry found other signs that Moscow was not 
committed to upholding and establishing the Moscow Declaration on party 
independece. According to Yugoslav sources from Poland, “The Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union explained to the Central Committees of 
the Eastern Bloc that the Party Declaration between Tito and Khrushchev relates 
exclusively to relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia”.476 This letter was meant to have been secret 
and confidential. More worrying still, the Yugoslav analysis found that several 
representatives of the old guard from the Soviet bloc countries  
placed pressure on the Russians and expressed their own dissatisfaction 
with the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and with the manner of 
Comrade Tito in Moscow (remarks of Czechoslovak Ambassador I.T. 
Grishin that the cordiality towards Tito was exaggerated; open criticism of 
Josef Revaj in the plenum of the Hungarian Communist Party about 
‘Soviet stance towards Titoism’, in Bulgaria remarks that Khrushchev is a 
‘traitor’…).477 
 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry thus concluded that the Soviets would seek to 
restrain East European regimes from forming contacts with the West through renewed 
relations with Yugoslavia. They also saw that Khrushchev could try to limit Yugoslav 
bilateral relations with Western and other governments in the future—a possibility 
highly incompatible with the political goals of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. 
Moreover, the Yugoslavs suspected that the Soviets were wary of resistance from the 







old guard within the East European Communist party leaderships, as evidenced by 
their reaction to the endorsement of Rákosi earlier in 1956.478 This wariness might 
have been another factor in the Soviets’ willfully ignoring the Moscow Declaration in 
particular. At the end of 1956, then, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry concluded that 
Soviet politics “give the impression that the Russians comprehend the [Moscow] 
Declaration as a temporary document which needs to be utilized to bring Yugoslavia 
closer to the bloc as quickly as possible.” 479 The re-establishment of Yugoslavia’s 
diplomatic relations with Soviet bloc countries thus raised fears in the Foreign 
Ministry that this might lead to a comparably subservient relation to the Kremlin. 
Both the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and Tito’s Office of the President, remained 
suspicious of the old guard within Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania, which had actively worked to place pressure on Yugoslavia after its 
expulsion from the Cominform. Whether such suspicions were real as in the case of 
Rákosi, or imagined, they prevented close collaboration with these states in the near 
future. 
Looking for evidence of the Soviet intention to include Yugoslavia within the 
Soviet bloc, Yugoslav diplomats observed the placing of Yugoslav books in the 
windows of bookstores alongside materials from the Soviet bloc countries in Moscow 
and reported this as Soviet preparation for subjugation.480 The Yugoslavs were even 
more angered by the placement of Yugoslav news in the section with articles on 
Eastern bloc countries in the major Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestija after 
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Tito’s 1956 visit.481 The Kremlin was then reluctant to publish news from Yugoslavia 
after the signing of the Moscow Declaration. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry counted 
this as another sign of Soviet intentions to suppress the significance of Yugoslavia 
and its independence. The Ministry complained that such occasions underlining 
Yugoslavia’s important role in the Balkans such as the arrival of Dag Hammerskjöld 
in Yugoslavia and Tito’s stay in Greece were only noted briefly in the Soviet press.482 
The visit of Nasser and Nehru to Tito on Brioni was published as a note without 
comment on the meeting.483 Except for the statement of Tito on the Suez conflict 
(which seems to be the reason the Brioni meeting was mentioned at all), Soviet 
publications omitted any citation from the Yugoslav press in the months following the 
Moscow Declaration. Moreover, the Soviets attempted to downplay the Yugoslav 
slogan “independent roads to socialism” by frequently featuring the phrase “leading 
the way in the class struggle” to Yugoslav displeasure.  
Soviet journals reported on Yugoslavia in short pieces without analysis of 
internal developments. The Soviet Union did continue to publish some original 
materials from Yugoslavia, including pieces on legal regulations and textbooks on the 
economy.484 Izvestija and Pravda did occasionally republish editorials from Yugoslav 
papers. This was the one aspect of the Soviet approach the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
regarded positively in that it offered “an ‘objective’ treatment of Yugoslavia within 
the Soviet press”.485 Republished editorials enabled the Yugoslav party to 
communicate its views within the Soviet Union in an unaltered form.  On the whole, 









however, the Soviet Union desk in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry concluded that the 
Soviets were continuing their efforts to play down Yugoslavia’s role within the 
Communist movement; too little was published, and what was published was placed 
alongside Soviet bloc material.486 
To make matters worse from the Yugoslav perspective, the Soviets kept 
pressuring them to adopt the same easy and low-cost visa regime allowed to the East 
European states by the Soviet Union.487 This was not beneficial for Yugoslavia, 
which had established its own visa regimes for Western Europe and many other 
regions of the world where its by now over 80 of its embassies were located. 
According to the Soviet proposal Yugoslavia would be obliged to grant inexpensive, 
easier obtained visas to tourists from Soviet bloc.In addition, Yugoslavia would most 
likely lose its existing visa regimes with several Western states if it adopted the 
Soviet proposal. 
After the Moscow Declaration, the Soviets or their East European satellites 
even asked the Yugoslavs to participate in intra-bloc negotiations in a few instances. 
For example, the Yugoslavs were invited to an August 1956 meeting of the Foreign 
Trade Ministers to discuss the coordination of export and import to Asia and 
Africa.488 The Yugoslav Military Attaché received a Romanian invitation to follow its 
naval exercises and those of the bloc countries.489  Moše Pijade, then the President of 
Skupština, was invited again by Romania to participate in a secret meeting of 
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Communist countries’ representatives for the Interparliamentary Union to coordinate 
strategies for an upcoming Bangkok conference.490 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry concluded that such invitations had ulterior 
motives and noted that,  
Internally, the Russians do not treat us without reservation and 
prejudice in regard to our foreign and domestic policies, but they want 
to neutralize our experience and our relations with socialist countries, 
while publicly they wish to treat us, in the eyes of the West and also 
those of other socialist countries [as inside the bloc] – in order to 
revive suspicion of westerners in the independence of politics of 
Yugoslavia”.491  
 
Still, the Ministry welcomed such Soviet attention: “this tells us that at least the 
Russians still classify Yugoslavia as an independent socialist country in relation to the 
Eastern bloc”. 492 The Yugoslavs hoped that the Kremlin would continue to fear their 
influence on the Soviet bloc countries. This signaled the existence of continued 
recognition of some independence for Yugoslav foreign policy vis-à-vis the bloc, 
similarly to what Khrushchev had granted Finland vis-à-vis the Nordic Union. 
Under these circumstances, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry advised state 
organs that “it seems to us inopportune to silence our publications about the Belgrade 
and the Moscow Declarations in particular. Our journalism could conveniently 
dedicate some serious studies to them (especially within party journals), providing 
documents for us to call upon often as reflecting the foundation of our relations with 
the USSR”.493 It is important to note that by the end of 1956 (unlike in 1948), 
instructions regarding Yugoslavia’s Soviet policy no longer originated from Tito and 
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Kardelj alone. Nor were they kept secret from most of the Yugoslav state organs. 
Instead, they were drafted by the Foreign Ministry, originating with its team of Soviet 
analysts. Tito and Kardelj influenced the extent to which these recommendations 
were carried out, but they intervened only on matters pertaining to their own person 
or the Yugoslav party’s profile. 
The Yugoslav Ministry remained frustrated with the Kremlin in that “many 
dealings which normally need to be completed between the Yugoslav Embassy [in 
Moscow] and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including invitations to events, 
were conducted in Belgrade instead.” 494 The Soviets tended to work around the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and its representatives in Moscow, instead contacting 
directly and separately the various Yugoslav state institutions and establishing 
contacts on the highest levels in an effort to reduce the presumably unsympathetic 
Ministry’s influence. Khrushchev wished to continue dealing with a few key leaders, 
i.e., Tito and Kardelj alone, just as in Finland he preferred to deal exclusively with 
Kekkonen. Between 1948 and 1953, the Kremlin had been best able to execute its 
agenda in Finland through the Finnish Foreign Ministry (which had agreed to curtail 
anti-Soviet propaganda in order to preserve the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line). But it 
quickly became clear that the Yugoslav Ministry in 1956 was not interested in 
heeding the Kremlin’s suggestions or in advancing Yugoslav-Soviet relations beyond 
limited diplomatic exchanges that did not include, for example, the Soviet suggested 
visa regime. While Stalin had wished to replace the Tito-Kardelj-Djilas leadership in 
1948, Khrushchev in 1956 wanted to keep Tito and Kardelj in charge of Yugoslav 
foreign policy and thus to undermine the emerging initiative of the Foreign Ministry. 





A well organized, ably staffed and relatively autonomous ministry would serve to 
further the execution of independent diplomatic ties between Yugoslavia and non-
Communist states. These ties effectively weakened the Soviet ability to cordon 
Yugoslavia off from gaining further significance as an independent Communist state 
outside the Soviet bloc on Europe. 
 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and Finland, 1955-1956 
 
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was particularly interested in the conduct and 
success of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line in the context of Khrushchev’s new foreign 
policy. Ministry documents analyzing Finland multiplied between 1955 and 1956. 
Separate studies were written on ‘Karelia’, the Finnish territory taken by the Soviet 
Union at the end of the Second World War, and on Finnish Soviet relations in general 
from 1948-1956.495 These files featured analysis on topics such as “Tendency of the 
Communist party of the Soviet Union for integration with the Socialist Parties of 
Western Europe” and “Opinions of the 20th Party Congress of the CC or the USSR 
towards Scandinavian countries.” The Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow already noted 
in its January 1956 report that President Paasikivi’s New Year’s speech “reflected in 
certain manner the stronger international position of the country.”496 The President, in 
addition to citing “the development of good relations with the Soviet Union” for the 
successes of Finnish foreign policy in 1955, emphasized equally the Finnish 
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commitment to Western economic practices: “as the American practice has also 
proved, the successes in the fields of trade [in1955] prevented the necessity of state 
intervention [in the economy] as the only means of reducing crises.”497 The Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Regional Section for Europe was anxious to find out whether 
“Finland’s membership in the UN and the Nordic Council led to the development of 
intensive relations and collaboration with the West” in 1956?498 Both memberships 
had become possible through Finland’s approved distance from the Soviets. Such 
possibilities were of interest to the Yugoslavs, who were considering further 
rapprochement with the Soviets on just those terms in January 1956. 
Yugoslav analysis of Finland found it curious but instructive that Paasikivi—a 
conservative, member of the National Coalition Party (NCP)—supported 
Kekkonen—the leader of the Agrarians’ Party (AP)—for President very publicly on 
numerous occasions that year, and even in his New Year’s speech.499 By 1955, and 
increasingly in 1956, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line came under criticism from the 
ranks of the Social Democrats (SDP) and also from Paasikivi’s own NCP. Critics 
portrayed overtures made toward the Soviet Union, such as the Agreement on 
Friendship Assistance and Mutual Cooperation of 1948 (renewed in 1955) as 
conciliatory appeasement. Early in 1956 both the Social Democrats and the 
Conservatives began to advocate closer trade ties with the United States. The 
Yugoslav Embassy surmised that the SDP, seeking a new coalition with the NCP in 
1956, was in a political battle with the AP. In the context of this power struggle, the 
SDP and the NCP challenged the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, the foreign policy most 
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closely associated with Kekkonen. Yugoslav analysis of Finland appreciated “the 
united stance and harmony of Paasikivi and Kekkonen in holding on to this policy 
tenaciously” in 1956.500 If the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line faltered, so would this model 
neutralism for the Yugoslav Ministry, balancing correct but limited diplomatic 
relations with Moscow with the cultivation of ties outside the Soviet bloc. 
Yet the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry also found the SDP’s pro-Western 
coalition with Paasikivi’s conservative party acceptable. Of course, the SDP “could 
not become stronger and a more decisive political factor in the country without the 
additional growth of the working class.”501 In addition, the SDP, despite its strong ties 
to the Trade Union movement, did not desire collaboration with the Finnish 
Communist Party (SKP) and this the Yugoslav Ministry welcomed. In fact, according 
to “reliable internal sources”, the SDP sought to abandon some of its previous 
“methods of ‘radical’ agitation, including general strikes, for example, that could 
alienate [the middle] classes from the Party”.502 According to its own internal 
analysis, the SDP needed to “further strengthen its influence among the middle 
classes … in striving to reach its goals, SDP needs to collaborate with the more 
liberal wing of the National Coalition Party (NCP), which is interested in the 
industrialization of the country; with them it is possible to reach an agreement on a 
number of questions which the Agrarians will not entertain”.503  
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry predicted that the result of SDP and NCP 
collaboration would not be the much-feared increase of Soviet influence on Finnish 
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foreign policy but that instead its “most likely consequence would be an increase in 
pro-Westernism”, which would still present a domestic challenge to the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line.504 Curiously, for a Communist state which had just concluded 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s analysis 
seemed to favor the SDP’s approach on Western trade. The Yugoslavs projected its 
possible success under the influential Väinö Leskinen, who had served as Minister of 
the Interior in Kekkonen’s fifth government, 1953-1955. Leskinen had by the mid-
1950s incurred the disfavor of the Soviet Union and the Finnish Communist Party. 
The Yugoslavs felt Leskinen was in the most favorable position to deliver a victory 
for the SDP, because “he both  fought against the Soviets [in the Second World War] 
and there acquired a series of friends who are today very influential politicians in the 
NCP”.505  Leskinen was in fact known for his thoroughly patriotic stance during the 
postwar period. He had served in the famous Ässärykmentti (Aces-battalion), 
composed of draftees from Helsinki’s two major settlements of industrial working 
class sections, Sörnäiset and Kallio. He was one of the influential SDP members who 
founded the so-called Asevelisosialistit group (brothers-in-arms-socialists), a 
subdivision of the Aseveliliitto (union of brothers-in-arms), a union dedicated to the 
conservation of the memory of the Winter and Continuation Wars. This union was 
however banned in 1945 and condemned by the Finnish Communist Party as a Fascist 
organization. Leskinen’s profile combined a commitment to social democracy with 
patriotic Finnish nationalism, most often reserved for upper class conservatives. He 






was also pro-Western, and this combination made him a significant political figure in 
the view of the Yugoslav Ministry. 
The Yugoslav analysis commented critically on the opposition to Leskinen’s 
group in the SDP. The opposition’s leader Eero Antikainen, the President of the 
Finnish Trade Unions “thinks that it is possible to collaborate with the Communists 
on certain questions (concretely on a general strike).”506 The Trade Unions were 
facing “an offensive…reducing the force and authority of the Trade Union, an 
offensive which is supported also by a side of the current Government, a part of the 
Social Democratic Party, [with which] Antikainen thinks collaboration on concrete 
questions [with CPF] can accomplish” some goals of the working class.507 In 1956, 
Antikainen still “argued for the nationalization of energy sources, banks and 
Pharmacies”.508 The Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Section specifically asked its Helsinki 
diplomats to investigate “how strong the tendencies towards nationalization of 
branches of the economy are within the [Finnish] labor movement”, whether 
Antikainen’s above-noted goals had “received the character of an ‘action program’ in 
the practical politics of the trade unions and how much support such initiatives could 
find within the Social Democratic Party (SDP)”.509 
The Yugoslav ministry obviously feared any development of influence from 
the Finnish Communist Party. The Yugoslavs had since 1948 identified the party as 
entirely loyal to the Soviet Union; all party positions, were considered detrimental to 
Yugoslavia’s ability to maintain its neutral position outside of the Soviet bloc. The 
                                                 
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid. 





Yugoslav Foreign Ministry asked its representative in Helsinki to ascertain whether 
the more conciliatory stance of the trade unions towards collaborating with the SKP 
was “a symptom of collaboration on the level on some concrete questions” between 
the SDP and the KP, or whether the SDP could have fallen under Moscow’s 
influence.510  
The conflict and competition between the Finnish political parties heavily 
influenced the Finnish political response to the events in Hungary. The conservatives 
had not followed Paasikivi after his personal support of Kekkonen since 1948. In this 
context, the AP had been the political winner. Kekkonen had formed governments in 
1950-1953 and 1954-1956 as Prime Minister to Paasikivi and was subsequently 
elected President, beginning his term on 1 March 1956.The events in Hungary gave 
the Social Democrats the much-needed opportunity to challenge the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen status quo. SDP’s Prime Minister Karl-August Fagerholm stated that 
“Finland as a small country cannot allow for the use of force as a method for solving 
international questions. All aggressive measures in that view are similar and need to 
be condemned. Our obligation is to contribute to the ending of conflicts and the 
cessation of bloodshed. In all international questions the basic task we have is to 
place the preservation of our nation first.”511 Not only did Fagerholm as a Social 
Democrat condemn the Soviet invasion in terms of the lives lost. He also commented 
on it on security grounds for Finland. Antikainen was even more critical, as the 
President of the Trade Union’s he declared on Finnish radio, “that workers are 






coming to work on the day of a state holiday, and in that way earn overtime wages 
given as donation to Hungarian refugees.”512 
Concurrent with the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Ministry cables pressed 
Yugoslav diplomats in Helsinki “to extend your reports to a more complete analysis 
of events which characterize domestic development and foreign policy of Finland.” 
513 In response, the embassy submitted a full 12-page analysis of the Finnish response 
to the Soviet invasion of Hungary.514 It noted that in the aftermath of the Soviet 
invasions, “President Kekkonen thought that the government needs to oppose the 
earlier described [aid] campaigns [for Hungarian refugees] and criticism of Soviets, 
despite the mood of the country and to replace the critical press coverage with a 
passive attitude toward the Soviet government”.515 Moreover, Soviet Ambassador 
Vladimir Lebedev’s visit to Fagerholm on 19 November 1956 was “interpreted as an 
effective warning and pressure on the government, against its views [expressed] in 
the [United Nation’s] General Assembly, and also in relation to the [aid] campaigns 
in the country which actually have an anti-Soviet character”.516  
The Yugoslav Ministry noted that the positive effects of restored sovereignty 
over Porkkala in 1955, as well as UN representation for the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, 
were quickly counterbalanced in 1956 by Soviet military action in Hungary and the 
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formation of the Conservative-Social Democratic opposition coalition. Kekkonen was 
elected President in 1956, but the legitimacy of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was 
nevertheless questioned in Finland—so significant were the political consequences of 
the Hungarian revolution itself. In Finland, popular opinion, associated images of the 
Soviet military action in Budapest with those of Finland in the Second World War. 
Soviet military intervention was perceived as abhorrent and morally wrong. 
Kekkonen himself had regarded Finnish passivity as a necessary compromise, only 
privately expressing his displeasure to the Yugoslavs. After Hungary, Kekkonen had 
to face a united SDP-NCP opposition that was building ties with Congressional 
representatives in Washington. In 1956, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry still 
considered the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line its primary Finnish political ally. But after 
the death of Paasikivi in 1956, the Ministry felt less comfortable with Kekkonen and 
considered closer cooperation with the Social Democrats, who by this time were also 
seeking closer Finnish trade relations with the United States.  
 
Finnish Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1955-1956 
Rather than focusing on political analysis of the Yugoslav League of 
Communists, the Finnish Foreign Ministry was paying more attention to Yugoslav-
Soviet trade relations. Prior to the events in Hungary, the ministry had been observing 
the growing Soviet-Yugoslav trade and contrasting it with Finland’s own prospects 
with the USSR. The Finns estimated that the Soviet-Yugoslav trade would by 1957 
constitute approximately $70 million in exports and imports.517 The contrast with 
                                                 




earlier years was striking. While in 1955 Soviet trade had ranked 8th in Yugoslav 
exports and 14th in Yugoslav imports, by the first quarter of 1956 it had risen to fourth 
place in both. The Yugoslav-Soviet financial relationship was alsochanging. 
According to the analysis of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, in 1956 the Soviets 
cancelled the $90 million Yugoslav debt and the Soviets granted Yugoslavia $30 
million loan in Western currencies at two percent interest, with a further $54 million 
credit for part of the remaining debt. The rest was due only over a 10-year period 
starting in 1959. In addition, according to the Finnish data from Moscow, Yugoslavia 
was granted an additional $110 million credit for building three factories and mines. 
All of these sums are modest in the face of US authorizations of aid and credit that 
averaged $300 million a year from 1956 to 1959.518 However, in the eyes of the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry in 1956 these sums were significant, and the reporting of the 
ministry emphasized them as Yugoslav gains from having reformulated diplomatic 
relations with the Soviets.  
These figures as projected by the Finnish Foreign Ministry may well have 
been inflated, as their sources were Soviet projections from Moscow. Their 
importance, however, lies in the fact Finnish analysis expected Yugoslavia to carry 
out their economic agreement, within the context of rapprochement, as Finland had 
done first in 1948 and secondly in 1955. The international diplomatic corps in 
Moscow regarded Soviet economic assistance to Yugoslavia as significant by 1956 
and expected it to continue.519 Finnish analysis cited articles in the Soviet press, as in 
the May 1956 issue Kommunist, emphasized that Yugoslavia’s economic difficulties. 
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The Soviets press advanced the view that rapprochement would be mutually 
beneficial. While Soviet foreign policy needed some agreement with Tito and 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav economy supposedly required Soviet investment in order to 
expand its industry and raise living standards.520 For Khrushchev’s foreign policy, 
such economic ties would counteract the image that the Scandinavian countries and 
Yugoslavia was turning towards the West for assistance instead of the Soviet Union. 
Trade relations with the Soviet Union that obliged the acceptance of low-quality bloc 
imports were part of Finland’s political compromise, accepted under the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line. Finland projected similar terms of economic rapprochement for 
Yugoslavia.   
The Finnish trade analysis was framed in light of the Moscow Declaration. 
The 1956 agreement was interpreted in Finland as setting out to define the policy of 
“Titoist neutralism.”521 This policy was presumed to combine with previous year’s 
Belgrade Declaration of Yugoslav state independence from the Soviet bloc with a 
limited commitment to support the Soviet party on certain international key questions 
vital for international Communism. But according to the Finnish analysis, this ‘Titoist 
neutralism’ did contrast with Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union in its 
accommodation with Soviet party positions laid on the Yugoslav party in reference to 
issues such as the support of East Germany. The Finnish analysis questioned whether 
the compromise spelled out in the Moscow Declaration between independence of the 
state from and party support for the Soviet bloc could be tenable? At the same time, 
“Titoist neutralism” highlighted the independence of Yugoslav foreign policy. The 
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Yugoslav government called its policy “active coexistence”.522 This term was coined 
to distinguish Yugoslav from Finnish neutralism, and in order to portray Yugoslav 
political commitments towards the Soviet Union as a matter of ‘active’ Yugoslav 
responsibility. Ambassador Wuori in Moscow reported that “according to the 
explanations of Tito, this does not mean passive, peaceful neighbourly relations but 
the further development of relations between the two states.”523 Wuori was unaware 
of the sharply divergent perspectives that had come to divide the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry and Tito’s Presidential office. The Ministry sought stability in Soviet 
relations that would allow ambitious bilateral relations with other nations. Tito, on the 
other hand, was uncomfortable with diplomacy which might portray passivity or fail 
to clearly demonstrate his own agency. 
The Finnish Foreign Ministry noted that for the Kremlin only the part of the 
Moscow Declaration that addressed common position of the two Communist parties 
for a divided Germany and Korea was really valid.524 The Party Declaration seemed 
to support Khrushchev’s new position announced at the 20th Party Congress in 
February 1956 which proclaimed that the Soviet Communist Party would expand its 
relationship with Socialist parties across Europe, including even Social Democratic 
parties.525 The prelude to the party Declaration enumerated the officials who would 
take part in negotiations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. But they were 
identified by their party affiliation rather than their governmental positions, 
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highlighting dialogue between two one-party states. In the process, this identification 
pushed aside the importance of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. The Soviet party 
document underlined the necessity of having contacts between the two parties “as the 
cooperation of all progressive and peace loving forces has to be furthered as widely as 
possible”. Yet, the Finnish Foreign Ministry was surprised that the cooperation 
between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties was to be carried out by “personal ties, 
exchanges of written and oral opinions, through sending visiting delegations and 
when needed joint negotiations” noting that no permanent organ for the maintenance 
of cooperation was to be established.526 The Ministry had expected that the Soviets 
would have wanted a permanent body of some kind, especially as rapprochement 
with Tito had required the termination of the Cominform.  
Ambassador Wuori wrote to Helsinki, “It will be interesting to see how this, 
‘Titoist’ neutralism will succeed. Undoubtedly it has prospects for success; as 
international tensions are reduced the opportunities not only to get on speaking terms 
but also to agree on certain important questions between the two current camps have 
increased.”527 While Tito’s terminology of “active coexistence” sought to distinguish 
Yugoslavia from Finland, the 1955 and 1956 Declarations actually made the positions 
of the Finnish and the Yugoslav neutralism policies more comparable. Both Finnish 
and Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union emphasized economic cooperation as 
addressing political differences. Both sought to build on existing ties with the 
Western economies, and both emphasized independent foreign policies in the 
                                                 





framework of not challenging the geographic or political borders of the Soviet Union 
and the Soviet bloc. 
According to the Finnish analysis the Soviet Union also benefited from Tito’s 
visit of June 1956 and rapprochement with Yugoslavia in general in that  
it provided the USSR with another witness for the honesty of its peaceful 
goals [in addition to Finland]. After all, during the conflict with the Soviet 
Union, Tito was made into a hero in the West and his pronouncements 
were given authority. In order for his interpretation that the Soviet Union 
truly seeks peaceful goals to be painted false, Tito would also have to be 
considered a liar or something like that. However, this probably cannot be 
done as longs as the fight for Yugoslavia’s position and ‘soul’ between the 
two blocs continues.528 
 
The Soviet incursion into Hungary soon overshadowed the optimistic Finnish 
analysis of Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union. The events in Hungary directly challenged 
the Soviet military establishment, which did not share Khrushchev’s conciliatory 
approach to foreign policy. The military command took the events in Budapest as a 
provocation. Moreover, the invasion of Hungary weakened the credibility of 
Khrushchev’s claims to a foreign policy based on the idea of “peaceful coexistence”, 
already being questioned in the Western press. In November 1956, Wuori commented 
vaguely that “it is important and also from the Finnish point of view interesting to see 
whether the Soviet Union will have to change, possibly significantly, its until now 
maintained position which is based upon ’peaceful coexistence’ – and especially after 
the negotiations that were held with Tito—the principle, that ‘it is possible to strive 
towards socialism via different paths’ while taking into consideration the different 
factual conditions of each country.”529 Finnish analysis of Soviet reactions to events 
in Hungary noted that “a certain hesitation by the Soviet Union to interfere in the 
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events in Hungary in the beginning stages is explained by the fact that it is not easy 
for the Soviets to reverse their position.”530 The Belgrade Declaration established the 
Kremlin’s acceptance of neighboring Yugoslavia’s independent road to socialism. 
This was purported to establish credibility of Soviet foreign policy’s peaceful goals. 
Intervention in Hungary interfered with this purpose. 
But Hungary was a member of the Warsaw Pact, and a falling out between the 
Soviet Union and Hungary endangered the Pact’s integrity.531  According to Finnish 
analysis, it was clear from the beginning of the unrest in Budapest that the Soviet 
regime “could absolutely not allow Hungary to return to her ‘capitalist’ system”.532 
This analysis of the events in Hungary did, however doubt that a change was coming 
for Soviet policy outside the Warsaw Pact membership, concluding that  
It seems that the Soviet Union however seeks to maintain its previous 
foreign policy line established in the 20th Party Congress. At this point, 
there is no essential need to speculate that the Soviet Union would 
withdraw back to the Stalinist hard-line in domestic or foreign policy. For 
this type of change to take place there would have to be major changes 
carried out within the highest Soviet leadership.533 
 
 
Beyond the Ministry’s concern with the future direction of Soviet policy, it 
was interested in the Yugoslav insight to the Hungarian events. Wuori went on his 
own initiative to meet with the Yugoslav Ambassador Veljko Mićunović in Moscow 
on 13 November 1956 concerning the Soviet intervention. Wuori considered this to 
be crucial since “Mićunović is not only a well informed man but is also a member of 








the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party”.534 By this, Wuori meant 
that Mićunović was Tito’s confidant. Wuori and Mićunović agreed that the Soviet 
decision to replace the Stalinist leadership of Rákosi had been made too late.535 An 
earlier and successful reform of the Communist leadership they concluded would 
have prevented a large-scale uprising. For Finland and Yugoslavia, Soviet military 
action in Hungary was however setting a dangerous precedent. Both states would 
have preferred a stable, Communist government in Hungary, even if it had to be 
Soviet led.  Mićunović and Wuori agreed that “it was a completely mistaken 
expectation in the West that the Soviet Union would have allowed Hungary to be 
captured by an anti-Soviet leadership”. According to the Finnish and Yugoslav views, 
this was a sheer impossibility as it “was against the interests of the Soviet state”.536  
The Finnish analysis was mostly interested in whether the Yugoslavs found 
Janos Kádár’s leadership to be an acceptable replacement. Mićunović relayed the 
view to Helsinki that as an anti-Stalinist who had been imprisoned for his views, he 
was popular as an opponent of Rákosi and someone whom the Yugoslavs considered 
to be “a good man.”537 ‘A good man’ in this context meant that Kádár had not 
insulted either Tito or Kardelj nor had he participated in the anti-Yugoslav campaign 
in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split. But from the perspective of the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry, Kádár could be ‘an adequate man’ at best, as his policies neither 
included enthusiasm for Yugoslav-type reform Communism important to Tito and 
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Kardelj nor for Western economic ties crucial to the goals of the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry.  
Mićunović explained to Wuori that Tito and Kardelj viewed the subordinate 
position of the Soviet satellites to be based on the close connection between the 
Communist parties, which made Yugoslavia more vulnerable than Finland. Although 
during Tito’s visit “the Yugoslavs had had an easy time agreeing with the Soviets 
over foreign policy, the Yugoslavs found it difficult to reach cooperation between the 
two parties”.538 Mićunović further added that “the Yugoslavs were insulted that after 
Tito’s visit the Soviets sent out a secret memorandum to the Communist parties of 
Eastern Europe”.539 Although, Mićunović was unwilling to reveal the specific content 
of the letter, he commented that it represented different facts than those agreed upon 
in Moscow between Tito and Khrushchev.540 Later Finnish reports from Moscow to 
Helsinki detailed the content of this letter as consisting of a broadly phrased criticism 
of the Yugoslav road to socialism and a warning to other East European parties 
against imitating Yugoslav policies.541 News of the Soviet secret memo to Eastern 
bloc states that Yugoslav independence, as outlined in the Moscow Declaration, did 
not apply to them led to Tito’s outburst against Khrushchev in November 1956. Tito 
found this weakening of the Yugoslav position unacceptable. 
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Tito’s and Kardelj’s Second Response to the Events in 
Hungary 
The events in Hungary forced the Yugoslav party leadership to seek ways to 
distance itself from Soviet actions in both the domestic and international arenas. The 
official Yugoslav response, by way of Tito’s speech in Pula on 11 November 1956, 
was far more defiant in tone against the Soviets than Prime Minister Fagerholm’s 
statements in Finland. The first half of the speech contained several sharp criticisms 
of the Kremlin and was thus welcomed by several Western newspapers, including 
some from the Finnish press. It elicited a polemical response in Pravda. The harshest 
criticism was directed at Tito’s view that the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations,  
should in fact be significant not only in our mutual relations but also in 
relations among all socialist countries…in our opinion, [the Declarations] 
are intended for a wider circle than Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We 
warned that those tendencies which once provoked such strong resistance 
in Yugoslavia existed in all countries, and that one day they might find 
expression in other countries too.542  
 
Inserted here in Tito’s speech on the urging of the Foreign Ministry analysts, were as 
many references to the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations as possible. Here, in 1956, 
was an example of Tito allowing the Foreign Ministry analysis to influence his 
statements.  
Although the speech ultimately concluded that the second Soviet intervention 
was necessary, Tito began his lengthy exposition by openly comparing events by 
openly comparing in Hungary to Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 
1948. While Yugoslavia in 1948, like Hungary in 1956,  
                                                 




desired to build up her life and socialism in accordance with the 
specific conditions in her country…it did not then come to armed 
intervention because Yugoslavia was already united. Various elements 
were not able to carry out various provocations because we had 
liquidated their main forces already during the People’s Liberation 
War.543  
 
Tito further explained that he himself had informed the Soviets of the dangers of the 
Rákosi government while in Moscow in June 1956: “We said that Rákosi’s regime 
and Rákosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state and to 
bring about inner unity”, especially after the Rajk trial of 1949, where the charges 
against him featured his Yugoslav contacts before the Tito-Stalin split. Tito 
proclaimed, “these are the most dishonest people in the world to me”. According to 
Tito’s speech, the Soviets reacted too late in removing Rákosi and made an even 
bigger mistake by replacing him with Gerö, “who differed in no way from Rákosi”. 
Despite his scathing account of a series of Soviet mistakes, Tito eventually arrived at 
the blasé conclusion that “there is no point now in investigating who fired the first 
shot.”544 
According to Tito’s account of events, while “it is a great mistake to call in 
the army of another country to teach a lesson to the people of that country” Gerö was 
still primarily to blame, since it was he who called in the Red Army. Domestically, 
Tito’s speech served as a defense against rumors that Tito had sanctioned the entrance 
of the Soviet troops in a neighboring country. This Tito vehemently denied, swearing 
that “you can rest assured that we have never advised them to go ahead and use the 
army. We never gave such advice and could not do so even in the present crises.”  In 
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Pula, Tito ultimately condoned the Soviet response, explaining that while the initial 
uprising against the Cominformist Rákosi was justified, after the initial entry of the 
Soviet troops “reactionary elements got mixed up in the uprising….The justified 
revolt against a clique turned into an uprising of the whole nation against socialism”, 
which is why the second deployment of Soviet troops was justified. Tito concluded 
that “if it meant saving socialism in Hungary,…although we are against interference, 
Soviet intervention was necessary to vouch safe the new Hungarian government...” In 
an increasingly conciliatory tone, Tito also vouched for the new Hungarian 
government: “I can say to you Comrades, that I know these people in the new 
Government and that they, in my opinion, represent that which is most honest in 
Hungary”. 
In December 1956 Kardelj gave a speech devoted to the events in Hungary at 
the Yugoslav Skupština. Kardelj defended Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and its 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union by arguing that if Hungary would have 
followed Yugoslavia’s example in building its socialist system, then the events in 
Budapest would never have taken place. Kardelj’s outburst stated that  
instead of making fruitless attempts to restore capitalism and other 
political parties, the progressive socialist forces in Hungary should 
have fought during the past revolutionary days for the victory of the 
principle of direct democracy by creating united workers councils and 
self-governing communes as basic foundations for a new socialist 
regime.545  
 
Kardelj’s speech highlighted the superiority of the Yugoslav Communist model with 
its use of workers’ councils and other ‘democratic’ forms of social administration. 
The speech like Tito’s was intended to dispel rumors of the Yugoslav leader’s 
                                                 




involvement in the Hungarian events and to portray the Hungarian events as mistakes 
typical of the prior Soviet policy of intolerance towards independent Yugoslav 
socialism. Like Tito’s outburst, Kardelj’s speech was also inspired by the Soviet 
secret memorandum which downgraded the importance of the Moscow Declaration. 
It is not surprising that the Soviet press immediately lashed out at Kardelj. On 
18 December 1956, Pravda published a two-page editorial entitled “For Whose 
Benefit?” condemning Kardelj’s speech. Both the length and the position of the 
column on the front page of this leading Soviet paper suggested that its criticism was 
in fact an official reply to the Yugoslavs. The international diplomatic corps in 
Moscow reported it as such. The Soviet reply rested on Lenin’s principle that it is less 
important which state agency is in charge of activities and how the activities are being 
perceived. Instead it is more important to ask for whose benefit the activity is taking 
place. The Pravda article called Kardelj “the self-assured Communist ideologist of 
heresy.” It compared his call for a purer form of worker’s councils in Hungary to the 
demands of the Kronstad uprising when protesting Soviet sailors demanded that the 
workers councils should be cleansed of Bolsheviks. The article concluded that Lenin 
had of course not accepted the sailors’ demands, and therefore Kardelj was 
advocating a revisionism of Leninism. Even more scathingly, the article asked “if 
Kardelj is denying the initial period of a Communist dictatorship as a form of rule, 
how is it then that in Yugoslavia, Djilas has been sentenced to prison? And why does 
the Yugoslav government maintain armed forces?”546 
The speeches by Tito and Kardelj were effective diplomatic tools to provide 
domestic and international explanations of Yugoslavia’s role in the Hungarian events. 
                                                 




Their criticism of Soviet actions guaranteed Western support for Yugoslavia, yet 
Tito’s support of the new Kádár regime mollified the Soviets enough to prevent 
another schism. In Finland Tito’s speech was publicized widely, as four out of the 
five most significant newspapers carried editorials about it.547 The Finnish coverage 
concentrated on the first part criticizing the Soviet invasion. The Yugoslav 
Ambassador Slobodan Sardelić reported to Belgrade that the “one organ of the 
[Kekkonen’s] Agrarians’ did not carry a story, which is understandable considering 
their caution against coming out on foreign policy questions which in this way or that 
way concern the Soviet Union”.548 In opposition to the silence of the Agrarians’ 
Party, Yugoslav Ambassador Sardelić rejoiced that the Conservative Party’s press 
“underlines the independence of our position, the decisiveness with which we fight, 
and firmly [states] that the speech in Pula represented support for Gomulka in his 
negotiations with the Russians”.549 The Social Democratic Party similarly 
“emphasized how after recent events in Eastern Europe it can only be said for 
Yugoslavia that it is leading its own independent road to socialism.”550 Yet Sardelić 
also noted that the SDP unfortunately cautioned that “the Yugoslav system is only in 
some measure a little more liberal system than those of the people’s democracies, and 
that it is similarly ready to immediately close the mouth of those who are daring to 
think more freely, as for example Djilas.”551  
In general, Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s analysis accepted that the official 
Finnish leadership did not agree with Tito’s evaluation of events in Hungary. For 
                                                 








example, it was simply not true that Tito did not tacitly accept the Soviet incursion. 
The Finnish reading of Tito’s and Kardelj’s speeches questioned the necessity of 
Yugoslavia’s returning to the Tito-Stalin split in its interpretations of the Hungarian 
events. The Finnish Foreign Ministry considered that the most plausible reason for 
the rhetorical tangent was “Tito’s political vanity,--which forces the statesman to 
highlight the historical significance of his own role and the full equality of his 
position in comparison to his larger partner, which are the two points that are 
underlined in every part of Tito’s speech”.552 The Yugoslavs were however 
encouraged by the Finnish reactions which to them “emphasized that Tito’s thinking 
is always listened to with attention in Finland, that [it is important that] in the future 
Yugoslavia carried out with success its own politics of remaining out of blocs, which 
politics represents valuable experience for Finland”.553 
Finnish diplomatic analysis concluded with reports from Moscow. Wuori told 
Helsinki with sarcasm that “I have described this speech in my report mainly for the 
reason that it demonstrated that the ‘camaraderie’ continues between the Muscovite 
and ‘Titoist’ comrades”.554 The Finnish analysis of the polemic between the Soviets 
and the Yugoslavs in December 1956 maintained that “what is at the core here is that, 
for Yugoslavia to maintain its relations with the West, apparently in these [post-1956] 
circumstances she is forced to retreat further towards the West, more than in fact 
would be healthy for the sustenance of ‘Titoist Communism’”.555 
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The Independence of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry: A Survivor of 
Hungary 1956 
The Yugoslav Ministry had considered the best and worst possible outcomes 
of the events in Hungary for Yugoslav foreign policy. They concluded that Tito’s 
involvement approving the Soviet intervention was only marginally detrimental to the 
future of Yugoslav foreign policy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, more 
damaging was Moscow’s proclivity for ignoring the content of the Belgrade and 
Moscow Declarations, which spelled out the Yugoslav independent road to socialism.  
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s analysis of Finland in 1956 testified to the 
way it wanted to apply Helsinki’s example to relations with the Soviet Union. In 
December 1956 like in April 1953, the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Section requested more 
detailed and more extensive analysis from its Helsinki representation and generated a 
series of numbered questions from Belgrade to Helsinki.556 Underlying the close 
Yugoslav interest in the Finnish Social Democratic Party in the mid-1950s was the 
fact that it was challenging the Agrarians’ Party support for the Kekkonen-Paasikivi 
Line and its more careful attitude concerning Moscow. The pro-Western attitudes of 
the SDP and also the conservative NCP in Finland dealing with the Soviet Union 
were now preferred by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry in the aftermath of the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary over any indication of increased Soviet influence. 
Within its own documents from 1956, the ministry itself largely refrained 
from using ideological language as a tool of condemnation. Their language did not 
regularly identify foreign political parties as “Cominformists” or “Fascist elements”, 
                                                 




which remained the tendency of public announcements originating from Tito’s 
Presidential Office. These differences in tone with regard to ideological language 
clearly distinguish documents drafted by Tito and or Kardelj for the Presidency, from 
those of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. The ministry documents did however include 
the customary closing statement, “Death to fascism, Freedom to the people”, at times 
to indicate the gravity or urgency of subject matter in cable correspondences between 
Helsinki and Belgrade, as when it was dissatisfied and demanded more detailed 
analysis from its Embassy in Helsinki.557  
The Helsinki Embassy then took its own work very seriously by the mid-
1950s. As the 3rd Section of the Ministry in Belgrade made specific policy analysis 
requests to it, the Embassy itself also made suggestions to the Ministry. For example, 
the Embassy asked for personnel who could speak Finnish, sarcastically adding “at 
least passively”, so that the group could cover more newspapers, journals and other 
publications.558 In December 1956 Sardelić wrote to Belgrade  
These are facts, without hesitation: Comrade Bužek is a very fine 
official, disciplined, hardworking and has the best of qualities. [Upon 
arrival here] he quickly demonstrated his very limited experience and 
knowledge, yet once more confirming the thinking which was 
unanimously accepted by the Cadre’s Commission: there is no need to 
send to a small Embassy Comrades who do not have any kind of 
diplomatic experience abroad.559  
 
The comrade in question had been sent to Helsinki as a favor to a high party member 
which is why Sardelić called him sarcastically ‘comrade.’ Above all, he and many 
Yugoslav Ambassadors like him found it insulting if anyone was sent to the mission 
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as the result of party favoritism rather than international experience. Such people 
would be better suited to Embassies that contained a larger staffs, suggesting that in 
such cases these employees would cause less harm to the important work of the 
mission.560 Sardelić also requested  
the Embassy be also given all records about the exchange of goods 
with Finland. The last time that the Secretariat delivered any records it 
was due to the intervention of the Embassy. I think there is no need to 
allow this kind of ‘uninforming’ of the Embassy. From the cable 
conversation of Comrade [Vladimir] Velebit with [Otso] Wartiovaara I 
can see that the Finns asked questions about corn. Please provide full 
information.561  
 
Sardelić’s serious and insistent attitude reflects those of others who felt motivated to 
make all efforts to develop a professional and effective Yugoslav mission abroad.562 
 In Belgrade, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry tried to maintain the ties that were 
developed since 1948 (as discussed in Chapter 2) with the current Finnish 
Ambassador Otso Wartiovaara. Yet, after the departure of charge d’affaires Ville 
Niskanen in February 1953, relations between the new Ambassador and the ministry 
had devolved into formal exchanges which provided little substance. In addition to 
Niskanen’s departure, his trusted contact Ivan Vejvoda had moved on from his 
positions first as Section Head for Scandinavia in 1948 to become Ambassador of 
Yugoslavia to France. Niskanen’s perhaps overly frank approach (later criticized 
internally by the Finnish Foreign Ministry) had interested Belgrade much more than 
formalistic Wartiovaara.  
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Wartiovaara was a highly accomplished civil servant within the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry. He had served as the Ministry’s Chief of Staff in 1945, as Section 
Head for the Legal department in 1952 and was made into a full Minister in 1954. He 
had worked together with Kekkonen in 1944 on a commission dedicated to the safe 
placement of refugees from Karelia. From Belgrade onwards he would serve as an 
Ambassador to Vienna and London before his retirement in 1974. His 
accomplishments and personal if not party-related connection to Kekkonen was the 
reason he was placed as Ambassador in Belgrade. Yet Wartiovaara, for example, 
approached Dobrivoj Vidić, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, and Ambassador 
to Hungary, on 17 December 1956 with a written list of six official questions 
concerning the Hungarian invasion.563 Although discussions with Finland over 
reactions to the Hungarian events were sought after, the Yugoslavs deemed his 
approach as neither sincere or indicative of the interest of the Finnish government in 
Yugoslav relations but rather reflecting Wartiovaara’s own desire to “speak with us 
even briefly in a way that when the report will be submitted, it will at least state that 
there was a conversation with the President of the Government [Tito] and with the 
deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs”.564 Wartiovaara presented Vidić with such vague 
questions as, “What do [you] think should be the solution to the current situation in 
Hungary?” and “Are the Russians actively in search of some acceptable solution in 
Hungary and do [you] deal with the Russians towards that direction?”565 Vidić simply 
“confirmed that [the Yugoslavs] do through normal diplomatic channels in general to 
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deal with the Russians in that direction although it is not very easy”.566 From his 
reply, it was completely unclear what ‘that direction’ meant. Vidić added to his report 
on the meeting that Wartiovaara seemed rushed and did not wish to bother him 
further.567 The earlier connections between the Finnish Embassy in Belgrade and the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry were clearly absent by 1956. In any case Kekkonen had 
been sworn in as the Finnish President the same year. His control over the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry promised that more was to be gained by dealing directly with him, 
as the Yugoslav Ministry would indeed do in the subsequent years, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5. 
 The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was still benefitting from previous ties in 
Helsinki. The Yugoslav representation there continued to consult Niskanen now 
resident in the Finnish capital. Having retired from the Foreign Ministry, Niskanen 
offered his opinions in 1956 as a private citizen on various issues, including the 





Khrushchev’s foreign policy had at first displayed some impressive results in 
this period. Rapprochement with the Yugoslavs, and the endorsing of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line with Finland, helped to ratify the post-1945 Eastern borders for the 
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Soviet Union. This was a real security and economic achievement for Khrushchev, 
and one realized before the détente with the West proceeded under Leonid Brezhnev 
in the 1970s. The fact that Social Democratic prime ministers led all Scandinavian 
governments except Iceland’s in 1955 helped Khrushchev to find trade partners in 
Scandinavia.  While Finland could not achieve complete parity with other 
Scandinavian states in Soviet foreign relations, in 1955 the Kremlin allowed Finland 
to join the UN and the Nordic Council. The Kremlin also returned Porkkala, 
concluding its lease of the island early. The most important aspect of Khrushchev’s 
foreign policy, considered as a whole, was that he was able to constitute these crucial 
changes just in time: rapprochement with Tito less than five months before the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary, and solidifying the status quo Soviet bloc borders before the 
Social Democratic-Conservative party coalition was born in Finland. The SDP-NCP 
coalition rose partly as a consequence of Soviet demonstration of military power in 
Hungary and was effective because of Kekkonen’s silence on the events. Its effects 
were felt in 1958 when the Social Democrats and the Conservatives were able to 
briefly form a government that challenged Kekkonen’s authority and the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line. 
Khrushchev’s initial answers to the Stalinist dilemma of how to consolidate 
the Soviet bloc in Europe when the United States was unwilling to leave Western 
Europe, and when it proved to be impossible to integrate Finland in the north and 
Yugoslavia in the south to the bloc, were not easy to carry past the Hungarian 
uprising. Finnish analysis about the new direction of Khrushchev’s foreign policy 




to “democratize” the system. Accepting Yugoslavia’s independent road to socialism 
would make it seemingly necessary to offer this chance to Warsaw Pact countries as 
well and yet this was impossible from the point of view of Soviet security; “in other 
words ‘speaking-over’ the Soviet bloc [to Yugoslavia and Finland] is more difficult 
than using force”.569 The Ministry argued that “this Soviet flexibility concerning Tito 
cannot be explained as a show of weakness from Moscow. It should be remembered 
that military intervention in Hungary, and Bulganin’s harsh warnings over the Suez 
events, demonstrate that the Kremlin trusts in the influence that their military and 
economic power represented within international affairs.”570  
By the end of 1956, the Finnish analysis concluded that,  
Although it is too early to begin to guess whether the relations between 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will actually develop, it is clear that 
although Tito continues to identify himself as a Communist, and even seeks 
some kind of a leadership position – at least ideologically—‘within the 
socialist world’, certain priorities of the Yugoslav state – by this I mean 
Yugoslavia’s relations with the West – direct the Yugoslav neutrality defined 
by him above all from the Soviet Union, which [Tito] attempted to assert in 
some ways in a bad-tempered tone, and not completely logical way, with his 
speech in Pula.571  
The Belgrade and Moscow Declarations underlined this unsolvable dilemma: 
at one and the same time, the Yugoslav state was supposed to occupy a position of 
independence from Moscow, while the Yugoslav party would remain linked to the 
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Soviet party on important international questions, even if internally unconnected. The 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was only interested in pursuing bilateral relations outside 
the Soviet bloc. It was therefore interested in party politics only when they furthered 
that goal. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry arrived at the conclusion that the Kremlin’s 
suppression of the Moscow Declaration represented the biggest threat to Yugoslav 
policy of neutralism. Tito and Kardelj remained now similarly insulted at Moscow’s 
unwillingness to admit to Yugoslavia’s special position publicly in the Soviet press 
and privately in communications with its Eastern Bloc states following the Moscow 
Declaration. This led to Tito and Kardelj’s outbursts criticizing Soviet actions in 
Hungary in 1956, despite the fact that Tito had personally previously sanctioned 
Soviet use of force. This dilemma predicted the continuation of public schisms 
between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties to be discussed in the next chapter.  
Finnish analysis of what the Finnish Foreign Ministry in 1956 termed “Tito’s 
neutralism” hoped for a greater role for Soviet trade in the Yugoslav economy. This 
would have provided Finland with comparative information regarding its own trade 
with the Soviet Union, which remained a required element of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line. Moreover, Kekkonen’s Ministry would have been glad to find a successful and 
comparative example to refer to in Soviet trade with another neutral country, as the 
SDP and NCP demanded more trade with the West and less trade with the Soviet 
Union. The Finnish Foreign Ministry was concerned over the role of Tito and his 
circle in discouraging the construction of these economic ties, which in fact never did 
strengthen significantly. Identifying more with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the 











Chapter 6:  Freezing Out Finland and Yugoslavia: The Soviet 
Rifts of 1957-1958 
 
On 9 May 1958, Pravda printed an unsigned article as an official statement of 
the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, asserting that the Yugoslavs 
had “sold out their Communist ideology to the United States for a total of $164.3 
million.”572 Arguing that the Yugoslav leadership had recently adopted positions 
against the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc similar to those of the American 
imperialists, the article went on to cite the public record of US economic aid to 
Yugoslavia and list the funds as paid to the Yugoslav Party for a series of actions 
undermining the bloc. For his speech in Pula in November 1956 (on the Soviet 
military intervention in Hungary), Tito had allegedly received the first $98.3 million, 
Kardelj’s speech in December 1956 earning another modest $6 million, and the final 
$60.5 million provided for the Yugoslav refusal to sign the Soviet 12-Party 
Declaration in November 1957. An unspecified sum would also be forthcoming for 
the League of Communists’ Seventh Party Congress Program in April 1953, which 
was characterized as hostile to the Soviet bloc.573 The article even called the 
Yugoslav leadership “falsifiers” and “slanderers,” recalling Soviet rhetoric from the 
early years of the Tito-Stalin split.574 While Pravda spoke of a Yugoslav government 
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divided between anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet factions it condemned the entire party, 
including Tito, as opponents of the Soviet Union.575  
This stark condemnation came less than two years after the signing of the 
Moscow Declaration. The Kremlin’s censure of the Yugoslav party led to a 
diplomatic freeze between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1958. The Kremlin instituted 
a similar rupture in their relations with Finland from August 1958, in response to the 
new Social Democratic-Conservative government. As the previous chapters have 
shown, the Yugoslav and Finnish Foreign Ministries had been exchanging 
information and referencing each other’s relations with the Soviet Union since 1948. 
The Foreign Ministries continued to do so again in 1958. Their attempts to maintain 
neutralism as a common policy toward the Soviet Union in the challenging 
circumstance of 1958 is the topic of this chapter. 
The leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) reacted 
immediately to the Pravda article by announcing the withdrawal of their Ambassador, 
Veljko Mićunović, from Moscow. Mićunović had enjoyed not only wide contacts 
within the international diplomatic corps in Moscow, but also an exceptional 
relationship with the Soviet leadership. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Mićunović 
was more closely connected to the party and to Tito and Kardelj than to the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry. He was liked and respected by the Soviet foreign policy 
establishment as a party insider close to Tito, as opposed to the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry, which was more interested in pursuing a non-ideological relationship like 
that of Finland. As Chapter 4 indicated, Mićunović had, unlike Foreign Minister Koča 
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Popović been at the Brioni meeting of November 2 during which Khrushchev asked 
Tito to sanction Soviet military action in Hungary. Mićunović had been sent to 
Moscow as Yugoslav Ambassador in March 1956 to signal Yugoslav interest in 
improving relations after Khrushchev’s secret speech on Stalin’s mistakes. He had 
invested his own political capital in reconciliation between the two parties. The 
Pravda article made it clear that no permanent reconciliation between the parties was 
forthcoming. During his two-year stay, until the summer of 1958, Mićunović had 
never been refused a meeting with Khrushchev. His withdrawal and reassignment was 
perhaps the most personal rebuke Tito could make to Khrushchev. It also suggests 
Tito’s acknowledgment that party reconciliation had not been a promising strategy, 
leaving the Foreign Ministry to reassume the leading role in Yugoslav-Soviet affairs 
that it had been taking prior to the Hungarian intervention.  
Tito’s and Kardelj’s outbursts against Khrushchev’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge the validity of Yugoslavia’s own road to socialism since November 
1956, as detailed in Chapter 4, had caused this new confrontation. Although it had 
been the analysis of the Foreign Ministry that originally identified  the lack of 
recognition of the Moscow Declaration by the Soviets as the greatest threat to 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations, Popović and his Ministry did not support their leaders’ 
provocative manner of lashing out against Khrushchev. Again, there was a Finnish 
connection in 1958. If Tito’s and Kardelj’s speeches at the Yugoslav Party Congress 
threatened Khrushchev’s leadership within the Soviet bloc, the Finnish Social 




therefore Khrushchev’s regional Scandinavian policy that both coalition partners had 
opposed since the events of 1956.  
The Soviet Union effected a de-facto suspension of economic trade with 
both Finland and Yugoslavia in the fall of 1958. The USSR refused to negotiate 
the 1959 trade agenda with Finland, simply delaying negotiations indefinitely. 
The Kremlin had already proposed changes to their trade agreements with 
Yugoslavia in January and August 1956. A Soviet credit for the proposed 
construction of an aluminum plant was delayed until 1962. All other trade and 
credits agreed upon in 1956 were also effectively cancelled.  
While in 1956 Finnish and Yugoslav politics had supported the Soviet 
bloc by not criticizing Soviet response to the Hungarian Revolution, by 1958 the 
Yugoslav party’s conflict with Khrushchev, and the Finnish political opposition to 
President Kekkonen, brought the tacit Yugoslav and Finnish acceptance of the 
Soviet bloc into question. This second Yugoslav-Soviet conflict made permanent 
reconciliation between the two Communist parties virtually impossible.  
Khrushchev’s Approach to Yugoslavia and Finland  
In 1955, Khrushchev had been confident of Soviet technological, political and 
overall superiority in natural resources against the Western powers. He was 
enthusiastic about the future of his domestic political leadership. At that time, he was 
willing to permit a separate, autonomous Yugoslav road to socialism, as enumerated 
in the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations of 1955 and 1956. Renewed relations with 
Yugoslavia secured the Soviet bloc’s border across Europe. These relations also 




forged Khrushchev’s own way forwards. Yet by the summer of 1958, Khrushchev’s 
level of comfort with a divergent Yugoslavia had deteriorated. In November 1957, the 
Yugoslav Party had refused to sign the Soviet’s 12-Party Declaration. This 
declaration of the 12 Communist parties in power was intended to establish the basic 
framework of an international Communist movement for building socialism, post-
Cominform but under Soviet auspices with China included. Its signing coincided with 
festivities in Moscow for the Soviets’ launch of the first earth satellite Sputnik-1 and 
the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. Tito was conspicuously absent.576 The 
Declaration emphasized the leading role of the Communist Party, establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, public ownership of means of production, and various 
other necessities for a functioning Communist state. The declaration named 
‘Revisionism’—a Soviet term previously used to condemn the Yugoslav leadership—
as the main threat to Communism.577 The Yugoslav Seventh Party Congress followed 
in April 1958 with its own program. Once again condemning Stalin and Stalinism, the 
Yugoslav party demanded equality and autonomy between Communist parties.578 
Khrushchev took this as a Yugoslav rebuttal to the 12-Party Declaration. He 
demanded clarification of the draft program’s statement that Yugoslav-Soviet trade 
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relations were to be conducted on the basis of “mutual” benefit. According to 
Khrushchev, the USSR was engaged primarily in giving economic aid to Yugoslavia.  
These points of growing contention had been tempered when Khrushchev and 
Tito met in Romania in August 1957. Khrushchev then publicly recognized the 
continued legitimacy of the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations and the agreed 
principles of state sovereignty, party independence and non-interference in Yugoslav-
Soviet relations. This apparent reconciliation in Romania was however deceptive. As 
early as 18 December 1956, Pravda commented, “Kardelj at the session of the 
Yugoslav Federal People’s Skupština, in a speech, devoted mainly to the Hungarian 
events attempted, to present some sort of ‘third line’ but in its substance he only 
proved that there cannot be any such line.”579 On 11 March 1957 Pravda had rebuffed 
the Yugoslav critique of Stalinism, calling it a “monstrous and revolting sacrilege for 
any Communist even to compare those mistakes with the subversive activities of the 
imperialists”.580 Pravda’s final enumeration on 9 May 1958 of the dollar amounts for 
which Yugoslav Communism had already sold out to the United States sent a clear 
message from the Kremlin: Tito was again a leader without credentials within the 
Soviet bloc. At the same time, the Kremlin was questioning Finland’s credentials as a 
constructive if non-Communist neighbor to the USSR. Its parliamentary elections 
were to be held 6-7 July 1958. In those elections Kekkonen’s Agrarians’ Party (AP) 
won only 23 percent of the popular vote, not enough to sustain the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line on its own. 
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Khrushchev’s initial willingness to first make peace with the Yugoslavs in 
1955, his courting of Tito in connection with the Hungarian crisis in 1956, and his 
subsequent policy reversals in 1957 and 1958 have often been interpreted as evidence 
of the Soviet leader’s inconsistency and generally contentious personality.581 His 
persona thus embodied erratic decisions or, indecision, and a lack of diplomatic 
discretion and consistency. This line or argument, surfacing again in accounts of the 
Cuban Missile Crises in 1962, is often applied also to Khrushchev’s rhetorical 
outbursts against Tito in 1957 and1958. They come on the heels of a seemingly 
principled rapprochement with Yugoslavia and diplomatic reengagement with the 
Scandinavian states in 1955.  
Yet Khrushchev’s anti-Tito outbursts also reflect his response to the 
challenges he faced in Soviet domestic politics. The so-called ‘anti-Party group’ of 
Vyacheslav Molotov/ Lazar Kaganovitch/ Georgi Malenkov in the Presidium, 
together with Dimitrii Shepilov in the Central Committees Secretariat, had staged an 
attack against Khrushchev in June 1957. Khrushchev had survived, but during the 
power struggle these opponents brought forward his leniency towards Yugoslavia as a 
sign of weak political leadership. Khrushchev publicly contested these accusations, 
citing “Comrade Molotov’s erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question” as one of the 
reasons for his purging from the Presidium in July 1957.582 Khrushchev’s change of 
course in Yugoslav relations after 1956 can thus be interpreted as compensation for 
earlier softness.  
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Finnish analysis of Soviet foreign policy and its Yugoslav relations in 1958 
further connected Khrushchev’s policy reversal to Soviet nuclear politics. According 
to the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the main aim of Soviet foreign policy in 1958 was to 
attain a high-level meeting with the United States and to propose a bilateral 
agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. President Dwight Eisenhower did 
exchange letters with Khrushchev on the subject of nuclear testing in April and May 
and frequently during the summer of 1958. The Soviets feared and opposed 
deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany, which according to Soviet 
propaganda at the time, would require the reciprocal placement of nuclear weapons in 
Poland and the granting of nuclear capability to China.583 The Soviets similarly 
opposed US military flights over the North Pole. This path represented the shortest 
aerial distance between the United States and the Soviet Union, making the route 
strategically important given the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  
The US government doubted the sincerity of Soviet intensions toward a so-
called ‘East-West’ summit within the political context of 1958. It was possible that 
the Soviets merely sought to create a peace-seeking image for themselves by 
proposing a summit to which the US could not agree. After the launching of 
intercontinental Sputnik with the R-7 rocket, the Soviets possessed a short-term 
advantage in the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons. Khrushchev sought to make 
this advantage a permanent lead by seeking a freeze in the development of delivery 
systems. Because the US seemed unwilling to attend such a meeting, neither within a 
bilateral framework nor within the multilateral framework of NATO, the Soviet 
                                                 
583 UM: R-Sarja, Moskova 1958, 13.5.1958, “Ydinasekokeilut, huippukonferenssi, napalennot, Y.K:n 
luonne” (Report 26, Nuclear testing, high-level conference, flights over the north pole, U.N’s 




leadership had to be content with the British-American-Soviet moratorium on nuclear 
testing, signed in September 1958. Yet Khrushchev followed this limited agreement 
with provocations in divided Berlin in November. The Finnish Foreign Ministry 
concluded that Khrushchev was unable to accept any alternative to direct bilateral 
Soviet-American negotiations. The Ministry forecast that his stubbornness would 
create considerable difficulties for Finnish-Soviet and Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The 
Ministry concluded that,  
This inability to alter the adopted positions and strategy seems to be tightening 
the reigns within both camps. The situation will most probably become unpleasant for 
‘the neutrals’, as for example the Soviet discussion of Yugoslav ‘unorthodoxy’ 
shows. If the relations [between the Soviet bloc and Western states] continue to 
worsen, it seems probable that the Nordic states will be placed in a ‘headlining’ 
position, as West German naval vessels– a NATO navy – will most likely appear as a 
significant force in the Gulf of Finland. There is no lack of indication towards these 
further moves.584  
The ministry argued that hostile Soviet pronouncements against Yugoslavia 
were neither the product of Khrushchev’s inconsistency as a leader, nor of Soviet 
domestic policy; their main concern was not even Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Their 
primary goal was to prevent or at least to stall the United States from overtaking the 
Soviet Union in nuclear and missile technology. Khrushchev’s particular goal was to 
reduce the Cold War to an economic competition between the two super powers 
against each other, a competition that he believed the Soviet Union would win. The 
Finnish Ministry feared that against the threat of American nuclear superiority and 





access points via the North Pole by way of Finland or via Turkey and Italy by way of 
Yugoslavia, this Soviet security concern would challenge both Finnish and Yugoslav 
relations with the Soviet Union. Whether such fears were valid or not, a broader 
regional and geo-political perspective did not encourage the Kremlin to allow a 
Finnish government to be led by the anti-Communist Social Democratic Party, or be 
comfortable with a Yugoslav Communist party led by Tito and Kardelj. Their 
questionable loyalty called both of their roles as guarantors of the bloc’s European 
border in to question.  
 
An Independent Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and Soviet 
Relations, 1957-1958 
 
Veljko Mićunović’s transfer from having primary responsibility to the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry into first a temporary and then a permanent high party 
position highlights the separate spheres in which the Ministry and the party had come 
to occupy. With Partisan credentials from the Second World War, Mićunović became 
a Deputy Minister of the Interior in the Yugoslav government in 1945, only 
transferring to the Foreign Ministry to become a Deputy Minister in 1951. 
Immediately following Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, Mićunović was appointed as 
Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow where served from March 1956 to September 
1958. However, Mićunović was moving closer to the party than the Ministry, as 




Yugoslav League of Communists Commission for the drafting of the controversial 
program of the Seventh Party Congress. In June 1958, after his recall from Moscow, 
he was appointed to the party’s separate Commission for International Relations, 
effectively placing him within the top LCY hierarchy.  
On his 20 June 1958 visit, Mićunović was asked by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry whether he was to be identified (in the official Soviet transcript of their 
meeting) as an Ambassador, representing the Foreign Ministry, or a party official, 
representing the LCY.585 Unwilling to choose between the party and Popović’s 
Ministry, Mićunović replied that since “we had talked about all sort of things and 
they could report it as they wished. I had no objections”.586 The Soviets were less 
interested in diplomatic protocol than in confirming their own impressions that the 
party hierarchy must be more important than the Foreign Ministry. In 1958, the 
highest organ of the Yugoslav Party, its Secretariat of the Executive Committee, had 
only five members. They were Tito, Kardelj, Aleksandr Ranković, Svetozar 
Vukmanović-Tempo and Ivan Gošnjak. None were representatives of the Foreign 
Ministry, nor would there ever be a representative of the Foreign Ministry in the 
Secretariat.  
By the summer of 1958, the Kremlin was clearly irritated by the Yugoslavs’ 
ability to present themselves as Communists to Communist regimes, as neutrals to 
neutral states and as open-for-business partners to Western governments. Popović had 
been able to by then to repair ties with the West by settling with Italy over Trieste, by 
not abandoning the Balkan Pact (despite the Kremlin’s pressure), and by not allowing 
                                                 





the party leadership to prevent him from bettering bilateral relations with party 
rhetoric over the recognition of East but not West Germany. When Tito had made 
public statements in support of the Soviet Union, it had been in the context of the 
Suez crisis in 1956 and not concerning relations with Western Europe or the United 
States. Even Mićunović adhered to the diplomatic protocol of neutralism when 
speaking as a representative of Yugoslavia to the international diplomatic corps in 
Moscow.  He was perfectly capable of flying to Brioni on 2 November 1956 for a 
secret meeting on Hungary between Khrushchev and Tito, apparently endorsing the 
Soviet view and then criticizing Soviet actions there on his return to Moscow. 
Mićunović’s memoir Moscow Diary would later establish his international 
reputation, not as Tito’s and the party’s advocate who had challenged Popović for the 
seat of Foreign Minister already in 1953, and not as someone who retired to the party 
apparatus in 1958, but as a classic neutralist himself. Often-cited in English language 
scholarship on the Hungarian uprising, his memoir portrays Mićunović as simply a 
career diplomat keeping a diary during his tour as the Yugoslav Ambassador in 
Moscow. The chapters shift from general impressions of how “Soviet disapproval in 
the field of party affairs will probably be carried over into other aspects of Yugoslav-
Soviet relations” to personal opinions. “I no longer had any doubt in my mind that the 
principal initiator of the current anti-Yugoslav moves by the Soviet Government was 
Khrushchev himself”.587 Mićunović himself seeks to downplay the significance of his 
Party role in the memoir. For example in response to Enver Hoxha’s emotional 
accusation that deputy Foreign Minister Arso Milatović was “a greater enemy of 
Albania than any of our previous ministers”, Mićunović writes that “I expressed 
                                                 




doubt about the charges against Milatović and rejected the assertion that he was an 
enemy of Albania…I rejected any suspicions that might be directed at Yugoslavia in 
this connection.”588 Were it not for the book’s introduction by translator David Floyd, 
which describes Mićunović as “a fervent patriot, a sincere Marxist socialist…[who] 
did not hesitate in his loyalty to Tito”, one would likely not guess that Mićunović had 
established a close relationship to Tito on the strength of his Partisan credentials. In 
his own words, Mićunović tries to appear ideologically detached and engaged only in 
seeking practical benefit for the Yugoslav state through diplomatic correspondence.589  
The contradiction posed by Mićunović’s two roles became apparent in the 
first half of 1958; The Yugoslav party leadership was increasingly at odds with the 
Soviet leadership, while the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry hardly altered its correct 
formality with Soviet contacts. True, it was Foreign Minister Popović who in 
February 1957 expressed indirect criticism of the Soviet Union by stating the 
principles of Yugoslav neutralism policy in no uncertain terms, 
The heart of our dispute with the Soviets and satellites lies, in our 
opinion, in the differing viewpoints regarding our relations and 
standpoints towards the Socialist camp. We do not wish to enter the 
camp, as this would not be in accord with our established principles, the 
trend of our foreign policy, nor with the general interests of peace and 
socialism…to avoid a regression into Stalinism, which I am deeply 
convinced has been responsible in the postwar period for inflicting 
incomparably more harm on the cause of socialism than all the 
imperialist conspiracies together.590  
 
Yet following the Seventh Yugoslav Party Congress in the spring of 1958, the 
strongest pronouncements against the Soviets in 1958 originated from the Yugoslav 
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party leadership and not from the Foreign Ministry. In June 1958 Tito himself replied 
publicly to Soviet criticism of Yugoslav revisionism: 
The main reason for this [Soviet] campaign is that we refused to sign the 
Declaration of the 12 countries in Moscow last November and to join the 
so-called Socialist camp because, as is well known, we oppose the 
division of the world into camps…the United States started giving us aid 
in 1949, not so that Socialism would triumph in our country – they do 
not like Socialism and they do not conceal this; they state openly that 
they do not like it – but because we were threatened by famine and 
because Yugoslavia would in this way be able more easily to resist 
Stalin’s pressure and strengthen its independence. Comrade Khrushchev 
says often that Socialism cannot be built on US wheat, but we think that 
those who can will do it, whilst those who do not know how will not be 
able to build it on their own wheat…After all, US wheat is no worse 
than the Soviet wheat we are not getting, and we are getting wheat from 
the United States.591 
 
Rather than focus on the war of the words between the Yugoslav and Soviet 
parties, the Foreign Ministry still wanted to conduct relations as they had proceeded 
prior to the Seventh Party Congress. Even if there was no Soviet ‘wheat’ 
forthcoming, simply conducting normal diplomatic activities with the Soviet Union 
did not harm the Ministry’s goals but could help to relieve the growing tensions 
between the two party leaderships. In September 1958, the Yugoslav Ministry issued 
visas to five members of the Soviet delegation of the trade union members for 
chemical industry and petroleum, to five members of a separate delegation of Soviet 
trade unions of metallurgy and oil and to a 48 member “team of the Soviet Circus” for 
a two month stay in Yugoslavia.592 Yugoslav and Soviet representatives visited each 
other’s naval schools. In September, the Leningrad Admiralty Institute sent members 
to Rijeka, while a delegation from the Yugoslav ship Djure Djaković visited “the 
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Putilov”, a Soviet ship stationed in Leningrad.593 Visits from delegations of Soviet 
press and university professors were planned for late September. 
The Foreign Ministry was adhering to the principles of Yugoslav neutralism. 
Relations with the Soviets were established to assure the Soviet Union that their 
political border in Eastern Europe was guaranteed, while competing political and 
trade relations were also pursued with states outside the Soviet bloc. From this 
perspective of the Ministry, cessation of economic, cultural or economic relations 
with the Soviet Union would damage these connections. 
Mićunović himself, was greatly upset with the Foreign Ministry’s continuing 
issuance of visas to Soviet persons, which he himself had to oversee. In his remarks 
to Belgrade, Mićunović commented, “I heard only from the Russians that on 
September 12 a delegation of the Admiralty Institute of Leningrad leaves for 
Yugoslavia”, indicating his displeasure that he had not been informed of Belgrade’s 
continuing collaboration.594 Mićunović continued to express frustration, customarily 
citing his own views as the Moscow Embassy’s: “We were against these circus 
collaborations because it is harmful to us, and the Russians here have all advantages; 
the Russians forced us, and we fed them by our own hand”.595  Mićunović 
complained that the Belgrade Circus arriving in Moscow was only half the size of the 
Soviet circus, would stay only a short time, and appear mainly in the minor Soviet 
cities.596 In Mićunović’s view, it was outrageous that a further “53 visas were issued 
for Soviet officials merely for the organization of a Soviet pavilion at the Zagreb 








International Fair and that another ten Soviet officials left for ‘temporary work’ to 
Belgrade Fair.”597 Mićunović strongly objected, calculating that by the end of 
September “there will be close to 200 Soviet delegates, artists, specialists, foreign 
civil servants and others in Yugoslavia.”598 Mićunović concluded, 
We think that this kind of situation is not normal considering the hostile 
politics that the Soviet government carries out against Yugoslavia. It is clear 
that the Russians are at the moment forcing different delegations on us at a 
time when they are intensifying their hostile campaign against the “Yugoslav 
leadership”; while, for example, this spring when that campaign was more 
moderate and when they talked about preservation of normal relations, these 
kinds of delegations were postponed or refused by the Soviets themselves.599 
 
Mićunović’s Moscow Diary where he tries to portray himself as a diplomat adhering 
to Yugoslav policy of neutralism makes no mention these concerns or comments to 
Belgrade concerning Soviet-Yugoslav cultural cooperation or visa matters. 
Beyond the unwillingness of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to cut back on 
activities with the Soviets, Mićunović raised several specific objections. Yugoslav 
delegations that arrived to the USSR in 1958 were isolated from the Soviet workers, 
while Soviet functionaries were unwilling to participate in even a minimal number of 
customary discussions, because in Mićunović’s view, “then they would have to say 
something about our relations and the politics of the USSR towards Yugoslavia”.600 
The Yugoslav delegations toured factories and city landmarks. Mićunović was 
incensed that “the Soviets [we]re making toasts about the solidarity between workers 
and friendship between our nations while simultaneously the Soviet press writes the 
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worst things against Yugoslavia and her leadership”.601 These practices of the Soviet 
state were felt to be degrading. However, regular diplomatic exchanges, with no 
significant political commitment beyond the security guarantee for the Soviet bloc’s 
border states Hungary included, were precisely what the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
hoped to achieve. 
In 1958, the Soviets did continue various cultural exchanges in place of trade 
and political relations. Trade union contacts were maintained separately, away from 
the quarreling political parties. For Mićunović, this activity reduced Yugoslavia’s 
equal status as an equal party and trade partner to a subordinate cultural one. 
Mićunović’s goal in Moscow had been to elevate the status of the Yugoslav party, a 
task in which the Pravda article of May 1958 quoted at the beginning of this chapter 
made clear he had failed. Still, the cultural exchanges continued to serve their own 
propaganda value by demonstrating that Yugoslavia remained ‘with’ the Soviet 
Union. To counter this impression, Mićunović felt that Soviet visits should be closely 
supervised, and suggested that “Belgrade suppl[y] a centralized program for this type 
of collaboration with the USSR. Without that, we can hardly maintain equilibrium 
with the Russians, who one-sidedly violate the agreed-upon program and are forcing 
collaboration which is in their interest and thus places us in the passive position of 
observers or participants in carrying out the Soviet propaganda scheme”.602 Here 
Mićunović appealed for the reconnection of the special role of UDBa within the 
Foreign Ministry discussed in Chapter 4. Popović had however been able to contain 
the role of the security service and Aleksandr Ranković within the Foreign Ministry 






by 1958, after cutting off its access to the crucial Analytical Department as noted in 
Chapter 3. Removing UDBa’s influence from the Foreign Ministry had made the 
latter’s analysis more independent, and there was also less influence from the party 
leadership whom Ranković represented. This change did not help Mićunović in his 
efforts to maintain the role of the controlling role of the party in Yugoslav foreign 
policy. 
 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s Analysis of Soviet Foreign 
Policy in 1958 
By 1958, Foreign Ministry analysis of the Soviet Union was less focused on 
the inter-party conflict than the existing historiography suggests. A ministry report 
from Moscow to Belgrade in March 1958 concludes,  
Our relations with the USSR have worsened because of the foreign 
political hardships [the USSR] has endured with the Western states, 
Socialist Europe and Asia in recent times. It is necessary not to lose sight, 
because of the complex ideological disagreement, that our difficulties with 
the Russians are increasingly really the consequence of [the Soviet 
position] on West Germany, our refusal of American military aid, [Soviet] 
conflict with France, the anti-Yugoslav campaign of [European] 
socialists…603  
 
The Ministry’s internal discussions demonstrate that the two most important elements 
of Soviet foreign policy from its perspective, similar to that of the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry, were Khrushchev’s desire to attain “a meeting at the highest level” with the 
United States and Soviet views on “European integration”.604  
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In a policy document produced in August 1958, titled “Positions of FPRY and 
the USSR on international problems”, the Ministry comments only briefly on the 
conflict between the two parties: 
On a series of international problems our positions coincide with the 
Soviet position, but with those positions that are in agreement there 
remains fundamental difference … on the fundamental question of 
dividing the world into camps, the politics of the USSR as a great power 
and hegemony over their camp.605   
 
This policy document predicted that due to differing views on a number of international 
issues and declarations by the state-Parties (specifically the 12-Party Declaration and the 
Yugoslav Seventh Party Congress program), agreement with Moscow in the future will be 
unattainable. Still, the ministry emphasized its own efforts to strengthen Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations by seeking collaboration within international organizations, noting that “in contacts 
with Western diplomats, [the Ministry] worked to break distrust towards those Soviet foreign 
political acts”, but that the Soviets “did not want to attribute political meaning to this kind of 
intermediary activity on our behalf, and therefore did not come to recognize our role within 
the camp”.606 The conflict between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties was 
considered permanent but also no reason to abandon a careful course in relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
Instead, like the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Yugoslav Ministry focused on 
the Soviet desire for a meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States. The 
Yugoslav ministry surmised that “the initiative on this question was given by the 
USSR; prompted by the fact that on a certain number of very serious and acute 
problems, in the first place disarmament, [the Soviets] arrived at the conclusion that 






at a low level the solution cannot practically be reached”.607 Yugoslav analysis 
predicted that, since all NATO states were involved, the Soviets would not achieve 
their desired ban on nuclear testing through multilateral negotiations. Neither did the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry see this as the goal of Soviet foreign policy. The ministry 
felt that by strongly attacking NATO throughout 1958, the Kremlin wished to weaken 
West European collaboration. The propaganda attacks might serve to relax tensions 
within the Soviet bloc. The Soviets were also discussing the creation of a 
demilitarized zone in Europe. Each of these Soviet initiatives, in the view of the 
Yugoslav Ministry, served Khrushchev’s goal of keeping American missiles out of 
West Germany.  
Even more than the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, 
was interested in European integration. The Yugoslavs believed that Soviet 
opposition to integration had not altered fundamentally since the end of the Second 
World War.608 According to the Yugoslav Ministry, Khrushchev’s Scandinavian 
regionalism policy sought to stall West European integration. The aim of such bloc-
politics was to promote the division of the world into two exclusive camps, and two 
world markets. According to the Yugoslav Ministry, “there was generally not room 
for ‘issues’ of European regional collaboration” in this world view.609 Its analysis 
considered that, “this kind of politics from the USSR had nonetheless the result of 
giving a powerful impulse for political integration of Western Europe and was one of 
the fundamental causes of its realization”.610 The Soviet Union opposed West 








European economic collaboration and the Euro-Atom project, “which will only 
facilitate the division of Europe more”.611  
The Yugoslavs noted the variation on this fundamental Soviet approach 
provided by Khrushchev’s Scandinavian policy. It seemingly “proposed to the 
countries of ‘the small Europe’ a plan an organization for European cooperation, and 
would allow mutual trade and the Euro-Atom” project.612 And yet, the Yugoslav 
analysis continued the goal of Khrushchev’s Scandinavian policy was to allow inter-
Nordic cooperation as a way of “weakening West European collaboration by striving 
to arouse opposition which exists between Western countries, which would divide 
them that much more and in that way weaken their collaboration from inside Western 
organizations, especially NATO”.613 The Yugoslavs saw the new Presidency of 
Charles de Gaulle in France as beneficial for these Soviet goals as pursued through 
Scandinavia. 
The ministry emphasized that the Yugoslav relationship with wider West 
European organizations was more positive, concluding, “Yugoslavia is of the opinion 
that the contemporary concrete forms of regional uniting, especially of West 
European politics and military organizations (NATO), the European Council, the 
West European Union and others, carry in themselves no negative characteristics”.614 
This opinion reflected the Foreign Ministry’s position but not necessarily that of the 
Yugoslav party. The LCY leadership viewed such organizations as instruments of the 
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two-bloc competition, from which Yugoslavia should therefore abstain. But for the 
Foreign Ministry, Yugoslavia needed to take part in the “positive” elements of West 
European integration, for example by working with the Organization for European 
Economic Collaboration (OEEC). This collaboration was preferable, as it was based 
on facilitating bilateral trade relations.  
The conflict of interest between the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and the 
Yugoslav party leadership concerning relations with the Soviet Union (between 
neutralism and Communist ideology) did not result in the permanent reassertion of 
control over foreign policy by the party leadership as the one-party structure of 
Yugoslavia would have implied. It might have been expected that Mićunović, through 
his elevated party position would have been able to prevail in his views on Soviet-
Yugoslav relations over those of his superiors within the Foreign Ministry with little 
connections to Tito’s inner circle. However, this was not the case. Instead, Mićunović 
was moved to a new position within the Party apparatus. The position guaranteed him 
higher leverage within the domestic Yugoslav hierarchy, but not a higher position 
with regard to determining Yugoslav foreign policy.  
Among the key Yugoslav Ministries, the Foreign Ministry had by 1958 
evolved into an institution that produced its own policy agenda independently from 
the Yugoslav party, as its analysis of the Soviet Union in 1958 shows. This is not to 
say that turbulent relations between the Yugoslav and the Soviet party leaderships did 
not surface again. Yugoslav revisionism was criticized by the 21st Soviet Party 




reconciliation between Tito and Leonid Brezhnev in October 1962. However, these 
rhetorical debates remained largely outside of the work of the Foreign Ministry.  
For the Finnish Foreign Ministry, as discussed later in this chapter, Soviet 
pressure on the neutralist Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line worked without such problems of 
ministry and party coordination. Policy came from the office of the Finnish President 
to be implemented through subservient foreign ministry. Soviet foreign policy 
towards Finland sought to head off any government, which was led by another party 
than that of President Kekkonen. This was done in order to prohibit the parliament 
from challenging the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. In the Yugoslav case however, the 
one-party Communist state left the parliament no independent role but tempted the 
Soviets to challenge the party itself. 
 
Soviet-Finnish Relations in 1958: The Year of the “Night 
Frost” 
 
The largest concern for the USSR after the establishment of Finland’s policy 
of neutralism was the prospect of a Social Democratic and Conservative coalition, 
that would challenge the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line and possibly shift Finnish foreign 
policy orientation towards the West. In the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution both parties had gained support for their interest in expanding Western 
ties enough to form a government if they could agree on a coalition. In the July 1958 




Party (NCP) 29, making a proposed coalition of 77 in a total of 200 seats in the 
Finnish parliament. Despite the fact that the SDP had lost six seats and the NCP had 
only gained five, coalition was now possible because Kekkonen’s Agrarians’ Party 
(AP) had lost five seats. In the 1958 elections the AP won 48 seats against the 50 for 
the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL), a coalition to which the Finnish 
Communist Party (SKP) belonged. This made it very difficult for the Agrarians’ Party 
to form a government as the remaining, minority parties were left with only 25 seats 
and three of them belonged to a party unlikely to unite with the AP. Unless it broke 
the general rule among all Finnish parties of excluding prominent Communists Party 
politicians from significant ministerial positions in any governing coalition, even with 
the 22 seats of the minorities’ parties added, the Agrarians could muster only 70 seats, 
versus the 77 seats of the DSP and NCP. Kekkonen fearing a Soviet reaction to a 
government which included both the West-leaning Social Democrats and the 
Conservatives but excluded the SKDL completely, demanded that his Agrarians 
simply not agree to participate in forming an SDP-NCP government.  
Upon the announcement of election results, the Soviet press assumed the 
offensive, sounding-off warnings about the consequences of a Social Democratic-
Conservative government for Finnish-Soviet relations. In the 13 August 1958 
Izvestia, its Helsinki correspondent observed that “the Agrarians’ Party has in recent 
years played the most significant role in Finnish politics, it would therefore be 
difficult to understand now a withdrawal from those policies”.615 The author blamed 
the “the faltering of some of the Agrarians’ Party’s political leaders who begun to 
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consider the formation of a coalition government with the united bloc of rightwing 
Social Democrats and the Conservatives”.616 The article sternly warned the 
Agrarians’ Party against “incredible forgetfulness” of the Social Democrats and 
Conservatives’ “real purpose especially in terms of foreign policy.”617 Soviet 
propaganda highlighted the Conservatives’ goal of changing Finnish political 
orientation exclusively towards the West and of the danger of their co-opting the 
Social Democrats to pursue this goal. The obvious Soviet goal was to promote a 
majority government of Agrarians and Communists. 
To emphasize the significance of the Soviet message in Moscow, the Deputy 
Foreign Minister Georgi Zarubin raised the article with the Finnish Ambassador Eero 
Wuori even twice on the day of its publication, first at a luncheon concerning fishing 
rights and again at a Danish Embassy reception in the evening.618 Referring to the 
Agrarians’ Party’s ‘divided’ position on forming a coalition government, Zarubin 
repeatedly warned “how dangerous for Finland it would be if the political parties 
begin to divide internally.”619 The matter of friendly political parties deviating from 
the Soviet line would prove to be a concern that stretched beyond Finland to Italy as 
well as to Yugoslavia.  
Not limiting itself to grim warnings, the Soviet press also tried to counter the 
Social Democrats and the Conservatives by bolstering the profile of the Finnish 
Communist Party. On 30 August 1958 Pravda published an extensive article by the 








Finnish Communist Hertta Kuusinen together with a story about the 40th anniversary 
of the party distributed by the TASS news agency.620 
Such Soviet scrutiny and pressure caused deep concern in the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry. The ministry expressed reservations over the “very strict surveillance of the 
political situation in Finland over the summer” 1958 which was “not confined to the 
realm of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which is very well aware of the situation in 
Finland, down to specific personal details, but also that of the rest of the Soviet 
apparatus”.621 A most glaring example of this cryptic reference to the security 
apparatus was when Finnish Military Attaché was made to answer questions about 
Finnish party politics upon his visit on military matters to the Moscow barracks 
“pointing to the all around surveillance of Finland” even by the Soviet military.622 By 
the end of August, Ambassador Wuori was exasperated. As he put it, “recently I have 
had the distinct displeasure of not being able to avoid the question ‘is the Finnish 
governmental crisis over?’ from any Soviet official anywhere…in the current context 
[of Soviet pressure] this intense interest does not confine itself exclusively to a 
compliment”.623  
The Foreign Ministry was placed in the very difficult position of having to 
receive all of the Soviet pressure to stop the formation of a SDP-NCP government 
and yet having no influence in the negotiations over a new government. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the ministry had been obliged to carry out the politics of the Paasikivi-
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Kekkonen Line since 1948. By 1958, the ministry, not an autonomous institution as 
the Yugoslav one, was working under the direct guidance from Kekkonen as 
President and co-founder of “the Line.” Ambassador Wuori carried on a detailed and 
frequent correspondence with Kekkonen himself, as noted in Kekkonen’s private 
Diary.624 In 1954, Kekkonen’s closest collaborator within the Agrarians’ Party, 
Johannes Virolainen, had replaced Kekkonen as Foreign Minister. Between 1957 and 
1958 the ministry was lead by Paavo Johannes Hynninen who was without party 
affiliation and therefore easily co-opted by Kekkonen. This combination gave the 
ministry no direct line to the SDP or the NCP, but only one to Kekkonen. Wuori and 
Kekkonen shared concern over the Soviet reaction to a Social Democratic-
Conservative government. But since Wuori’s closest contact was the President, who 
proved to be unable to prevent his own party from joining an SDP-NCP led 
government, Wuori found the ministry without leverage to raise its concerns over 
effects of the future government on Finnish-Soviet relations. Whereas in Yugoslavia 
in 1958, the ministry advised and led the party in foreign policy, in Finland the 
Foreign Ministry was lead by President Kekkonen until the Soviet reaction to the 
SDP-NCP government interrupted his ability to do so. On 25 August First Deputy 
Prime Minister Frol Kozlov approached Wuori, pointing out that “concerning the 
question of the future parliament, from the Soviet perspective, it would be most 
important above all, that the relations would be able to continue to develop in friendly 
spirit”.625 This led the customarily even-tempered Wuori to reply with considerable 
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frustration “as far as I know the importance of friendly relations is generally 
understood in Finland”.626 
On August 29, a new government consisting of eight seats for the Social 
Democratic-Conservative coalition and seven for the Agrarians’ Party and Minorities 
parties was formed under a Social Democratic Prime Minister, Karl-August 
Fagerholm.627 The outcome left Soviet representatives dissatisfied. SKDL was left 
completely out of the government. The Kremlin further objected to the appointment 
of Social Democrats Väinö Leskinen as Social Minister and Olavi Lindholm as the 
Second Minister of Transport and General Works. They had fought in the Second 
World War against the Soviet Union and were known to have supported the Whites in 
the Finnish Civil War. For the first time in his political career Kekkonen was 
devastated. In his diary Kekkonen writes “when I read the open letter of appointment 
[to the cabinet] I told them that ‘this is the worst speech which I as President have 
delivered, and it doesn’t help much that it was written by others.’”628 Kekkonen 
privately added “now we must end the talk about a Paaskivi-Kekkonen Line…this is 
so ****** miserable. All the work I have done in domestic as well as foreign politics 
seems to be drifting into sand….someone in the Agrarians’ Party’s meeting had said, 
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‘although it is risky we should try to see whether the ice breaks with a stick”.629 
Kekkonen was outraged that in return for ministerial seats the Agrarians’ had decided 
to ‘test’ Finnish-Soviet relations. The next day Heikki Waris, the previous Social 
Minister 1957-1958 from the Social Democratic Party, informed Kekkonen that he 
was traveling to Washington ‘on confidential matters’ to discuss loans from the 
World Bank and credits from the US government.630 This led Kekkonen in his own 
words to explode, “I said do you ****** wood log-heads not understand that 
[acquiring increased US funding] is a completely impossible foreign political act after 
the formation of this new government?”631 With the Social Democrats and 
Conservatives in power, Waris left, over Kekkonen’s objections. On September 1, 
Kekkonen wrote the Agrarians’ Party’s leadership a chilling personal letter which 
described his feeling of betrayal of those party leaders that had descended his 
instructions not to join the government that, and how he felt they had jeopardized the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line,  
After the solution which the AP’s central government and group made 
in the matter of forming the government, I must state that the work 
which I have performed since 1944 in domestic and in foreign policy 
is drifting out of my hands. I ask that the publications of your party 
will no longer refer to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, because it no 
longer politically exists. It is similarly pointless to speak of a Paasikivi 
Line, it is best that you begin to speak of a NCP-[SDP] formula in 
‘entire nations’ line. To quote the historian dedicated to the SDP 
‘Paasikivi was only a transitory politician’. Signed U.K.  
 
Ps. I will serve as President the remainder of my term, if that is alright 
with you, so that I will not cause harm to foreign political position of 
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the country. I am following the actions of the AP with warm 
interest.632 
 
Kekkonen felt that not only had he been personally betrayed, so had his partner 
Paasikivi, recently deceased in 1956.   
With no faith in the new government, Kekkonen told its new Foreign Minister 
Virolainen (at other times Kekkonen’s closest confidant), that he objected to the visit 
of Waris to the US. “You are like children at the playground”, he said, “if foreign 
policy was handled like this in the 1930s [referring to the last time NCP had been in 
government] it is no wonder that we ended up in a war”.633 The same day, Kekkonen 
circumvented even the Foreign Ministry, which was under his own influence, to meet 
with “Mr. G” who in fact was none other than Vladimir Zhenihov, the KGB’s 
Helsinki Resident. Zhenihov would now pass on Kekkonen’s communications to the 
Kremlin until December 1958. It is not possible to know if Zhenihov, or the KGB had 
played a previous role in Kekkonen’s dealings with Moscow because his diary begins 
only in 1958. However, during what became known as the “Night Frost” crisis, 
Kekkonen communicated with Zhenihov or another KGB contact weekly. Zhenihov 
confirmed to Kekkonen that “the Soviet Union regards the new government very 
negatively and considers its purpose to change the foreign policy of Finland.”634 
While Kekkonen tried to “convince [Zhenihov] that the foreign policy direction will 
not change, after all that depends on me,” Zhenihov replied that the Kremlin 
“believes in that, but the Soviet Union considers this as the first postwar attempt to 
break Finland’s foreign political line, and if this succeeds next time the attempts will 
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go further.”635  Kekkonen asked that the Kremlin not commence a “newspaper war”, 
to which Zhenihov agreed. This however, was not a promise that the Kremlin kept. 
 In response to the new coalition, the Soviets froze all diplomatic exchanges 
with Finland and begun to publish intense attacks on the government. Khrushchev 
himself would later in January 1959 call his strategy the setting of a ‘Night Frost’ 
over Finnish-Soviet relations. Articles celebrating anniversaries of different events in 
the Second World War such as the 14th anniversary of the signing of the Finnish-
Soviet armistice, covered by Izvestija in 19 September 1958, begun to appear.636 The 
article underlined the benefits to Finland from the normalization of relations with the 
Soviet Union, adding that friendly relations are not supported by all Finnish 
politicians, “those belonging to Leskinen’s influence and the NCP members who 
stand behind them are Western reactionaries who calculate that they can fulfill their 
foreign political wishes.”637  At the same time, the Soviet press attacked the Finnish 
media. On September 23, Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article titled “From the 
Point of View of the Retarded” which attributed anti-Soviet sentiment in the Finnish 
press to the fact that the alleged conservative Aatos Erkko owned the main Finnish 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat; it was for this reason that the Social Democratic press 
had turned from the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. The article drew an unfavorable 
comparison between the “retarded thinking of these publications” and the “clear-
headed thinking” of the Swedish-Finnish press that supported Kekkonen’s Agrarians, 
commenting that many Finnish Swedes belonged to the landowning class but still 
held this view. 
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To Kekkonen, the Soviet press attacks were an extremely unwelcome 
development. He had already in the summer of 1957 remarked while viewing the 
Yugoslav-Soviet war of words in the press that “newspaper polemics between 
Finland and the Soviet Union would be detrimental.”638 Anticipating the onset of a 
rhetorical war in Finnish-Soviet relations in early September 1958 Kekkonen 
commented to himself in his diary that “the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line has been 
replaced by Sack-Line: you put a sack over your head and proceed running around in 
a circle.”639 Yet, as with Yugoslavia, Kekkonen did not anticipate an actual military 
conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union. He considered that “it is also difficult 
for the USSR to act against Finland because Finland is the display window for Soviet 
peaceful co-existence politics to the world.”640 Kekkonen however believed that if the 
Kremlin thought that Finland had stepped too far away, and he himself was not able 
to contain the provocation in time, then a Soviet military reaction was also possible, 
explicitly as in Hungary in 1956. 
The Soviet intellectual world played its own part in the censure and 
intimidation of the Finnish government. In November, the Military Club in Moscow 
hosted a lecture on the topic of “current international political situation” in its lecture 
series “For the Spread of Universal Knowledge.”641 The first question put it bluntly: 
Why had relations between Finland and Soviet Union grown colder in recent days? 
The lecturer replied that although the “National Democrats” (referring to the SKDL) 
had won a considerable majority in the elections, “reactionary forces” had still been 
                                                 
638 Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat,  31.8.1958, 111. 
639 Ibid. 12.9.1958, 115. 
640 Ibid. 





able to form a government. “The goal of these reactionary circles,” the lecturer 
asserted, “is to push Finland closer to the West and America.”642 
The USSR enlisted its satellites in more subtle rebukes. When the Finnish 
government hosted a reception to celebrate Finnish independence day 6 December 
1958, the ambassadors of the Soviet bloc members protested by attending stag, 
leaving their wives at home in protest.643 High-level Soviet diplomats boycotted the 
event entirely. Though the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry did in fact attend, Khrushchev himself stayed away, sending only 
his deputies from the Presidium, Kozlov and Aleksey Kosygin. The higher-level 
officials were replaced by representatives of the Soviet arts and sciences, which for 
the increasingly agitated Ambassador Wuori “was actually a refreshing change” since 
the Soviets normally worked to censor both the arts and science.644  
In these circumstances, instead of the Foreign Ministry restraining anti-Soviet 
expressions in Finland, Kekkonen did so directly. In October he personally prevented 
the publication of a confessional book titled “A Communist as Minister of the 
Interior” by one of the leading Finnish members of the Communist Party which 
outlined how Yrjö Leino was trained by Moscow and how he had been able to 
advance his political career in the Finnish Parliament with the help of the Soviet 
Communist Party.645 Kekkonen considered that in the future the Kremlin would make 
increasing demands for the SKDL to be included in any government, and considered 
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SDP and Fagerholm to be behind attempts to publish it.646  Including any Communist 
in a Finnish government would become even more implausible after the publications 
of such a book. Kekkonen personally stopped further publication of a Finnish cartoon 
imitating Ilya Repin’s famous painting ‘Burlaks on the Volga’ which portrays 
impoverished poor people pulling expensive ship belonging to the nobility on to the 
shore in 1870s Russia. The Finnish cartoon by Kari Suomalainen had replaced the 
enslaved Burlaks with Soviet bloc states, and on board the ship, Khrushchev was 
shouting out “be ashamed you imperialists.”647 The cartoon (already having been 
displayed in London) was scheduled to be placed on a four-story billboard facing the 
UN headquarters in New York. The subtext of the cartoon was that Ukrainian Repin 
had actually retired to Kuokkala in Finland at the end of his career. Despite the many 
requests by the Soviet government for him to return to the USSR after Finnish 
independence in 1917, he had not done so. Moreover, Kuokkala had been lost to the 
Soviet Union in the postwar settlement. The cartoon was meant to remind the Finnish 
public of all of these embarrassing details.  
On 27 October 1958 the Councilor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow 
Zoran Perišić met with the Finnish First Secretary Salomies at an event in the Iranian 
Embassy. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry wished to know “whether the recent strong 
articles criticizing the Government of Finland in the Soviet press meant that Finland 
and the Soviet Union had arrived at the point of ‘frozen relations’ after the elections 
and the forming of the new government?”648 Salomies confirmed that the relations 
had grown cold citing as its most significant proof that the Soviets “did not begin the 
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scheduled negotiations for the credit of 400 - 500 million rubles for the construction 
of a metallurgical plant at all, as was projected after Kekkonen’s [May 1958] visit.”649 
Further, “the negotiations over the use of the Saimaa Canal had been stopped 
completely” and “the negotiations for the following trade agreement need to begin but 
the Russians do not show any desire for them and refuse to set the dates.”650 The 
indefinite delay in the trade negotiations was a proven Soviet tactic against Finland 
and Yugoslavia in 1948 and in1953 as discussed in Chapters 1-3. More importantly 
“Soviet Ambassador [Vladimir] Lebedev was pulled from Helsinki a month ago 
[September 16], but a new one has not been named, and neither have the Soviets 
requested a protocol for a new one”.651 In fact, Zhenihov had told Kekkonen privately 
already September 8, :  
The position of Moscow [regarding trade relations] is negative, 
rational and final. The position will be one of passivity [towards 
Finland], except on some concrete questions, in which a negative 
stance can surface quickly…It would be best that those who wish to 
continue good Finnish relations with the Soviet Union seek maximum 
benefit [from the absence of trade]. The Soviet Union does not wish to 
conclude a trade agreement with Finland if this is bad for Finland, 
therefore it is better that the negotiations do not start at all.652 
 
Zhenihov implied that economic difficulties might force the government to fall. 
 
The Soviet policy of refusing to conduct normal diplomatic relations was 
confirmed to an interested Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on November 5, when the 
Yugoslav Deputy Military Attaché Mutić met with the Finnish Deputy Military 
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Attaché Raisinen over dinner to discuss Finnish-Soviet relations.653 Raisinen 
confirmed that the Russians continued to stall on all trade negotiations.  
Regarding credits which the USSR needed still to approve for Finland 
from their side, Raisinen thinks that nothing will come of that. Based 
upon an earlier agreement these negotiations needed to begin at the 
latest by October 20. The Finnish delegation had already waited, as he 
says, two months for an invitation to start negotiations, but still have 
not received one.654  
 
Raisinen openly admitted that the reason for the Soviet approach was “that the 
Russians are not satisfied with the composition of the current Finnish government, 
which they say has a ‘rightist character’”. Raisinen told Perišić of the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry’s concern over the growing strain in Finnish-Soviet relations. Raisinen 
“pointed out how Finland has altogether four million people and the USSR close to 
200 million and they have in to every matter carry out friendly politics with the 
USSR” based on this calculation alone. 
 
Finnish Analysis of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1957-1958  
 
The Finnish Foreign Ministry recognized that Soviet disapproval of the political 
change in Finland was compounded by the situation in Yugoslavia. There were strong 
parallels between the Soviet pressure on the Finns and their excoriation of Yugoslav 
party leadership in November of 1958. In their analysis of the continued Soviet 
denunciations of the Yugoslav leadership, the Finnish Ministry noted a strong 
                                                 





polemical article in the November 1958 issue of the journal Communist  B.N. 
Ponomarjev.  
 
Leaders of rightwing Social Democratic parties have renewed their visits to 
Yugoslavia attempting to transmit to the Yugoslavs their experiences of 
serving the imperialists and the betrayal of both socialism and the working 
class. Folk wisdom says ‘state the name of your friends, and I will tell you 
who you are’. Facts point out that the leadership of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party, after having stepped on to the shaky road of ‘national 
Communism’ are sinking deeper and deeper into the swamp of opportunism, 
and further away from socialist ideals.655  
 
The Foreign Ministry considered that one of the purposes of the article was to prevent 
closer cooperation between the Finnish Social Democrats now in charge of the 
government and Yugoslavia. Despite the Soviet pressure, in November the SDP-NCP 
government continued to hope that Khrushchev would sustain his “realist politics” he 
had pursued since 1955 and would come to accept the government eventually. The 
ministry however, found it increasingly worrisome that Ponomarjev found absolutely 
no redeeming qualities in the Yugoslav political situation. The article “does not refer 
to anything positive in Soviet relations with the Yugoslav state [outside the Party], 
but condemns with ferocity the neutral position adopted by Yugoslavia.”656 
Ambassador Wuori consulted his “trusted Yugoslav source” in Moscow in November 
1958 but both concluded that “it is necessary to wait and see what will be the final 
orientation of the Soviet leadership towards the Yugoslav state.”657 
As Wuori told Kekkonen on October 14,  
I am worried about the fact that there was complete ‘rest’ between the 
USSR and Finland, as between USSR and Yugoslavia. Nothing is 
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happening. Only one Finnish businessman is in Moscow. Rauma-
Repola [company] has made an offer to renew the machinery in four 
paper factories in the Soviet Union, but now Swedish industrialists 
have visited those same factories. No one will talk to Finns.658  
 
Overall, Finnish analysis for 1958 concluded that Soviet foreign relations had 
become more anxious, especially in pressing for high-level negotiations with the 
United States. The Finns noted with special concern that  “the continued Soviet desire 
to demonstrate their critical attitude towards the Yugoslav Communist Party by 
refusing to attend its [7th] Party Congress and in that way effecting also the refusal to 
attend of all Soviet ‘bloc’ states”.659 These actions were interpreted as steps toward 
“strengthening the Soviet bloc” through a hostile campaign against a “neutral 
bordering state.” Finnish analysts became increasingly concerned when the Soviet 
critique was accompanied by Khrushchev’s visits to Hungary and Voroshilov’s to 
Poland.660 The Finnish Foreign Ministry interpreted these visits as direct criticism of 
Yugoslavia: first, they noted that Hungary was, in contrast to Yugoslavia, a bloc state 
par excellence; second, they pointed out that Voroshilov had been originally 
scheduled to visit Yugoslavia in May of 1958, only to cancel his state visit on the 
morning of his scheduled arrival. This put the Yugoslavs in the embarrassing position 
of having to first erect, then hurriedly dissemble banners of welcome for him in 
Belgrade.661 Mićunović, still in Moscow in early May, guessed that Voroshilov would 
not in fact leave for Belgrade, but because he was made unable to reach any Soviet 
official to verify the cancellation of the visit in time, the banners had to be raised. 
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A Finnish report titled “Yugoslavia – aka ‘Socialist Bloc’s challenger” closely 
connected the emerging discussion of ideological questions within the Soviet press in 
April and May 1958 with the Soviet discrediting of the Yugoslav party leadership.662 
The Soviets trotted out examples of former leaders who had “acted against the Soviet 
Communist Party”, categorically labeling Malenkov, Molotov and others 
“dogmatists”, “servants of dead letters” and “those detached from life”.663 In addition 
to these domestic offenders, the Soviet press called the Party Program of the Austrian 
Social Democratic Party ‘revisionist’. In the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s view, the 
actual goal of this press campaign was to discredit the Yugoslav party leadership, a 
campaign that became worrisome for Finland as well when the Social Democratic-
Conservative government was formed in the fall of 1958. On Yugoslav ratification of 
the program for its 7th Party Congress in May, the Soviet press printed “more or less 
official condemnations of the Yugoslavs by the Communist Parties of other states”, 
including China’s, as wider evidence of Yugoslav deviation.664 These denunciations 
were followed by a plethora of additional propaganda, culminating in the 
aforementioned Pravda article of May 9, dividing up US aid to Yugoslavia as sales 
for specific anti-Soviet speeches and acts. The article appeared following a full 
session of the Central Committee on the issue of Yugoslavia and was read in its 
entirety on Radio Moscow the same day.665  
To the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Pravda attack against the Yugoslav party 
and the previous months’ criticism of domestic and European revisionists were 
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clearly linked. In the ministry’s view, the Yugoslav refusal to sign the 12-Party 
Declaration “called the authority of the Soviet Union into question as ‘the first and 
most experienced socialist country’ for the second time …The Yugoslavs charge the 
Soviet Union and its leadership with seeking hegemony over and suppression of other 
socialist states under their command”.666 The Finnish analysis understood that “the 
Yugoslav [Party] leadership fears being placed under the increasing control of the 
Soviets”.667  
The Finnish Foreign Ministry, like Kekkonen, found this rhetorical battle 
unhelpful to European security and security-oriented neutralism in Europe. For 
Finland, the Soviet charge that US economic aid was a pay-off raised the question of 
whether Finnish-Western trade might also be labeled bribery in the future. As the 
Pravda article put it, “The Imperialists do not give anything to anyone for free”.668 
Finnish reports noted with caution, “Finland is also a state which has received credits 
‘from both sides,’ and from both sides these credits obtained from the opposition are 
being followed with increasing suspicion”.669  
The Finnish analysis found differences in state interests between the Soviet 
Union and of Yugoslavia to be “as alive now without Stalin as they were while Stalin 
was pursuing them…Tito continues to say, ‘Stalin did this and Stalin did that.’ These 
claims cannot conceal the fact that there are factual conflicts of interest between his 
state and that of Stalin’s successors”.670 Beyond the ideological framework, the 
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coherence of the Soviet bloc held primary and practical importance for the Soviets at 
this time. Finnish analysts noted that after the launch of Sputnik and the subsequent 
American initiative for a space program, Yugoslavia’s absence from the Warsaw Pact 
and enrolment in the Balkan Pact with Turkey and Greece acquired a larger 
significance for the Soviet Union, even if the main significance of the Balkan Pact to 
Yugoslavia was as a “security guarantee”.671  
In this context, the occasional unwillingness of the Yugoslav delegation to the 
United Nations (led by Foreign Minister Popović) to abstain from voting against 
Soviet initiatives and several votes for the US position, as on the question of 
recognition of Taiwan was, in the Finnish judgment constituted, a further challenge to 
the Soviet Union.672 Kekkonen wanted to make sure that the Finnish delegation 
would not do the same. Such actions reduced the collective strength of the Soviet bloc 
directly and the Yugoslav “fronting” of their political status outside the Soviet camp 
constituted obstacle to the Soviet foreign policy effort to ratify a “European status 
quo”.673 Finnish conclusions mirrored those of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. Both 
considered the Yugoslav-Soviet party conflict detrimental in that it reflected no 
specific political goal on the part of the Yugoslavs. The Finnish Foreign Ministry 
concluded “from the Yugoslav perspective, it would seem beneficial if Soviet-
Yugoslav relations remained approximately the same” without further interruptions 
from the party.674  
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Two Roads to Repairing Soviet Relations 
In the course of October 1958, Kekkonen grew increasingly worried about a 
further Soviet reaction to the SDP-NCP government. On October 23, Boris Pasternak 
received the Nobel price for literature, and although Pasternak refused to accept it, he 
was ousted from the Union of Soviet Writers. Kekkonen thought that this indicated “a 
world-political hardening in the Soviet Union, since the Soviets were not afraid of the 
criticism of the West to which this act would undoubtedly lead.”675 Simultaneously, 
the SDP continued to consider it possible for Finland to survive without a trade 
agreement with the Soviet Union until spring 1959, and therefore wanted to pursue ‘a 
hard-line’ until then.676 A prominent economist and representative of the Swedish 
People’s Party Nils Meinander, commented that “the scare concerning Finnish-Soviet 
relations and their worsening has been exacerbated. It has been invented by 
Kekkonen in order to strengthen his own position.”677 On November 6, Kekkonen 
demanded that the AP’s Virolainen resign from the post of Foreign Minister. He told 
Virolainen that the only solution to Finnish-Soviet relations was the formation of a 
new government. Virolainen did not agree, instead he argued that Khrushchev would 
come to accept the SDP-NCP government. Virolainen referred directly to Yugoslavia 
as evidence for his position “after all Yugoslavia has received loans from the USSR. 
Therefore Soviet-Yugoslav relations should be an example to us!”678 This Kekkonen 
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found incredible. For him, his Kekkonen-Paasikivi Line was the example for 
Yugoslavia in relations with the Soviets, not the example of party disputes between 
Tito and Khrushchev. 
On November 12, the Finnish Secret Police reported to Kekkonen that the 
Finnish Communist Party had instructed its publications to print rumors that “Finland 
is no longer capable of fulfilling its 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union.”679 His 
aforementioned KBG contact informed Kekkonen that the Kremlin will not change its 
position before the end of December, but that Kekkonen should act by that time.”680 
On November 25 Virolainen agreed to resign. The following day Kekkonen told 
parliamentary groups’ representatives that simple substitutions in the existing 
government would not do and demanded that a new one be formed. Kekkonen then 
met with Zhenihov who promised Kekkonen that “as soon as there is a new 
government Soviet trade agreement would be made and an Ambassador would be 
sent to Helsinki.”681 Wishing to speak with Khrushchev privately, Kekkonen 
proposed that immediately after the forming of a new government he would travel on 
a private trip with his wife to Leningrad. In December Zhenihov informed Kekkonen 
that the Kremlin “does not want official Social Democrats in the government, but 
some Conservative experts and two unknown Communists” and none of the former 
Ministers.682 To this Kekkonen replied simply “No.” The Kremlin further threatened 
to then send either Molotov or Marshal Zhukov as the next Ambassador to 
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Helsinki.683 On December 4 Virolainen’s resignation was made official and later that 
day Fagerholm handed in the resignation of his government to Kekkonen who had 
demanded it. On 13 January 1959 a Conservative minority government consisting 
only of Kekkonen’s Agrarians’ Party and the Swedish People’s Party was formed. It 
contained 15 ministers entirely from the AP.684 Two of the positions Foreign Minister 
and Minister for Trade and Industry were filled by members of the minority by the 
Swedish People’s Party who served for less than a half term each. Kekkonen included 
no Communists or anyone else from the SKDL. Finnish-Soviet relations were thereby 
repaired. 
Now when party pressure towards Tito and Kardelj no longer worked in late 
1958, the Yugoslav Ministry was left to manage relations with no more opportunities 
for the Kremlin to manipulate Yugoslav domestic politics. The ministry was from 
here on able to be the primary originator of foreign policy for Yugoslavia. This it did 
from the basis of the recommendations of its analytical department and Foreign 
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Minister Popović. As Khrushchev’s ability to consume Tito’s and Kardelj’s 
ideological statements was cut off, so was Soviet influence from domestic Yugoslav 
affairs. In Finland however, Soviet policy succeeded in seeing power taken from the 
Social Democrats, who had won enough seats in the Parliament to lead a coalition 
government for the first time since the establishment of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line 
in 1948. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had indeed been jeopardized by the formation 
of the Social Democratic-Conservative government in August 1958. However, by 
January 1959, Kekkonen was a President who commanded the Foreign Ministry and 
was supported by a government in which ministers only from his party served until 
the end of their term 14 July 1961. In 1958, Finnish foreign policy of neutralism was 
thereby preserved, but the parliament that had been influential under Paasikivi no 
longer played any role in foreign policy. Finland was not a one-party state, but its 
foreign policy was directed by a leader of one party, Kekkonen. Simultaneously the 
Foreign Ministry of a one-party Yugoslavia directed its foreign policy based on the 
institution’s collective analysis. In sum, the pursuit of neutralism in Finnish and 
Yugoslav policies toward the Soviet Union in 1958 was a compromise by which none 








Chapter 7: Conclusion and Afterword: From Neutralism to Non-
Alignment 
 
“The smaller European countries displayed a particular eagerness for 
contact with us after the split, for example Scandinavia, Belgium etc… 
and although the volume of trade with them did not increase much, 
their political influence proved useful.” 
Edvard Kardelj in Edvard Kardelj Reminisces685 
 
The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 had one neglected but important consequence for 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry received crucial resources for fighting 
Soviet propaganda attacks against Yugoslavia and went on to build up an independent 
role as well as an international network for representation. This meant operating 
separately, sometimes independently from the daily direction of Josip Broz ‘Tito,’ his 
inner party circle and his presidential Secretariat. Nevertheless, it was Tito himself 
who enabled the Foreign Ministry to assume this relative independence. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Tito had appointed Edvard Kardelj, the second-ranking member of the 
Communist leadership, as the Ministry’s head immediately after Yugoslavia’s 
expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948. Tito then appointed Koča Popović to 
succeed Kardelj as Foreign Minister in 1953. While never a member of Tito’s inner 
party circle, Popović remained in the position until 1966 and expanded the 
international reach and reputation of Yugoslav diplomacy. As noted in Chapter 5, 
when Tito withdrew his close party associate Veljko Mićunović from the post of 
Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow in 1958, he indirectly acknowledged that even 
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Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union were better directed through the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry than through the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.  
The Finnish example was becoming already important during Stalin’s last 
years. On the day that his death was announced in March 1953, the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry wanted first to know the Finnish reaction. From that time forward, as 
detailed in Chapter 3, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry regularly compared notes with 
Finnish analysis of the Soviet Union. In addition, Finland’s policy of neutralism, as 
outlined in the postwar Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, had been an important example for 
the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry as early as 1948. Finland had drafted a foreign policy 
program as seen in Chapter 2, that relied on diplomatic relations to avoid 
confrontation and promote trade, thereby staving off the Soviet imposition of military 
and political obligations. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line gave up West European 
political integration in return for state sovereignty and a political process outside the 
Soviet bloc.  A Finnish Communist Party, loyal to Moscow, continued to exist, but 
none of its leading members were ever included in a postwar government. 
Simultaneously with the Yugoslav-Soviet split, Finland concluded an Agreement on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Unlike 
Yugoslavia, Finland henceforth maintained a closely managed relationship with the 
Kremlin. Between 1948 and 1953, the Finnish example showed the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry that a political position outside the Soviet bloc was possible for a bordering 
state. Yugoslav-Finnish political contacts and cultural exchanges expanded between 




relations with the Soviet Union would greatly help to end the Soviet military and 
economic threat to Yugoslavia. 
Repeated outbursts from Tito and Kardelj against first Stalin, and then Nikita 
Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership asserted the independence of Yugoslavia’s 
Communist party and its policies, but interrupted the Foreign Ministry’s pursuit of 
Finnish-style relations with the USSR. The Ministry, led by the Sorbonne-educated 
Popović and the Ministry’s university-educated officials saw the Tito-Stalin split 
reborn, to Yugoslav disadvantage, as an ideological argument between the two party 
leaderships that challenged the Belgrade and Moscow agreements with the Kremlin in 
1955 and 1956. These arguments not only impeded the pursuit of broader diplomatic 
and trade relations but also threatened to divert policy priorities and resources away 
from the Foreign Ministry. Popović had already used his position to facilitate the 
signing of the Balkan Pact (1953-1954), the resolution of the Trieste question (1954) 
and the expanding of Yugoslav relations with the Western governments. Beyond 
economic and political cooperation, he even discussed a military connection with 
NATO. Significantly, as noted in Chapter 3, he eliminated the de facto influence of 
the Yugoslav Security Service (UDBa). Nothing came of the NATO talk, but from 
1953, Popović asked his Foreign Ministry to pursue a course balanced between good 
relations with the Soviet Union and the freedom to explore other non-military 
relations. The model for this kind of foreign policy was found in Finland. 
By 1958 however, it had become clear to the Foreign Ministry that if 
Yugoslavia, like Finland, wished to remain outside the Soviet bloc, its relations could 




that they would side with the Soviet Union in support of East Germany and its claim 
to West Berlin. Tito, Kardelj and Mićunović (independently of Popović and the 
Foreign Ministry) had sanctioned Soviet military action in Hungary in November of 
that year, as explained in Chapter 4, in order to preserve one-party Communist rule 
there. Yugoslavia’s involvement in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising quickly 
became public. The abortive revolution’s Communist leader Imre Nagy had taken 
refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, where the Yugoslav Ambassador—loyal to the 
Ministry— had welcomed him.686 Tito and the rest of the party leadership 
subsequently insisted upon turning him over to Hungarian (read Soviet) officials, 
which lead to Nagy’s long detention and execution in 1958. But Tito and the 
Yugoslav party’s support of the Soviet’s maintenance of control over bloc members 
was not enough for the Kremlin. The renewal of ties between the Yugoslav and 
Soviet parties in 1956 soon led Khrushchev, as we saw in Chapter 5, to push Tito to 
sign the 12-Party Agreement recognizing the hegemony of the Soviet party over other 
Communist parties in 1957.  The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry joined Tito and Kardelj 
in arguing that this would make Yugoslavia a de facto part of the Soviet bloc. The 
Yugoslav ‘no’ to the 12-Party Agreement led to another escalating war of words 
between Tito and Kardelj on one side, Khrushchev and the Soviet party on the other.  
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry saw Finland facing a similar rupture in 
relations with the Soviets in 1958, as also noted in Chapter 5. The successful postwar 
assertion of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, had exempted Finland from pressure to 
join the bloc after 1948. The Yugoslav Ministry had since 1953 recognized the 
success and usefulness of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line and sought to follow its 
                                                 




practice in maintaining a working relationship with Moscow while building bilateral 
political and trade ties with the West. But by early 1959, the Ministry had come to the 
conclusion that such a policy that focused on the European balance of power would 
not be sufficient to safeguard Yugoslav independence.  Despite Tito’s approval of the 
Soviet military action in Hungary, it became clear that the Yugoslav security 
guarantee for the Soviet bloc border, now like Finland’s, was not enough for Soviet 
leadership. At least it was not enough if Tito and Kardelj kept challenging the Soviet 
Union with polemics presented in the international press. To pursue peaceful relations 
with the Soviets, the Yugoslav party would have to demonstrate submission to or at 
least silence towards the Soviet party. Khrushchev, had traveled to Belgrade in 1955 
to apologize for Stalin’s refusal to accept Yugoslavia’s independent Communist path; 
now in by 1957 he was asking Yugoslavia to acknowledge the inferior position of its 
party and ideology.  
The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line demanded the pursuit of stable, cordial and 
extensive trade and diplomatic ties. This was impossible for Yugoslavia as long the 
Soviets periodically challenged Tito and Kardelj to a duel; a duel that they were 
generally all too eager to join. As for the Finnish example, the Yugoslav Ministry 
watched the Kremlin bring down a pro-Western Social-Democrat-Conservative 
government in 1958 by suspending diplomatic relations, interrupting trade and 
attacking the government in the press. In bringing it down, the Soviet Union dealt 
directly with President Kekkonen, a model for relations which the Yugoslav Ministry 
had no desire to replicate. In the Yugoslav Ministry’s view, the Soviets had 




had been able to exclude all Communists and even socialists from the government 
that would last from 1959 to 1961, it had still required the Kremlin’s approval. This 
rendered the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line far less appealing to the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry in 1959 than it had been in 1948 or 1953. Moreover, the so-called “Night 
Frost Crisis” was not resolved to the benefit of an independent Finnish Foreign 
Ministry. The Ministry remained under Kekkonen’s effective control. The Yugoslav 
Ministry concluded that all this meant a Soviet reassertion of control over Helsinki. 
Between 1959 and 1961, Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry began to seek out 
connections beyond Europe, turning away from Finland in the process. The Ministry 
felt that in order to avoid the Finnish predicament and to increase its own 
independence, the Yugoslav version of neutralism should focus on non-Communist 
states beyond the Soviets’ immediate purview. Foreign Minister Kardelj’s 1949 
speech, delivered at the United Nation’s General Assembly, had already expressed 
Yugoslav interest in the less-developed, non-European members. As he turned to the 
Tito-Stalin split Kardelj stated that, “the attitude of the USSR towards Yugoslavia is 
enough to show that the Soviet government cannot always be seen as the interpreter 
of contemporary aspirations for peace and democracy.”687 Kardelj linked 
Yugoslavia’s economically disadvantaged position not only to the Soviet conflict but 
to the problems of less developed countries in general, “This is precisely why the 
offering of economic help as a means of developing and strengthening the 
independence of the less developed countries is an open question in the world today. 
There is no doubt that this is a problematic aspect of the work of the UN; 
                                                 




nevertheless, its resolution should be among our most urgent tasks.”688 In 1949 
Kardelj was appealing to the United Nations for more United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Aid (UNRRA).689  
A decade later, his comments came in handy for the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry as they searched for a precedent in forming ties with newly independent 
African and Asian states. Their number had increased significantly since Yugoslavia 
had begun what was then a search for wider bilateral relations, outside the Soviet 
orbit, with embassies opened in New Delhi and Rangoon in 1950. 690 In the decade 
after the Tito-Stalin split the number of Yugoslav embassies nearly doubled, from 53 
embassies in 1948 to 91 in 1958. In 1948 Yugoslavia had diplomatic relations with 64 
countries. 691 By the end of that year Kardelj had created embassies in most of these 
states, as evidenced by the number 53. Popović actively sought diplomatic relations 
with additional states and increased the number of embassies accordingly. The 
number of Yugoslav Embassies in the 1950s is particularly impressive when 
compared to the First Yugoslavia, which in 1939 had only 31 embassies. 692 Tito, 
always fond of international travel, now toured this longer list of non-European states 
extensively. In 1958 and 1959 he visited Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Egypt. In 1961 he went to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, 
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Tunisia and Egypt. By this time, Yugoslavia was ready to be more than the observer 
to the Asian stirrings of the mid-1950s that would now become the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Tito’s brief meetings with India’s Nehru and Egypt’s Nasser in 1956, as 
acknowledged in the Introduction, now served as building blocks to connect to these 
stirrings.   
Between 1959 and 1961 the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry begun to promote 
cooperation with African and Asian states based on these previous contacts. Popović 
remained uninterested in an ideological approach to these new partners. He ordered 
the Ministry to examine practical arrangements, such as Yugoslav arms sales to 
Rangoon. Already in 1958 Tito had agreed to the withdrawal of his close associate 
Mićunović from Moscow, a clear sign that he was willing to let Popović guide the 
Ministry and Yugoslav foreign policy. Between 1959 and 1961, the Ministry 
discussed furthering bilateral relations with Asia and Africa, ties that would now lead 
to association with the emergence of a formal Non-Aligned Movement. The Yugoslav 
turn began only after 1958, after the Finnish-Soviet ‘Night Frost Crisis’ and the 
renewed freeze in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Only the Yugoslav interest after 1958 
led to the Belgrade conference of 1961 when 32 heads of state, mostly from Asia and 
Africa, met to launch the Movement. The Non-Aligned framework presented 
Yugoslavia with a new extra-European opportunity. The Ministry could easily bring 
Tito on board as the Presidential representative of Yugoslav foreign policy. The 
Asian and African context also offered Tito’s public persona room to breathe outside 




To Popović’s displeasure, the Yugoslav policy of Non-Alignment did come to 
be known for its ideological position. The influence of previous Yugoslav policy of 
accepting Soviet security interests could still be seen in the Non-Aligned Movement’s 
siding with Soviets on the questions of West Berlin and East Germany. These were 
positions that supported Soviet policy in Europe, which hardly could have been a 
priority to any of the other African and Asian states more concerned with anti-
Colonialism than the significance of a divided Germany. This Non-Alignment, not 
fully in place until 1961, would distinguish Yugoslav and Finnish foreign policy from 
one another from 1961 onwards. The Yugoslav Ministry would nonetheless continue 
its close attention to Finnish relations with the Soviet Union and unite with 
Kekkonen’s interest in launching the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe in 1975. 
Neutralism as Political Strategy 
In this dissertation I have juxtaposed the development, content and purpose of 
two parallel but separate political strategies of neutralism. Neutralism is a concept not 
often defined or examined in detail. It is often understood as an ideology. Historians 
of Yugoslavia such as Duncan Wilson have referred to it as “some such policy.”693 As 
an ideological construct, neutralism is supposed to imply non-adherence to 
predominant power structures, such as the Soviet and Western blocs in the Cold War. 
Understood as an ideology, neutralism is purported to have a superior political quality 
in that it is expected to oppose militarism and preclude military conflict. This comes 
from the legal concept of neutrality, according to which the legal status of abstention 
                                                 




from participation in a war between other states and the maintenance of an attitude of 
impartiality toward the belligerents can be claimed.694  
What do the two separate Finnish and Yugoslavia examples comparatively tell 
us about neutralism? Two political leaders, Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, 
at the end of the Second World War conceptualized the Finnish policy of neutralism. 
Both had intimate knowledge of Russia and the Soviet Union, as we saw in Chapter 
2. Paasikivi worked as State Treasurer at the turn of the 20th century when Finland 
was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Tsarist Russia. Kekkonen began his career 
within the Finnish police force and worked to build up the Secret Police (SUPO). Its 
main purpose was surveillance of Soviet representatives or their Finnish contacts. 
Both men participated in negotiations with the Soviet Union in the closing days of the 
Second World War. For them, neutralism was not based on an ideological 
commitment to any form of non-militarism. Instead it was a political strategy 
designed to get Finland out of facing renewed military intervention from the Soviet 
Union. Its purpose was to prevent another unwinable confrontation with the Red 
Army and to keep Finland from becoming part of what became the emerging Soviet 
bloc. Paasikivi and Kekkonen did not choose neutralism because they thought it was 
the best possible foreign policy. Securing independence militarily and then pursuing 
ties with the West was a better option in their view. Since this was impossible, 
especially when the Soviet Union became a postwar superpower, the Finnish policy 
of neutralism accepted the payment of heavy war reparations, the permanent loss of 
Karelia, and the temporary loss of the Porkkala naval base in 1948. It thereby 
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admitted Finland’s war guilt but did not forfeit state sovereignty. With the drafting 
and signing in 1948 of the Finnish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, this Finnish policy of neutralism sought to guarantee to the Soviet 
Union that Finland would not join a military alliance with the West. Finnish 
neutralism promised to limit cooperation with the West to trade which it also would 
carry out with the Soviet Union. Finnish neutralism was a political and economic 
bargain with the Soviet Union that allowed Finland to remain outside the Soviet bloc.  
 The Yugoslav policy of neutralism, as shaped by its Foreign Ministry, was 
similarly a political strategy and not an ideological commitment. It followed the 
Finnish example and was a reaction to the Tito-Stalin split. Similarly to Finland, 
Yugoslavia needed to avoid a military conflict with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav 
Ministry saw its best strategy to achieve an independent position outside the Soviet 
bloc as the building up of formal diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet 
Union. Yugoslavia could use them to demonstrate that it would not challenge the 
Soviet Union or the borders of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. This, the Ministry 
hoped, would leave Yugoslavia free to pursue bilateral trade and political relations 
outside the Soviet orbit. Yet Tito and Kardelj insisted that ideological distinction in 
the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split was needed if Yugoslavia were to assert its 
independence from the Soviet Union. The two party leaders demanded that their 
presumed ideological superiority not only justified the split but now defined the 
states’ political independence as well. The Cold War was a competition between two 
ideological systems of government, and Tito and Kardelj as ardent Marxists argued 




grounds. In 1956 and 1957, their affirming outbursts against the Soviet Union 
competed with Yugoslav Foreign Ministry’s policy of neutralism. Yet in the face of 
this renewed conflict with Khrushchev’s Kremlin, the Ministry won back priority in 
foreign relations by 1958.  
 Yugoslav and Finnish relations with the Soviet Union between 1948 and 1958 
tell us that neutralism is at best a successful political strategy of smaller states against 
states with larger political and/or military power. This is its only connection to 
formerly colonial states. In itself, neutralism does not suggest nor guarantee anti-
militarism. Neither Paasikivi, Kekkonen, nor Popović were pacifists. They were also 
not ideologues. Neutralism was only applied as a second best strategy when 
confrontation was not a tenable option. Nor does neutralism imply moral impunity for 
its practitioners. Finnish non-reaction to and Yugoslav sanctioning of Soviet military 
action against the Hungarian revolution displays such a failing. But when Walter 
Laqueur raised the undesirable ‘Specter of Finlandization’ in his 1977 essay, cited in 
the Introduction, his concern that Finnish accommodation with the Soviet Union had 
extended beyond the necessities of its geopolitical situation prompted a wider worry. 
The other European states might turn to this sort of neutralism in the optimistic 1970s 
atmosphere of détente that obscured the clear and present danger still posed, for 
Laqueur and many others, but the Soviet Union. In identifying the sort of “domestic 
adjustment” he feared from the Finnish model for “behaving responsibly”, he pointed 
only to self-censorship and Kekkonen’s long tenure as President.695 For Laqueur, its 
policy of neutralism had made Finland a client state of the Soviet Union. To him the 
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Finnish policy presented “a slow almost imperceptible retreat from independence – 
not just in foreign affairs but also on the domestic front.”696 In terms of foreign policy 
he fairly points to Finnish abstention from voting at the United Nations in favor of 
demanding that Soviet troops leave Hungary in 1956 and the general silence over the 
Hungarian revolution by the Finnish political leadership, as discussed here in Chapter 
4.697 But on the domestic front, as we have seen, the Finnish policy of neutralism did 
not lead to such an internal accommodation until 1958. Then, as we saw in Chapter 5, 
Kekkonen’s direct consultation with the KGB in Helsinki in the fall of 1958 to broker 
Finnish-Soviet relations and his subsequent bringing down of the government of 
political opponents in order to rescue the Finnish policy of neutralism does indeed 
support Laqueur’s critique. But changing the course by 1961, Kekkonen’s Agrarians’ 
Party government would be forced out by new elections. In 1961, Kekkonen signed 
off on Finland’s accession to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an 
associate member, marking a clear step away from its Soviet neighbor.  
In conclusion, as the Finnish and the Yugoslav examples from the 1950s 
show, a policy of neutralism can help a state gain or maintain state sovereignty. It can 
lead to successful economic policies and trade ties. Through its very visible successes 
neutralism can provide its promoters, in the Finnish case President Kekkonen and in 
the Yugoslav case the Foreign Ministry, more political autonomy than would be 
expected, more time to pursue political goals than would be otherwise be admitted. 
For the three years of his constructed government, Kekkonen did abuse that 
autonomy in the name of neutralism. As for Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry it would 
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unfortunately not be joined by other strong and relatively independent federal 
ministries needed for Yugoslavia to have a chance to survive after Tito. Neutralism, 
unlike its mythic ideology is not policy of moral right or wrong.698 It is however a 
political strategy of compromise. In the Finnish and the Yugoslav cases, it was a 
foreign policy of postwar compromise acted out at time of continuing political 
uncertainty. We may conclude that neutralism as a political strategy served the 
purpose of getting Finland and Yugoslavia out of some very difficult situations from 




                                                 
698 For a definition of the myth of Yugoslav Non-Alignment see the Introduction pages 16-24; for a 
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